Whether one likes it or not, the Tajik front is the only force that can resist the Taliban.
Author: Rustam Rushangar, analyst, especially for "Sangar"
The discussions behind the scenes of Afghan politics have become more heated. Border tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban, especially on the Wakhan issue, meetings between the Tajik and Pakistani authorities, a change of power in the US, more open tensions between Iran and the Taliban, an escalation of the Taliban's conflict with domestic popular demands, and...
This has led to the emergence of an unforeseen situation.
According to informed sources, the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRFA) has become more of an object of attention for regional and global players. Within the National Resistance Front itself, the question of what response should be given to possible new conditions and presented scenarios is being raised more seriously. Although many people want to ignore the Resistance Front, and this ignoring continues in different ways to this day, the fact is that the Resistance Front is still the only alternative military-political structure against the Taliban, which is unfair and unrealistic to ignore. The Front's lower activity, lower capabilities, and methods of conducting operational work are factors that give reason to ignore it. But otherwise, this is a kind of ignoring, it is deliberate. That is, some countries and powers want to ignore the Resistance Front even in the absence of the above factors. In this case, ignoring is more related to the policy and strategy of countries. That is, since the Resistance Front and the goals set by it are incompatible with their strategies, they want to close their eyes to it and say that the Front does not exist.
As far as I understand, in responding to new conditions or possible changes, the reaction can focus on two points of view. One of the points of view is that the Front should give a pan-Afghan response. This means that he should not speak about himself, but speak for the entire country. The second point of view is that the Front should speak for itself. About what is important and a priority for the Front. Of course, for preserving and surviving the Front as a military-political structure.
The existence of the two mentioned points of view led to the fact that at the beginning of the Taliban's rise to power, the Front and the Taliban could not agree. The Taliban later repeatedly stated that we wanted to talk to Ahmad Massoud about Panjshir and a specific area, but he wanted to talk to us about all of Afghanistan. Of course, the Taliban did not consider Ahmad Massoud responsible and competent to speak about all of Afghanistan. It seems that this issue is still debatable.
Of course, I am for the second point of view. The Front should speak for itself. It should talk about specific geography. Both with the Taliban, if there is an opportunity for negotiations, and with foreign actors. The beauty of this view is that it is clear and transparent, limited and accessible. Afghanistan's problems are numerous, complex, and large. They cannot be solved in a short time. In the short term, the Resistance Front concentrates on a certain area, determines its geography, and obtains it either by peace or war. Once the geography is obtained, the ground will appear for a national macro-discussion about all the country's problems.
Whether we like it or not, politics in Afghanistan and, of course, the problems of our country have acquired an ethnic character. For example, in the ethnic discourse, the Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Pashtuns have their political views. The Resistance Front is also considered ethnic, despite the desire to ignore this fact. Non-Tajiks consider the Resistance Front a Tajik structure. This is one of the limitations and frames that macro-narratives and macro-political structures impose on the military-political structure. Avoiding this in the short term is impossible, unwise, and illogical.
The Resistance Front must accept these limitations and frames, and by accepting them, it will be able to establish its position and base in a particular country and social geography. Once this base is established, the Resistance Front can implement its national issues, views, and programs through mutual understanding with other sides.
Of course, I am firmly convinced that if the Resistance Front continues to talk about all-Afghanism and holds the flag of all-Afghan honor and dignity in its hands, it will not be able to reach any principled and workable agreement with the internal and external parties.
The majority of the Pashtuns have decided to accept the Taliban as their representative and ruler. This is a fact. This must be acknowledged. Other ethnic groups also have definite political centers. The fact that the political representatives of the ethnic groups have their problems and have not been democratically elected is a separate issue. This should not be considered as a reason for the absence of specific political representatives among the ethnic groups.
Political, civil, and progressive forces among all ethnic groups that do not show commitment to existing ethnic political representatives are unstable and floating and do not play a significant role in defining the playing field. They have good views that seek to transcend ethnic boundaries, but this kind of political romanticism does not reflect the objective reality of politics in Afghanistan. These views can be discussed later.
Foreigners and strategists who write strategies on Afghanistan also divide Afghanistan very clearly into ethnic groups, and the main indicator of their knowledge of Afghan politics and society is precisely this element of ethnicity. However, one cannot look at all this alone and say that I do not care about all this and I am playing my instrument.
As I said, the idea is good and perhaps noble, but since it is incompatible with objective reality, it is impractical and, therefore, apolitical. It is useful to poets and romantic writers, but not to the young political leaders from whom the world and the people expect to lead Afghanistan out of the current crisis and impasse.