How regional players are shaping a new security order in Eurasia
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, exclusively for Sangar
The recent “Moscow Format” was not just another diplomatic meeting; it was a clear signal of a shift in the rules of the game in Afghanistan and beyond. Russia aimed to demonstrate that, amid intense competition between East and West, it is forming a new, deliberate model of Eurasian security.
The main message from Moscow: external actors, especially the United States, should not assume that Afghanistan remains a cost-free platform for remote crisis management.
This meeting was a response to recent discussions about a potential U.S. military return to Afghanistan, particularly rumors regarding the reoccupation of Bagram Air Base. Moscow, together with its allies—from China to Iran and Central Asian countries—has embarked on a risky but strategic mission, aimed at raising the cost of any renewed Western presence in the region. What is currently taking shape in Moscow can be described as a mechanism for regionalizing Afghan crisis management—a process intended to shift the center of decision-making from Washington to regional capitals.
Russia sent several parallel signals:
A warning to the U.S. and its allies against any attempts to establish military or intelligence infrastructure in or around Afghanistan.
Emphasis on Moscow’s independence—no need for third-party mediation, positioning itself as the key player in the Afghan dossier.
An attempt to integrate the Taliban into the regional security framework as part of a new Eurasian architecture, while acknowledging the risks and potential unintended consequences.
The official invitation to Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Taliban’s foreign minister, was an important symbol of this strategy. This invitation did not signify full legitimization of the Taliban, but served as a smart instrument to showcase Russia’s political influence amid instability following the U.S. withdrawal.
The presence of a Belarusian representative highlighted Moscow’s desire to expand its geopolitical horizon—from Central Asia to the western edges of Eurasia. This is how a new order is emerging, in which the Taliban are transformed from a threat into a tool for balancing regional security.
Within this system, four key regional powers act along their own vectors:
India engages in cautious contacts with Kabul, seeking to counter Pakistan’s exclusive influence.
Iran focuses on border security, Helmand water resources, and energy and transit projects.
China views Afghanistan as a missing link in the “Belt and Road” initiative, aiming for strategic connectivity via the Wakhan Corridor and the Aynak mining site.
Pakistan seeks to maintain its intelligence influence and shift the costs associated with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan onto Kabul; however, the logic of Moscow-led regionalization has already weakened Islamabad’s role.
Simultaneously, two opposing yet interconnected processes are underway: on one hand, the Eurasian bloc seeks to integrate the Taliban into a new regional order, while on the other, external powers aim to punish and hold the Taliban “accountable” for unpredictable behavior.
Caught between these dynamics, Afghanistan is turning into a battleground of soft power between Moscow and Washington. The current war is not over tanks and missiles, but over narrative, information, and political legitimacy.
The Taliban are currently in an extremely sensitive position. They are expected to demonstrate their sincerity in combating terrorism, combat drug trafficking, and act responsibly in managing borders and the refugee crisis. Any failure in these areas could lead to renewed isolation and increased Western pressure. Conversely, a smart integration into regional processes could provide the Taliban with an opportunity for gradual legitimization.
For Moscow and the Central Asian countries, the main priority is the creation of joint intelligence mechanisms, control over Afghanistan’s northern borders, and maintaining a balance between pressuring the Taliban and using them as a controlled instrument. At the same time, Delhi and Tehran are seeking to play a more active role in the Afghan dossier to protect their vital interests and establish a soft balance against Islamabad’s monopoly influence.
Although the Moscow meeting was formally dedicated to Afghanistan, in essence, it concerned the future architecture of security in Eurasia. If this project succeeds, Afghanistan will be seen not as a battlefield, but as a center for regulating the balance of power—a space where soft power competition between East and West shapes the region’s geopolitical future.
However, the key question remains: how can the policies of Moscow and its regional allies truly improve the situation in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan? At first glance, neither Russia nor its Asian partners are value-oriented powers; their priority remains risk control and ensuring security in the face of an unstable Afghanistan. For Moscow and Beijing, in the game of “de-Americanizing the region,” the Taliban are an imposed but convenient tool. This approach makes the future prospects for Afghanistan even bleaker.
In other words, if regional and external powers continue to view the Taliban solely as a tool for maintaining a controlled balance between pressure and benefit, the country will remain trapped in dependence and instability.
The contradiction between regional and extraregional visions reinforces the move toward multilateral mechanisms and approaches. Regional states are attempting to link their core interests and concerns regarding Afghanistan to a broader security and geopolitical agenda, utilizing existing regional capacities to project these interests on a larger scale. This process makes the region an active and influential participant in the Afghan issue, which in the long term could lead to the gradual isolation of the United States in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, the United States still possesses diverse and serious tools of leverage over the Taliban. If Washington decides to return to Afghanistan on a conditional basis, it could use internal threats as a pressure lever against the Taliban—an action that would force them into a tough choice between regional and extraregional alignment.
Overall, the message of the Moscow meeting can be seen as a symbolic but cautionary gesture toward the United States. This initiative, framed as a regional response, has gained greater political weight and could mark the beginning of an active mechanism for intervention in the Afghan crisis.
Thus, the Moscow meeting may signal the start of a new phase, in which the region itself begins to determine its role in managing the Afghan crisis and shaping the Eurasian security architecture.
