What Is Washington’s New Plan for the Region?
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, exclusively for Sangar
After two decades of direct presence in Afghanistan, the United States has shifted its focus from “costly state-building” to “remote risk management.” This marks not only the end of a failed project but also reflects Washington’s new understanding of Afghanistan’s role in global competition. Instead of investing in the development of local institutions, the tools now include financial pressure, human rights issues, and civil instruments—levers that allow threats to be contained without large-scale military deployments.
In this new paradigm, the Taliban are seen not only as an enemy or a terrorist group but also as a lever of pressure and a tool of regional influence against the Eastern bloc. Through a “soft and quiet presence”—intelligence and diplomatic visits, managing sensitive matters such as hostages—Washington pursues its security agenda, compensating for the absence of direct military power. At the same time, channels of engagement are shifting away from Islamabad (less reliable due to its growing ties with China) toward Arab and Gulf states, where the U.S. feels more confident.
Moreover, Washington employs the “terrorism card” as a controlled threat—an instrument for crisis management. The new policy shows parallel and often contradictory interactions with India, Pakistan, Russia, China, Turkey, and Central Asian states: the U.S. does not fully trust any one partner, using each as a balancing factor. Simultaneously, Washington relies on figures from the republic era as “reserve options” and propaganda resources to maintain domestic leverage.
The role of the United Nations has also become instrumental. Bodies such as UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), formally tasked with humanitarian missions, in practice become part of a monitoring and intelligence network. Today, the U.S. view of Afghanistan is no longer “strategically stabilizing”—the country is increasingly seen as a hub for surveillance and intelligence operations in Central Asia, as well as a tool of pressure against the Eastern bloc, rather than a base for permanent troop deployment.
This shift coincides with a rethinking of U.S.-Russia relations. In Afghanistan, Washington does not necessarily treat Moscow solely as an enemy but also as a tactical partner in containing China. Traditional U.S.-Russian battles have been replaced by intelligence games and influence struggles, with China perceived as the more ambitious and dangerous rival compared to Russia. This perception has strengthened Europe’s dependence on the U.S. in security, energy, and economic matters, keeping it under Washington’s “nuclear umbrella.”
China’s growing and self-serving influence in Afghanistan has become a shared concern for both Washington and Moscow. The shift in American policy is partly aimed at reducing Russia’s anxieties over U.S. interests, thereby freeing Washington’s hand to counter China in Afghanistan. Thus, Afghanistan is no longer an arena of direct U.S.-Russian confrontation; it has become a laboratory for containing China and preserving U.S. dominance in the “New Great Game.”
The U.S. policy reversal in Afghanistan reflects a multi-layered strategy, moving away from the logic of “direct presence and state-building” toward a logic of “instrumentalization and managed crisis.” The Taliban, the UN, Arab states, republican-era figures, and even Russia have become instruments in this strategy. This approach reduces costs for the U.S. but turns Afghanistan into a field of hidden competition and a mechanism for containing China. For Afghans, this does not promise sustainable stability but rather reproduces the “Great Game”—albeit in a softer and more complex form.
