Five Main Goals of the Taliban Foreign Minister’s Visit to New Delhi
Author: Wahid Peyman, journalist (Afghanistan)
Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Foreign Minister of the Taliban government, will travel to India next week after participating in the Moscow Format talks in Russia. The trip was made possible through a one-week approval granted by the UN Security Council.
Muttaqi’s visit to New Delhi comes at a time when relations between India and Afghanistan have not yet been officially redefined following the Taliban’s return to power. Nevertheless, the Security Council’s approval and India’s agreement to host the visit indicate that both sides intend to elevate their contacts, from technical interactions to political and economic dialogue. For the Taliban, this trip presents an opportunity to pursue several specific objectives that combine political, economic, and survival interests, particularly within the regional context.
1 - Consolidating Diplomatic Presence
For the Taliban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, perhaps no issue is more important than reactivating Afghanistan’s overseas diplomatic missions and appointing its own diplomats to these posts.
The Afghan Embassy in New Delhi was closed following financial and political crises in 2023 and has since provided only limited consular services. In recent months, the Taliban have been pushing for the appointment of their representatives not only to this embassy but also to consulates in Mumbai and Hyderabad — a move that India has approached with caution.
During his visit, Muttaqi is expected to advocate strongly for such appointments.
The Taliban place significant importance on the strategy of gaining control over Afghanistan’s diplomatic missions abroad, and whenever they reach an agreement with a country, they widely publicize it as a major political achievement. Muttaqi aims to demonstrate a similar diplomatic success in relations with India.
2 - Improving Political Relations with India amid Tensions with Pakistan
Tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, which began roughly a year after the Taliban returned to power, have intensified in recent months. A few days ago, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif openly stated that the Taliban must choose between cooperating with the Pakistani government or aligning with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
This year, disputes between the two sides have escalated to bombings and border clashes.
The TTP, which Islamabad accuses the Afghan Taliban of supporting, has carried out several deadly attacks in Pakistan in recent months. Pakistani authorities believe that without the Afghan Taliban’s support, the TTP would not have had such capabilities.
Amir Khan Muttaqi likely intends to leverage the longstanding rivalry between Islamabad and New Delhi in the Taliban’s favor. On one hand, he aims to open new avenues for cooperation with India, and on the other, to send a warning to Pakistan that the Taliban have other options in the region.
Meanwhile, India has also become more open in its security interactions with the Taliban. Meetings such as the one between India’s Deputy Foreign Minister Vikram Misri and Muttaqi in Dubai (January 8, 2025) and the direct conversation between India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Muttaqi in May of the same year signal this new approach.
During the upcoming visit, New Delhi is also expected to discuss in detail the issue of “not using Afghan territory against India.”
For the Taliban, this is an opportunity to demonstrate to India their relative independence from Pakistan — a political card that could give them greater leverage in the regional arena.
3 - Preventing a Chinese Monopoly in Afghanistan
China became the first country to appoint a new ambassador to Kabul in September 2023, and a few months later, the Taliban announced that their ambassador had been accepted in Beijing.
In January 2025, The Diplomat reported that after the talks in Dubai, India increased the level of its contacts with the Taliban to avoid falling behind China in regional competition. This concern intensified in August 2025, when the visit of China’s Foreign Minister to Kabul and discussions on mining projects and the “Belt and Road Initiative” became major news. It is clear that Afghanistan’s mineral resources — especially lithium and copper — have become one of the main centers of geo-economic competition in the region.
The history of recent agreements confirms this trend: from the Amu Darya oil contract with Chinese companies in January 2023 to the announcement of several new contracts by the Taliban Ministry of Mines. For Kabul, these resources provide an economic backbone and financial stability. For India, being excluded from this sphere would mean ceding strategic space to its main competitor.
From New Delhi’s perspective, establishing a channel of dialogue with the Taliban also has an economic purpose — to prevent China from becoming a monopolistic actor in Afghanistan. The Taliban, in turn, have likely concluded that India can simultaneously provide them with a large market, infrastructure investment, and an alternative route, reducing Afghanistan’s dependence on China and Pakistan.
4 - Negotiations on Chabahar Port and Transit Routes
Chabahar is a vital port for India: it provides a route connecting Afghanistan to Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan. However, the U.S. decision in September 2025 to revoke exemptions related to Chabahar sanctions has put this route at serious risk. The new sanctions have made banks and insurance companies more cautious, complicating any transactions and cargo shipments through the port.
During his visit to New Delhi, Muttaqi wants to understand how India plans to maintain the functionality of this corridor despite the sanctions pressure. A few days before the sanctions took effect, India sent three containers of humanitarian aid from Chabahar to Kabul — a move Indian economic media called a “significant timing”, signaling New Delhi’s determination to continue using this route.
For India, Chabahar is part of a broader strategy to connect with Central Asia. If this route is halted or restricted, the space for maneuver will once again shift to China. Therefore, technical discussions on insurance, shipping, and payment mechanisms during the visit are as important as political statements.
The desired outcome for both sides is to maintain at least the minimal functionality of this corridor for humanitarian shipments and trade in non-sensitive goods. If this is not achieved, the Taliban will be forced to use more expensive overland routes, increasing Kabul’s costs while limiting India’s influence.
5 - Attracting Humanitarian Assistance
The Taliban still relies on external support to meet urgent domestic needs. Since the fall of Kabul in 2021, India has remained one of the few countries that, without officially recognizing the Taliban government, continues to provide humanitarian aid — albeit at a smaller scale than during the Republic.
Through its policy of “assistance without recognition”, India seeks to maintain social and political influence in Afghanistan.
Amir Khan Muttaqi will undoubtedly try during his visit to convince New Delhi that Indian aid actually reaches the population and has a tangible social impact. The Taliban Foreign Minister will likely attempt to persuade India to become one of the leading donors of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan in the region.
