It is possible that Sirajuddin Haqqani was the mastermind behind the May 22 attack in Kabul, and the main target of the attack was his main opponent, Mullah Yaqub.
Author: Andrey Serenko
Source: telegram channel "Andrey Serenko"
1 - Judging by the first reports, one of the possible victims of the terrorist attack was the head of the Taliban Defense Ministry, Mullah Yaqub. Some sources say that he was "just" wounded, others that he was badly wounded.
2 - According to the anti-Taliban resistance forces, the reason for the explosion of a meeting of Taliban functionaries on May 22 was an explosive device installed on Mullah Yaqub's car. According to ISIS, the attack was carried out by a suicide bomber. Perhaps one should not rule out the version that both the resistance forces and ISIS were preparing to blow up the Taliban meeting in Kabul at the same time. Be that as it may, it can be assumed that Mullah Yaqub was one of the main targets of the action (if not the main target).
3 - According to reports, Taliban Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, Mullah Yaqub's main rival in the struggle for power within the Taliban junta, was absent from the Taliban meeting in Kabul. It can be assumed that the absence of Haqqani was not a mere accident.
4 - It is the Haqqani network that controls the Taliban suicide bombing group in Afghanistan.
5 - Previously, it was known that the Haqqani group often carried out terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, including using suicide bombers, under the flag of ISIS (the Caliphate took responsibility for the actions organized or ordered by the Haqqanis).
6 - The totality of these nuances, in our opinion, suggests that, quite possibly, Sirajuddin Haqqani was the mastermind behind the terrorist attack on May 22 in Kabul, and the main target of the attack was his main opponent, Mullah Yaqub. The perpetrator was a suicide bomber controlled by the Haqqani network through ISIS.
7 - It is curious how exactly one of the resistance groups, the National Liberation Front (Azadagan Front -Sangar), was involved in the operation with the assassination of Mullah Yaqub. If this is not a coincidence (which cannot be ruled out - a gathering of major Taliban functionaries is a desirable target for all their opponents), then it can be assumed that the Haqqani network and the intelligence of the Taliban Ministry of Internal Affairs controlled by Sirajuddin Haqqani has serious undercover capabilities in at least some groups of the anti-Taliban resistance and can influence the decision-making of the leaders of these groups (in terms of the choice of operations and their targets).
8 - The leadership of the Haqqani group has the ability to use not only the groups and brand of ISIS, but possibly some of the anti-Taliban resistance groups and their brand to their advantage in the struggle for influence and power within the Taliban.
9 - If, as a result of the attempt on May 22, Mullah Yaqub survived and if he does not believe in the version with "accidental luck" of ISIS or the resistance forces regarding the organization of Sunday's terrorist attack, then we should expect possible retaliatory actions from his side in relation to the customer of the attack - Sirajuddin Haqqani.
10 - The severity of internal contradictions in the leadership of the Taliban and the struggle for power in the government of the Taliban junta is reaching a qualitatively new level. Perhaps Kabul is on the eve of "events" associated with significant changes in the existing balance of power within the Taliban leadership.
* The organization is under UN sanctions or banned due to terrorist activities.
