Why can't Russia withdraw from the Afghan "great game"?
Andrey Serenko, head of the Analytical Center of the Society of Russian Political Scientists, Nezavisimaya Gazeta
One of the most notable terrorist attacks of recent times was the attack on the China House in Kabul, a hotel where Chinese citizens traditionally stay. Reuters photo
The Afghan branch of the Islamic State (IS) banned in the Russian Federation is using the weakness of the Taliban regime (the organization is banned in the Russian Federation) to strengthen its position inside Afghanistan. At the same time, local ISIS leaders do not hide their ambitions regarding the preparation of jihadist expansion both in the region and beyond. The strengthening of the Afghan branch of the IS puts before Russia and its partners in Central Asia the task of actively searching for effective mechanisms to contain and counter this threat, which makes it very likely that the Northern Alliance project in Afghanistan will be revived with Russian support.
Vilayat Khorasan, the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, led by Sanaullah Ghaffari (aka Shahab al-Muhajir), has become a very prominent player on the Afghan military-political board in 2022. According to some reports, the number of militants of various ISIS groups in Afghanistan has long ago exceeded 10,000 people. Currently, groups of IS militants are compactly deployed in the eastern (Nangarhar, Kunar, Nuristan) and northern (Badakhshan, Kunduz, Takhar) provinces of Afghanistan. In 2023, Vilayat Khorasan plans to expand its zone of influence in the country, in particular, it is preparing to transfer up to 7,000 IS fighters from the areas bordering Pakistan to the provinces of Logar, Paktia, and Laghman. It is expected that several thousand Islamic State fighters will be concentrated in the northern regions of Afghanistan next spring, immediately adjacent to the borders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
Against this background, a very effective ISIS group in Kabul is increasing its terrorist activity. In September 2022, Vilayat Khorasan claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack near the Russian embassy in the capital of Afghanistan, which killed two employees of the Russian diplomatic mission. A few months later, IS militants attacked the “Chinese House” in Kabul, a hotel where Chinese citizens traditionally stay. While there were no official Chinese deaths in the attack, various Afghan sources deny there were no casualties, giving varying numbers. Finally, in early January 2023, an IS suicide bomber blew himself up at the entrance to the Taliban Foreign Ministry building, killing more than 30 people. The regular terrorist actions of the Vilayat Khorasan militants in Kabul show not only the effectiveness of their organizers and perpetrators but also the inability or unwillingness of the Taliban to ensure the security of the capital of Afghanistan.
“The Afghan branch of ISIS, as a militant terrorist organization, achieved great success by 2023 and is now preparing for a new stage of military-political expansion inside the country, using the weakness and inefficiency of the Taliban control system in Afghanistan, as well as direct assistance from a number of regional commanders and Taliban groups” - Afghan experts comment on the situation. In their opinion, “this is only the beginning of a big ISIS jihad in the region – the strengthening and expansion of the bridgehead on the territory of Afghanistan is a prelude to the implementation of the strategy of aggression against neighbors from among the states of the region, including the Central Asian republics.”
On the eve of the New Year holidays, there were grounds to assert that the ambitions of “Vilayat Khorasan” are not limited to the regional dimension. In Istanbul on December 31, Turkish intelligence captured two supporters of the Afghan branch of the IS, who were preparing for a major terrorist attack. The militants turned out to be natives of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, who joined the Vilayat Khorasan. The attempted terrorist act in Istanbul on December 31 is proof that the Afghan branch of the IS is seeking to expand beyond the "near-Afghan" region and intends to attack targets thousands of kilometers from Kabul. The choice of Turkey as a presentation site for Vilayat Khorasan also shows the intention of the Afghan branch to develop terrorist activity in the “zone of responsibility” of other “wilayats” of the Islamic State. Perhaps this should be regarded as the intention of the "khorasanies" to become the first among equals within the existing system of "vilayats" of the IS.
Terrorist statistics show that such ambitions of “Vilayat Khorasan” are not groundless. In 2022, the Afghan branch of IS entered the top three among other “vilayats” in terms of the number of terrorist attacks and the number of their victims: in Afghanistan, the “khorasanies” carried out 181 attacks, as a result of which 1,188 people were killed and injured. In terms of the number of victims in 2022, the Afghan branch of the IS outstripped the “parent wilayats” of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (833 and 887, respectively), yielding only to the leader of the “death rating” - the IS branch in Nigeria (1412 people). There is no doubt that in 2023 “Vilayat Khorasan” will strive to improve the “intra-caliphate” KPI.
The apparent growth in the number of Vilayat Khorasan militant groups, the majority of whose members are from post-Soviet states and the Middle East, successful terrorist activity inside Afghanistan, and expansionist ambitions extending beyond its borders - all this makes the Afghan branch of the ISIS a priority challenge for the countries of the region and Russia. The hopes of some politicians and diplomats in Moscow for the Taliban as a force capable of successfully fighting ISIS did not come true: the Taliban was unable to provide security even in Kabul, including to citizens and officials of the Russian Federation, China, and Pakistan.
From Russia, the current situation will require the development of alternative and more effective security solutions as soon as possible, and not empty hopes for the Taliban regime. The confrontation with the Afghan branch of the IS is becoming too serious for Moscow and its partners in Central Asia to be left entirely to an ineffective force, which, moreover, the Russian side is not able to control.
The way out for Russia is seen in a return to the Northern Alliance model, which was created in the 1990s to curb the expansion of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. Then Moscow supported with money, weapons, and ammunition the Tajik and Uzbek detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Rashid Dostum, who were engaged in direct combat operations with jihadists on Afghan territory and thereby held back the "furious mullahs" near the perimeter of the borders of the post-Soviet republics.
It seems that today Moscow and its partners in the Central Asian region will once again have to support the creation of the Northern Alliance 2.0, but this time to neutralize the threat from the Afghan branch of ISIS. Here, the Russian side still has a choice: to create the infrastructure of a new “anti-caliphate” project in Northern Afghanistan from scratch or to agree with the leader of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan Ahmad Massoud, and his commanders on the subject of reorienting military activity from the Taliban to the ISIS direction. It is obvious that the final decision of the Russian side will have to be made in the next few months - time pressure is created not only by the approaching regular spring combat season in Afghanistan but also by the foreign policy situation that is not very favorable for Moscow, which its geopolitical competitors, primarily the United States, are actively forming not without success regaining influence in the Afghan "Great Game".