The group discords and structural collapse of the Taliban* are like a bomb that is about to explode and the group is in confusion, but instead of this group and the Haqqani network*, Pakistan already has other counterparts.
Author: Haris Jubran, Security and Terrorism Analyst, especially for Sangar
The nature of war and conflict of ideological coalition groups is based on the institutionalization of intellectual foundations and the monopoly of political power. After the victory, the focus of these groups is the division of power and the strengthening of their influence in the sphere of bureaucracy. Obviously, the ideology and the intellectual basis are known as the only point of contact between groups before victory is achieved, but the main identity of these groups after victory is the conflict over the division of power and the expansion of the sphere of influence for survival. Since for such groups the ideologies or common mindset for struggle has no inherent holiness, sanctification is a means to an end so that they can use this method to expand their area of recruitment and maintain their unity in decision making.
Following the handover of Afghanistan to the Taliban* (August 15, 2021), one of the prominent priorities of the political leadership of the group was to maintain unity and unify command. The group's thinkers and patrons from foreign intelligence knew that the new chapter will be a chapter in state building and legitimacy, but a military-political confrontation was predictable for them.
From here, according to the information, four important meetings were held behind closed doors between branches of the Haqqanies and Mullah Baradar (Kandaharies), and the last case was a meeting in Kandahar on March 22, which was leaked to the media and ended without any result. It is worth noting that three key factors reinforced the basis of the Taliban split: the historical background of the split, inter-group legitimacy, and military power. Meanwhile, the Haqqani network is known for its extravagance and radicalism.
In this note, the author attempts to focus on the basis and historical past of the Taliban's inter-group divisions. Consideration of the historical background of disagreements, inter-group legitimacy and the military potential of the branches is based on the author's personal interview with Taliban detainees between 2019 and 2021 in the detention center of the Afghan National Security Service and information from this service.
INTERGROUP LEGITIMACY
Figures such as Sheikh Abdulhakim Haqqani, Mullah Baradar, Nurullah Nuri, Mullah Khairmohammad Khairkhah, Mullah Abdulhaq Wasiq, led by Mullah Omar, were among the founders of the Taliban with the help of Pakistani intelligence. After the death of Mullah Omar, these figures considered Mullah Yakub the main heir to Mullah Omar's family and his self-proclaimed movement, and now define cross-group legitimacy in terms of his status and presence.
In the next stage, the big figures, considered the founders of the Taliban and mostly from the Durrani tribe, consider themselves the main heirs of the group called the Taliban and the Haqqani Network is seen as a Pakistani intelligence project that was borrowed during the last 20 years of war.
The Haqqani network has played a significant role in the war against the former Afghan government and international coalition forces over the past 20 years, with members of the network helping the Taliban in conventional wars, but their main mission in collusion with ISIS-Khorasan Branch* and Lashkar-e-Taiba* was carrying out urban attacks, bombings, suicide attacks, hostage-taking, drug trafficking and the implementation of special plans of the Afghan department of ISI.
Mullah Baradar and his followers consider the mission and responsibility of the Haqqani network as a contractor of Pakistani intelligence and consider it completed after the surrender of Kabul, and sought to prevent the Haqqani Network from becoming the decision-making center in the current system, which did not happen and through the mediation of the Pakistani intelligence service, the Haqqani network has a voice as an influential decision-making center in the current Taliban apparatus.
After the collapse of the republican regime, two more cases played a role in the rising of the Haqqani network on the Taliban: 1) the connection between Hamdullah Moheb, President Ghani's adviser in the Security Council, and Khalil Haqqani (in the photo) and the preparation for the surrender of Kabul; 2) According to information, before the Taliban entered Kabul on August 13, forces associated with the Haqqani network, on the advice of Pakistani intelligence, landed around the city and its environs and were waiting to enter Kabul. The arrival of the Haqqani network forces in Kabul and the capture of the city and government offices was another advantage that strengthened the position of the Haqqanis in internal negotiations.
According to Joseph Nye, one of the founders of the theory of neoliberalism and the inventor of the concept called “soft power”, “today the goal of most security policies is to ensure the independence of social action and measure the political situation within national borders.”
The Haqqani network, as the main and military wing, was aware of the complex and multi-layered situation within the Taliban and was always wary of intra-group illegitimacy, absolute affiliation with Pakistani intelligence, and persecution of Sirajuddin Haqqani. To this end, based on the words of Joseph Nye, the network was able to use military power to gain independence of action and form its political position. According to the Haqqani network, the end of security has no general concept, and this network sees security as its own survival.
HISTORY OF DISCORDS
The main spark of these disputes goes back to the death of Mullah Omar. After his death, members of the leadership and Council of Quetta clashed over the appointment of a new leader and the transfer of the crown of legitimacy. At this time, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who was accused of covering up the death of Mullah Omar in 2013, announced his death in 2015 and took over the leadership of the Taliban.
The appointment of Akhtar Mohammad Mansour marked the beginning of the Taliban's fragmentation and organizational collapse. Various factions attacked him and did not consider him worthy of leadership. The first reaction was from Mullah Omar's family members. Mulla Yaqub, Mulla Omar's son, and his brother Abdulmannan left Mullah Akhtar Mansur along with other figures such as Mullah Rasool.
Mulla Akhtar Mansur offered Mulla Yaqub (in the photo) the leadership of the military commission, membership of the Quetta Council and the Leadership Council as a political bribe to save the group from internal divisions and fragmentation. After the return of Mullah Yakub, Mullah Rasul continued to oppose, which led to clashes between supporters from both sides. Then the main bases of the splinter Taliban group became the provinces of Farah and Herat, between which there were violent clashes.
After the assassination of Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, Mullah Hibatullah inherited a fragile and fragmented leadership, and under pressure from Pakistani intelligence was forced to give a special place to the Haqqanians.
The assassination of Mullah Akhtar Mansur again raised the question of electing a new leader, and this time figures close to Mullah Akhtar Mansur proposed the person closest to him (Sheikh Abdulhakim), who had a good religious position among the Taliban, but luck smiled at Mulla Hibatullah and the Mansurians gradually distanced themselves from the current leadership.
As peace talks between the United States and the Taliban approached, a sharp rift developed between Qatari political cadres and the Taliban military commander that we still see today. Among the commanders who opposed the form and content of the negotiations, and then the signing of the Doha Agreement (February 29, 2020), were Sadr Ibrahim and Mullah Abdulkayum Zakir. According to the information, these both prominent Taliban commanders and influential figures are currently opposing the Haqqani network. Sadr Ibrahim is not on good terms with Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Abdulkayum Zakir is currently in the Kajaki district of Helmand province with his forces due to severe opposition with the Haqqani network. Some time ago, Mullah Baradar and Mullah Yakub went to him in Helmand to bring him back to Kabul, but they did not succeed.
Since the Taliban is a proxy force and a product of Pakistani intelligence, the control of the group is in the hands of the Pakistani military, so Pakistani intelligence plays a multi-faceted game with it. Singling out the Haqqani network, creating ethnic and tribal divisions, and linking to specific figures is one of the techniques that aims to keep the various factions under control, and to use one group against another if necessary.
According to the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS), in 2019, the Pakistani Intelligence Service diverted one group from the Haqqani network called Abu Ubaidah Caravan, which is responsible for part of the urban attacks, suicide attacks and bombings, and was also created another organization is the Islamic Appeal Coalition (Etilofi Da'vati Islomi). The two dormant cores are a strategic threat and an alternative to the Haqqani and Taliban network for the Pakistani intelligence service.
Another dormant disagreement, which is perceived as a soft threat in different layers and organizational structure of the Taliban, is the confrontation between generations (first and second generation Taliban), although the first generation of the Taliban is still in power, but they are somehow at odds with the second generation over the distribution of power, and this will become a serious cross-structural threat in the near future.
These differences have greatly upset the Taliban leadership at all levels and they are trying to find a way out, but in the meantime, the Haqqani network has not given up on extravagance, and is striving to maintain its political / military position and use state resources and funds for its survival.
It should be recognized that the Haqqani network, in addition to forming the current self-proclaimed emirate with part of the Taliban, has other dark and underground ties besides participating in the current power relations, such as the creation of an ominous triangle (ISIS Khorasan branch, Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani network), creating a transit corridor for terrorism; and securing a corridor for drug trafficking.
* The organization is under UN sanctions or banned due to terrorist activities.