What do recent events in Nuristan mean?
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, especially for Sangar
Pakistan, amid complex regional transformations—especially in the shadow of widespread crises in the Middle East—has adopted a multilayered and calculated approach toward Afghanistan. Airstrikes, efforts to redefine its international standing, and field movements in sensitive areas such as Nuristan indicate Islamabad’s shift from a passive policy to an active and offensive strategy. The key question is why Pakistan, despite its dissatisfaction with the Taliban, continues to avoid the group’s complete elimination and instead resorts to controlled pressure.
To understand this behavior, one must consider the relative failure of the “managed chaos” project in the region—a plan aimed at activating centers of instability in Asia through Afghanistan. It was expected that the Taliban, by providing the necessary groundwork, would facilitate the activities of transnational terrorist networks. However, considerations of survival and the need for minimal engagement with regional powers such as Iran, Russia, and China disrupted this process. At the same time, the Taliban’s weakness in understanding the depth of regional intelligence penetration meant that even dormant cells could not be activated in time.
The Taliban now finds itself in a strategic dilemma: on the one hand, the activation of foreign terrorist groups could undermine its fragile regional legitimacy and pose a direct threat to its political survival; on the other hand, reliance on extra-regional projects offers no guarantee of protection against regional responses. If such scenarios fail, the Taliban will face simultaneous internal and regional threats, including the strengthening of resistance movements and rising public dissatisfaction.
In this context, Pakistan—concerned about the relative rapprochement of some Taliban circles with India, as well as the declining ability to exert direct control over the group—has moved toward an alternative policy. This policy is based on the controlled weakening of the Taliban while preserving parallel options. Islamabad is well aware that in the event of a complete collapse of the Taliban, the power vacuum could be filled by groups such as ISIS-Khorasan, an organization capable of generating widespread and uncontrollable chaos and severely disrupting the regional balance.
Meanwhile, the Haqqani Network remains a strategic asset for Pakistan. Due to its deep security and operational ties, the network plays a regulatory role in Afghanistan’s internal dynamics. The cautious stance of Haqqani leaders regarding tensions with Pakistan reflects their understanding of the need to preserve this relationship. However, internal pressures within the Taliban and competition with the Kandahar faction are gradually eroding the network’s cohesion and increasing the risk of defections.
Recent movements in Nuristan, particularly in districts such as Kamdesh, can be analyzed within this same framework. Pakistan’s control or operational influence in these areas is not merely a tactical border move but may be part of a broader plan to open routes for the infiltration and movement of extremist groups. In conditions where the presence of forces affiliated with Kandahar hinders such scenarios, targeted destabilization could create the conditions necessary to alter the balance on the ground.
On the other hand, social and ideological conditions in some eastern regions of Afghanistan—including Salafi tendencies and dissatisfaction with the Taliban’s repressive policies—have made the environment more conducive to ISIS infiltration. If this situation persists, it could lead to the emergence of an alternative actor that would not only pose a serious challenge to the Taliban but also become a new instrument in regional competition.
Overall, what is taking shape is a multi-layered game involving Pakistan, the Taliban, and other regional and extra-regional actors. Pakistan seeks to maintain a balance between weakening and supporting the Taliban, both to prevent its complete control and to avoid the unchecked emergence of new threats. However, due to the complexity on the ground and the conflicting interests of various actors, this policy is more likely to intensify the cycle of instability in Afghanistan and the broader region than to provide a sustainable solution.
