The former head of Saudi Arabia’s intelligence service considers Hekmatyar complicit in the assassination of Abdullah Azzam.
Author: Mahfuz
Hekmatyar lacked moral judgment, insisted on seizing Kabul by force, and formed an “unholy alliance” with a communist; after calling Iran a “heretical state,” he took refuge there and later offered himself to Kabul and the Americans.
Prince Turki al-Faisal Al Saud, head of Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Directorate from 1977 to 2001 and overseer of the Afghan portfolio during the anti-Soviet jihad, gives a highly critical assessment of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in his book The Afghan Files, Chapter Eleven (pp. 110–140). He writes that although during the anti-Soviet jihad Hekmatyar, commanding one of the most effective military forces, enjoyed considerable attention and support from the intelligence services of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United States, he ultimately lacked moral restraint and sound political judgment.
After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, during the power-sharing agreements among the mujahideen in Rawalpindi—held in a format resembling a Loya Jirga—Sibghatullah Mojaddedi was appointed President, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf Prime Minister, and Hekmatyar Minister of Foreign Affairs within the framework of a transitional government. Turki recounts that after two hours of private conversation, Hekmatyar placed his hand on his chest and assured him, saying, “You are my brother,” after which he formally accepted the post of Foreign Minister.
Prince Turki then went to inform Pakistan’s Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of the agreement. However, while he was on his way, Hekmatyar announced by radio that he was boycotting the mujahideen government. Turki regards this sudden shift in position as an example of Hekmatyar’s political instability and unreliability.
Turki also expresses his belief that Hekmatyar was involved in the assassination of Abdullah Azzam (p. 111). He further mentions the 1990 coup attempt, when Hekmatyar entered what Turki calls a “completely unholy alliance” with the radical communist Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanai (pp. 111–112)—an event which, in Turki’s view, undermined the credibility of the parties involved.
When in April 1992 Kabul was effectively within reach, Turki writes that Hekmatyar refused to cooperate with Ahmad Shah Massoud and insisted on capturing the capital by military means (pp. 133–135). Some of his commanders, seeking to prevent destruction, advocated reconciliation. One of them, Inayatullah Tofan, was reportedly so distressed by this decision that he stepped aside and wept. Turki also notes that while he himself was arriving in Kabul to facilitate a political transition, Hekmatyar’s forces were shelling the area around the airport.
Later, after being defeated by the Taliban, Hekmatyar took refuge in Iran—a country he had previously called a “heretical state” (p. 137). Years later, he presented himself to the Afghan government, the Americans, and other interested parties as the only person capable of negotiating with the Taliban.
Throughout Chapter Eleven, Turki portrays Hekmatyar as an ambitious and inflexible figure prone to sudden shifts in position, who, in pursuit of power, was willing to enter contradictory alliances and abandon his commitments; in his view, this played a significant role in Afghanistan’s descent into civil war.