Four years have passed since the hateful and rejected Taliban seized power.
Author: Amrullah Saleh, former First Vice President of Afghanistan
Original article: این طالبانستان است، بیایید افغانستان خود را پس بگیریم
Providing a single, widely agreed-upon analysis of the causes and factors behind the fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is a difficult and nearly impossible task. Everyone who lived under the flag of the republic or benefited from it has their own perspective on the dark event of its collapse and the rise to power of the despised and rejected Taliban structure.
Each person evaluates this event from their own ethnic, political, social, religious, or economic standpoint—an event that once again took Afghanistan off the path of civilization and state-building. It is impossible to present a single, dominant version of this collapse. Therefore, my aim in this analysis is not to blame others or highlight their mistakes and shortcomings. Like others, I am expressing my point of view, shaped by political affiliations, power structures, regional, ethnic, linguistic, local, and historical circumstances.
First
Fortunately, access to social networks and the internet is now widespread, and many of the facts mentioned here are easily verifiable. My first point concerns the role of the vice president in the republic’s structure and under the constitution. The vice president’s powers are not clearly defined in the Constitution, and the president determines their scope. The level of authority depended on the relationship between the Vice President and the President.
The public’s expectations of me were based not only on formal powers—or lack thereof—but also on my political, ethnic, and historical roots. As I was one of the fighters alongside National Hero, martyr Ahmad Shah Massoud, the people expected me to defend his political legacy and views.
When I became vice president, the resistance camp of the 1990s was not only fragmented, but each part had lost its true core. Within the government, at minimum, the sphere of resistance was divided between me and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. I will leave aside the question of how much each of us defended these interests so as not to deviate from the main goal of this article.
Therefore, those who think the armed forces could or should have acted on my orders are unfamiliar with the spirit and letter of the Constitution. By law, apart from my security circle and closest supporters, I could not directly issue orders to any part of the armed forces. The vice president had to convey opinions and requests through the existing institutional mechanisms of the time—Security Council meetings chaired by the president, special security sessions, and cabinet meetings.
Due to my experience in security, particularly intelligence, the president was under pressure from the U.S. not to grant me broad and specific powers in this area. He stated this directly in his first major interview after the fall.
After Zalmay Khalilzad began direct negotiations with the Taliban in 2018, bypassing the republic, I took a firm and sharp stance, organizing public assemblies. I was the first, at a rally in Kapisa, to condemn Khalilzad’s negotiations, stating that they were extremely dangerous for the survival of the system and the achievements of the resistance and the republic.
This position, even before uniting with President Ashraf Ghani, led the U.S. embassy to effectively impose unofficial sanctions on me for more than two years of my vice presidency. Relations were very cold. Occasionally, attempts were made on both sides to establish understanding, but the gap in perspectives was too wide.
The U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Kabul, named Richard, held a private multi-hour meeting with me in my temporary office in Koti-Baghche a few days after my inauguration, as the vice president’s office had not yet been vacated by Marshal Dostum. Richard tried to explain that if I wanted a political future, I should not oppose the U.S.’s reconciliation policy. We did not reach an agreement, and his suspicions that I opposed meaningless and humiliating compromises with the Taliban only intensified.
Once, at the Haremsara complex, after a meeting, a serious verbal clash occurred, and he left the session following my harsh words. The U.S. embassy repeatedly demanded that press releases from the “six-and-a-half” early morning meetings should not be sent against the Taliban or mention their involvement in targeted killings and urban bombings, which they often refused to admit, because Khalilzad had coined the term “reduction of violence.”
For example, even after the republic’s fall, the Taliban published a list of suicide attackers involved in attacks against me, though previously they denied involvement. The explosion at Zanbak Square was part of the same series of crimes. The U.S. tried to justify the Doha agreement, and exposing Taliban crimes undermined their version of events.
I could have done much more, as I had both experience and energy, but I could not issue direct orders to the troops. Now, reflecting on my authority at that time, I blame no one but myself. If there was insufficient authority, I should have protested at the moment. Perhaps I was the only person in Afghan history who always performed morning prayers in my office. I tried to prevent Afghanistan from sliding into the catastrophe it eventually fell into.
Second: The Method of Negotiations with the Taliban
The so-called political elite of Afghanistan was extremely fragmented, and no political group sincerely and unanimously supported the government’s negotiating position. Every time Khalilzad visited Kabul, before meeting the president, he met with various individuals and made it public to show the president that he was not the only center of peaceful settlement on behalf of the republic.
Those who met with Khalilzad before the president felt important and considered mocking the Arg (the presidential palace) a demonstration of power and prestige. Khalilzad’s devilish tactic of creating divisions and discord was obvious. As has always been the case, the devil’s role in leading people astray was far from subtle. The isolation of the republic became one of the foundations of the new U.S. strategy.
As I have already mentioned (all my statements are available online), I understood that this method would lead to a dead end. But my viewpoint was not shared throughout the republic. Sometimes I was seen as the “gatekeeper of hell,” as if I only brought anger and punishment. In reality, based on my experience, I knew that the Taliban had not changed, and had become even worse.
When a trip to the U.S.—the last one for the republic’s leadership—was planned, I tried to convince the president not to take me, since I was not invited and my name was not on the list. However, Dr. Fazl Mahmood Fazli, head of the administration, conveyed the president’s request to set aside formalities for the good of the homeland and accompany Ashraf Ghani as a brother. I agreed.
In Washington, the Afghan embassy hosted a reception attended by over a hundred former U.S. officials, several current ones, generals, ambassadors, leaders, prominent journalists, and lobbyists. The president spoke very cautiously, justifying this by saying that a meeting with Biden was scheduled for the next day, and harsh words today could put him in an awkward position and devalue the negotiations.
After the president’s speech, former CIA Director David Petraeus stood up and said that the U.S. was on the verge of committing a crime in Afghanistan, which was unacceptable. He hinted at the inevitable troop withdrawal and a secret deal with the Taliban. This was the harshest statement at the meeting, and other speakers spoke in the same vein. The president told me: “Let Biden hear this from them himself, and we’ll save our words for tomorrow.”
Tom West (later U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan) was also present. The next day, before the meeting with Biden, no critical articles about his administration appeared in the American press, thus allowing Biden to avoid a public blow.
At the White House, I waited about an hour in the reception area because my presence was unofficial. When I entered, most of the negotiations seemed to have already concluded. Biden stood up and said, “Being vice president is hard work, thankless, and all the credit goes to the president. I was vice president myself, and I understand you.”
He offered me to speak. Due to time constraints, I asked three questions:
1 - If the goal of the Doha Agreement is peace, why will all your logistics and supplies of the republic’s armed forces cease on September 1, 2021, with no possibility of extension? After all, contracts should have been renewed in advance.
2 - If the Taliban violate the spirit of the agreement and go on the offensive, what is your plan? Or have you already abandoned the republic, and in fact, this agreement is a regime change?
3 - Are you mentally prepared for the fall of the republic?
The questions were tough, but Biden calmly replied that they were reasonable and added: “We will continue to support the republic, but the technical details will be explained by the Secretary of Defense and the CIA Director.”
We met with Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin (1.5 hours) and CIA Director (almost 3 hours). Later, it became clear that both had the task of deceiving us: all promises were false, and the goal was to prevent independent defensive actions so that the plan to bring the Taliban to power would not fail and the republic’s army would lose the ability to resist.
I have all the details of these meetings. None of the promises were kept, even though until the very end we were assured otherwise.
Third: Tactical Measures
I was in favor of acquiring anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines and their mass deployment along the Taliban’s routes. Their advantage in combat was often provided precisely by mines, and the absence of mines was a weakness (Afghanistan had signed the Mine Ban Treaty).
I also advocated for the purchase of drones. Foreign Minister Atmar shared my viewpoint and even organized a meeting with a Turkish company, but as vice president, I could not make such decisions directly.
I suggested distributing weapons to the population and organizing resistance “from house to house, street to street,” but I remained alone: others considered it a violation of “peaceful” agreements. President Ashraf Ghani usually agreed with the proposals of influential people and formally approved my initiatives in writing.
In the last weeks, funds were distributed by his order through the National Security Directorate. Anyone claiming they were ready to resist but received no support from Ghani is lying. In the end, the president did not reject a single request from such individuals.
However, some of these people secretly consulted with Khalilzad, who convinced them that “the Taliban had changed” and there was no need to worry. When it became clear that buying mines abroad was impossible (due to strong opposition from the U.S. and NATO), I began setting up small workshops for their production.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg even told Ghani that for the success of the Taliban peace process, they could not be executed and mines could not be purchased (a recording of his words is still on Twitter).
Although the president considered relations with the West fundamental, I had long seen that the West was betraying us. Ten days before the fall, he told me, “If you can, start that mine production workshop you mentioned.”
Although this was not part of my official duties, I began acting, but events unfolded too quickly.
My efforts were aimed at strengthening tactical actions to slow the strategic collapse. I supported the defense of Kabul’s suburban districts to at least temporarily prevent chaos before the Taliban’s arrival. But none of these measures formally fell within my powers as vice president.
Fourth: The Role of Propaganda and the Discrediting of the Government
Media outlets supported by Western countries, especially the U.S. Embassy, were tasked with portraying the government as an obstacle to peace. This program was promoted according to a pre-imposed plan.
For example, Tolo TV—the largest media outlet, which owes its fame and wealth to the republic—acted reactionarily and openly capitulated. The president was depicted as a power-hungry individual, even though he consistently stated in every meeting that his goal was not to cling to power, but to prevent collapse and disintegration.
The president’s words and reasoning were disadvantageous to the funded media, so they were prohibited from publishing them. They were instructed to create a positive yet fabricated and false image of the Taliban. Political leaders gained nothing from broadcasting the government’s positive statements and made every effort to weaken it. It was assumed that the Taliban focused solely on one target—the Arg Palace—and nothing else.
Fifth: Suspicious and Vindictive Neighbors
Much has been said about Pakistan’s role. What is today called the Taliban is, in reality, an exile structure that Pakistan has sheltered and supported for twenty years. Pakistan’s destructive role in the fall of Afghanistan has already been widely discussed.
For example, Qari Fasihuddin Fitrat, the so-called “chief of staff” of the Taliban army, spent a year in treatment at Hayatabad Hospital (Peshawar) after being wounded, with security provided by Pakistan’s military intelligence (ISI). The details of how Pakistan helped direct and coordinate wars against the republic’s forces require separate discussion.
The Taliban, with titles such as “mullah” and “mavlawi,” were in fact mere pawns, effectively controlled by the Pakistani military. One of our major mistakes was that, knowing Western intentions, we did not quickly establish broad defensive ties with neighboring countries to compensate for NATO’s betrayal.
President Ghani said in an interview that he is paying the price for believing in the West and the signed agreements that were never honored. Theoretically, the September 11, 2001, attacks disrupted the strategic U.S. relationship with religious extremism. But after Bin Laden’s elimination, Washington not only did not seek to crush the Taliban, but, on the contrary, tried to integrate them into its security system.
Sixth
On Thursday, August 12, 2021, Dr. Abdullah returned from Qatar and was invited to an emergency meeting at the Arg. After the briefings, I proposed a national resistance plan. The president remained silent. I deliberately addressed Dr. Abdullah:
— Doctor, you’ve just arrived. Do you have anything to say, or should we prepare for war?
He replied:
— If we assume resistance will occur, who and in what structure will take action? The conditions have changed.
After the meeting, I asked him privately:
— According to my information, the Taliban are preparing a large-scale offensive with the backing of the Americans.
He cautiously replied:
— In the last meeting with the Taliban, we heard nothing that would allow us to judge peace or war. The meeting was empty.
Earlier, I had repeatedly proposed establishing a joint commission to monitor violations of the so-called “reduction of violence” and had appointed General Jalal Yaftali on our side. But the proposal was rejected. Khalilzad claimed that most violations were committed by the government itself. The term “reduction of violence” was never defined, and my proposal to create a verification commission was never accepted.
Conclusion
I have always tried to strengthen national unity and avoid words or actions that could cause ethnic wounds. But the reality is that the Taliban are nothing more than a fanatical tribal army, indifferent to Afghanistan’s ethnic and cultural diversity. Religion is merely a cover for their lust for power, and to preserve their group, they sacrifice even the Quran.
An example is the silence surrounding sexual and moral scandals of senior leaders, which became public on the Internet and are more shameful than the Jeffrey Epstein case in the U.S. After the republic’s fall, “Talibanistan” emerged; Afghanistan was left in ruins—no Constitution, no national symbols, no public participation in governance.
Therefore, the Taliban structure will collapse—I do not know the form this collapse will take, but it is inevitable.
I lead the organization “Green Trend of Afghanistan” (RASA), which has been fighting the Taliban since 2011. After the republic fell, dozens of its members were killed, and many were imprisoned. We know how the Taliban psychologically tortures our comrades. Their courts are based not on Sharia or law, but on fanaticism, hatred, and arrogance.
Despite everything, we have not accepted and will not accept the Taliban—that is our historical pride. Freedom comes at a cost.
On August 15 at 11:40, I arrived in my village in Bagh-i-Surkh (Panjsher) and immediately began mobilizing people. With a small amount of weapons and sufficient resources, we began resistance. Fighting requires money, weapons, and people—and we have them in sufficient quantity to prevent the Taliban from claiming stability.
The Taliban will not be able to ensure real stability: the ability to travel from Kabul to Kandahar is merely an illusion of calm. Their strength lies in having armed about 3% of the population in the south, southwest, and some northern areas, paying them to secure their power. Other political forces in Afghanistan do not have such resources.
History shows: as long as internal wounds remain unhealed, there will be no stability. A peace founded on fear will not bring investment, a sense of community, or a real state. The situation will change when access to weapons is resolved—then the Taliban will be spoken to in the “historical language of Afghanistan”—the language of power. For now, Persian and Pashto seem to have fallen silent, and only the barrel of a rifle speaks—the main language of the country.
To preserve the sense of a united homeland among the people after the Taliban fall, we are building a movement based on restoring Afghanistan, not replacing one ethnic arrogance with another. We fight for the destruction of “Talibanistan” and the revival of Afghanistan.
