What Is the Paradox of the Selective Approach of Regional and Extra-Regional Powers?
By Abdul Naser Noorzad Tajik, researcher in politics and geopolitics, especially for “Sangar”
After five years of the Taliban’s presence in power, several key questions remain unanswered: How did the Taliban become a kind of principle of unwritten understanding between regional and extra-regional powers? To what extent will this understanding contribute to keeping the group in power, and what objectives and calculations underpin the conditional and selective engagement of regional and extra-regional powers with this group?
For a better understanding of the issue, it is necessary to recall Afghanistan’s geographical position over the past century; that is, the fact that Afghanistan’s transition from a “buffer state” in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to an “isolated state” in the twenty-first century, followed by its transformation into a multilayered, fluid geopolitical environment with numerous regional and extra-regional actors, may provide an important key to analyzing the current situation and answering another fundamental question: How and when will the Taliban be removed from power, and what will the world do with this group? Ultimately, this approach greatly facilitates the analysis of the existing situation and an understanding of the reasons behind conditional, selective, and issue-oriented engagement with the Taliban.
First of all, it is necessary to clearly understand that Afghanistan, in addition to its location along strategic fault lines, is also situated on a geopolitical fault line. The overlapping of these fault lines — both geopolitical and strategic — simultaneously demonstrates the degree of concentration of existing threats, challenges, and deadlocks, while also opening the way toward a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the issue and significantly helping to explain it. This is because security, economic, geopolitical, or international political issues, taken separately as a single cause and in isolation from other factors, are incapable of explaining the existing complexity. This is precisely why the majority of analyses based on the current situation and ongoing events are unable to provide a comprehensive explanation of the current Afghan problem.
Moreover, it is necessary to clearly understand that strategic fault lines are regions where ethnic, geographical, military, economic, and geopolitical contradictions overlap and possess the potential to generate crises; whereas geopolitical fault lines are merely places where the interests of various powers come into conflict.
On this basis, Afghanistan, in addition to its position along strategic, geopolitical, and transit fault lines, with its historical legacy as a buffer and isolated state, has, under the new international circumstances and from the perspective of the world’s emerging crisis hotspots, become an intractable deadlock — a multilayered geopolitical environment with numerous regional and extra-regional actors.
In this context, numerous factors, with adverse consequences arising from the existence of these geopolitical and strategic fault lines, pose a threat to regional security in the medium term. In addition, geographical factors are of great importance, such as the position of the Hindu Kush mountain range within Afghanistan’s power structure and the understanding that the Hindu Kush is Afghanistan’s geopolitical backbone and a natural boundary between spheres of influence at the regional and extra-regional levels.
In many studies, the Hindu Kush is regarded as a natural boundary between East and West, North and South, Arabs and Ajam, the Anglo-Saxons and the Orthodox East, as well as a dividing line and an area of intense rivalry between the civilizations of India and China. Moreover, Badakhshan — the apex of this geopolitical and strategic fault line — is the point of intersection of three civilizations: Indian, Chinese, and Orthodox; the connecting point of three security belts of South, East, and North Asia; and the place where the interests of major regional and extra-regional powers intersect.
However, despite this, the geography of northern Afghanistan, despite its outwardly calm appearance, has become an arena for intelligence operations by regional and extra-regional powers. The Taliban, amid this dramatic transformation arising from an implicit, indirect, and unwritten understanding between regional and extra-regional powers regarding the group’s survival in power, have also adopted a softer approach toward the regional security, political, and economic environment.
Conditional, issue-oriented engagement, stemming from a tactical and confrontational approach to the growing threats from regional and extra-regional powers, has created an exceptional and unique opportunity for the Taliban. The consequences of the crisis surrounding Ukraine in Eastern Europe, Iran in Western Asia, and the flare-up of crisis hotspots in other parts of the world have provided the Taliban with an opportunity to remain in power, serving as a kind of political insurance.
From all this, it becomes clear that, at least for an uncertain period, the world will continue to preserve the existing status quo. However, which factors in the further development of events could lead to a change in the world’s attitude toward the Taliban depends on several circumstances:
A change in the Taliban’s behavior as an absolute but acceptable evil, which would lead to dramatic changes in the situation and bring this group down from the seat of power;
An increase in the level of security threats that would disrupt the security of the region and the world, while the group proves incapable of controlling them. At least, this hypothesis applies to regional powers such as China, Russia, and Iran;
The level of general understanding or a change in the level of competition at the regional and global levels, resulting in the Taliban becoming an unnecessary, harmful, and unacceptable element.
However, until then, conditional, issue-oriented, and selective engagement constitutes the three main principles of relations between the Taliban, the region, and the world, which shape the core logic and practical basis of the region’s and the world’s approach toward the Taliban.
Conditional engagement in the security sphere means not only countering threats; it is also an attempt to control the dynamics of instability and draw a line between the zone of security and the spread of regional insecurity. According to the approach of regional and extra-regional countries, establishing and maintaining active intelligence channels of communication with the ruling group in Kabul leads to greater negotiating capacity and creates a framework for managing the existing situation.
The second principle, namely the issue-oriented nature of these contacts with the Taliban, stems from security incidents, the emergence of temporary security crises, and efforts to resolve them. Migration, terrorist groups, drug trafficking, and the effort to maintain security at a higher level are among the main objectives of this approach.
Finally, the selective approach most clearly demonstrates the main paradox of this position toward the ruling group. For example, human rights violations, women’s right to education and employment, civil liberties, and widespread repression are condemned by some countries and provoke strong reactions. Yet the very next day, Taliban delegations are invited to these same countries to discuss and negotiate issues concerning migration, drugs, and security, and are treated, in practice, as a state. Understanding this contradiction is linked to the security requirements to which regional and extra-regional powers resort under different circumstances.
However, the main logic of this analysis, which seeks to explain the reasons for states’ engagement with the Taliban, encompasses various factors, including geopolitical and geocultural factors, as well as security, economic, and international political considerations. The region and the wider world are connected through overlapping common security interests; at the same time, fundamental differences in interests themselves, conflicting views, and differing approaches to major political, geopolitical, and security-related developments demonstrate a significant divide between regional and extra-regional powers.
To understand this issue, it is necessary to identify some of the points where the interests of regional and extra-regional powers overlap in relation to engagement with the Taliban and determine which issues and factors contribute to states’ greater inclination to engage with the Taliban.
- The issue of ideological and cultural ties among states that consider Afghanistan and its geography part of their strategic depth. Neighboring and regional countries are predominantly included in this circle;
- The issue of economic, political, and ideological interests, which encompasses countries of the region, neighboring states, and the wider world. Iran, with its cultural influence; Pakistan, with its concept of strategic depth; Central Asia, with its focus on trade and economic interests; India, Turkey, and the Arab countries, in their pursuit of political hegemony; and China, with its economic, political, and ideological approach — all fall within this circle.
- The issue of competition for political and ideological influence, which involves China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the Arab countries;
- The issue of exploiting opportunities by countries involved in the Afghan issue, which seek to use this crisis to pursue their own political objectives. China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, the countries of Central Asia, Europe, America, and the Middle East all fall within this circle;
- The issue of geopolitics and political geography, which encompasses ideological powers such as China, Russia, Iran, the United States, and some European countries. Of course, the role of Turkey and its rivalry with the Arab world should never be underestimated. In pursuit of the idea of Pan-Turkism, Turkey is in constant competition with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and this competition primarily encompasses the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus region, and Afghanistan;
- The issue of creating networks of traditional and non-traditional friends and allies, which are used by global and regional powers in regional and global competition. In this context, Afghanistan can serve as a lever of pressure for extracting concessions in other parts of the world, while the Taliban are the most readily available force in this game;
- Terrorism embedded in the geography of Afghanistan has created a basis for numerous political and intelligence games by various states and has provided the Taliban with a good opportunity;
- The issue of political, security, and economic imperatives, which connect the South with the North and the East with West Asia, demonstrates that Afghanistan remains, under any circumstances, an attractive and significant geographical space for various neighboring, regional, and global powers, and that its importance will never diminish.
- The issue of maintaining a presence in the Afghan arena, which is expected to emerge after the post-Taliban phase. Various countries do not want to lose opportunities for influence, presence, and partnership in Afghanistan, even for the shortest period of time.
- The issue of highlighting the role of non-governmental organizations, which become instruments of pressure on states and result in less responsibility falling on the powers that have placed engagement with the Taliban on their agenda and use the Taliban card to advance their economic, political, and security interests;
- The issue of the absence of a single rule governing the existing order and international system, since its authority has effectively been eliminated, while the hierarchical unipolar system is in transition toward a post-polar world. Therefore, in the current anarchic environment, there are no orderly rules governing engagement — even with terrorist groups — and there is likewise no responsibility in this sphere attributable to any specific actor. Consequently, the issue of engagement with the Taliban cannot be separated from these considerations.
Conclusion
Overall, the engagement of the world and the region with the Taliban has not been shaped by political or ideological acceptance of the group, but rather by security considerations, geopolitical and economic calculations, and the necessity of managing the existing situation. In the context of regional and global competition, the Taliban have, on the one hand, become a threat and, on the other, an instrument for managing larger threats. Therefore, as long as this group retains security and geopolitical utility for regional and extra-regional powers, the likelihood of maintaining the status quo will be greater than the likelihood of changing it.
The fall of the Taliban will become more likely when either the group’s behavior and capabilities disrupt the existing security order, or when, in the calculations of regional and global powers, it transforms from a useful instrument into an unnecessary and harmful element.