What Program Is Pakistan Implementing?
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, exclusively for Sangar
Within the framework of a long-term transregional program, Pakistan responded based on its security considerations and vital interests. The issue of bombing Kabul goes beyond Islamabad’s independent decision; in fact, the United States decided to instill fear and terror among insurgents leaning toward the East. In this situation, Pakistan seized the opportunity and, acting as Washington’s executor and field partner, sent a warning to India. This warning is meaningful not only in the context of the longstanding rivalry between India and Pakistan but could also be applied in the future by U.S. drones against other regions.
A trend is emerging in the region aimed at establishing a new security system with the Taliban’s indirect involvement. The Taliban’s alliance in this system is solely due to Kabul’s strategic position and the geopolitical significance of the Hindu Kush. Within this configuration, the Bagram base remains a key element of both eastern and western security policies. However, as conditions change, only Kabul’s position will retain strategic significance—not the Taliban or any other local actors.
Recent Pakistani attacks on specific targets in Kabul are tactical security measures and part of a complex process to deceive and contain China, Russia, Iran, and especially India. From Islamabad’s perspective, responding to India’s actions—from inviting Amir Khan Muttaqi to reopening the diplomatic mission in Kabul—has become a geopolitical necessity. Effectively, these attacks sent a multilayered message whose significance extends beyond the country’s borders.
First, it restores Islamabad’s reactive role within transregional security. The attack on unidentified convoys in Kabul demonstrated that Islamabad remains a reliable operational tool for the West in the region. By showcasing its combined military and intelligence capabilities, Pakistan confirmed to the U.S. that it retains a place in the “remote management” system for Afghanistan. These attacks are effectively part of a joint display of power by Washington and Islamabad to maintain influence in Kabul.
Second, it restores Pakistan’s image as a victim of terrorism. In an environment where regional public opinion accuses Pakistan of nurturing terrorist groups, the country seeks to create a new image of itself as a victim of terrorism deserving international sympathy and support. This move effectively ends speculation questioning Islamabad’s capacity to operate amid the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) crisis.
Third, the Saudi-Pakistani alliance against Iranian influence. New ties between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan amid the Afghan crisis are a reaction to Tehran’s unchecked influence in the region. Islamabad, in coordination with Riyadh, seeks to rebuild a Sunni bloc to counter Iran’s soft power. This cooperation is part of the broader configuration of ideological and strategic competition in Afghanistan.
Fourth, delivering the West’s message to the region via Islamabad. The West, particularly the U.S., uses Pakistan as a communication channel and intermediary to convey messages to the region. The message is clear: without Pakistan, no Western power can effectively intervene in Kabul. This role consolidates Pakistan’s position in the West’s new “soft intervention” framework and transforms it into a bridge between Washington’s military and political strategy and spheres of influence in South Asia.
Fifth, discrediting the Taliban in the region. For four years, the Taliban confidently claimed that no country would be threatened from Afghan soil. However, by targeting TTP leaders, this claim is collapsing. Following the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri, leaders of other foreign groups—from Ansarullah of Tajikistan to Chinese Uyghurs and members of Tahrir al-Sham—are now under threat. Consequently, the Taliban are in a position of complete distrust.
Sixth, warning the Taliban regarding contacts with India. Recent attacks carry a hidden message for certain Taliban leaders who maintain contacts with India for convenience. Pakistan warns that Afghanistan is the product of forty years of Islamabad’s security investment, and no power has the right to share this field with India. This warning delineates new boundaries for intelligence and security competition within the Taliban.
Seventh, demonstrating power with both soft and hard components. Islamabad has shown that just as it can create and equip proxy groups, it can also suppress any potential defiance with hard power. This action sends a signal both to the Taliban and to regional competitors: Pakistan has not lost its control mechanisms.
Eighth, reinforcing authority in public perception. Through these military maneuvers, Pakistan targeted not only the Taliban but also the public opinion of Afghanistan and the wider region. The goal is to consolidate the perception of power and influence in the collective consciousness. This is precisely what the U.S. wants: a local actor capable of responding to Taliban defiance with force without direct U.S. involvement.
Ninth, symbolic coordination of recent events. The timing of events is not coincidental: simultaneous attacks in multiple Afghan provinces, Muttaqi’s visit to India, Delhi’s decision to reopen its embassy, the Moscow Format meeting, Putin’s visit to Dushanbe—all occur within a framework of calculated strategy. Pakistan and the U.S., recognizing the situation, sought to exploit it as a multidimensional opportunity.
Tenth, geopolitical fear as a new tool of control. What Pakistan demonstrates is not an act of retaliation but a form of “geopolitical fear management.” Airstrikes and symbolic operations aim to create a psychological effect: they are more a strategic display than purely military action. These attacks send a message to the Taliban, warn India, and remind the Eastern bloc (China, Russia, Iran) that Washington is still present in the shadows.
Overall, the events in Kabul are part of a larger chain in which Islamabad and Washington work together to restore a balance of fear in Afghanistan. In this game, Pakistan acts as the U.S.’s executive arm while simultaneously seeking to consolidate its position as a regional security guarantor. The recent attacks are not the endpoint but the beginning of a new phase of psychological, intelligence, and military competition in the region and beyond, where Afghanistan remains a quiet yet active arena of power struggle.
