Guerrilla operations in the mountains must resonate in the streets of the cities.
By Abdul Naser Noorzad Tajik, researcher in politics and geopolitics, especially for “Sangar”
The events in Yaftal, Badakhshan, despite their significance and unprecedented nature in the course of the struggle against the Taliban, constitute far more than a mere military operation. They demand strategic analysis, conceptual reassessment, and comprehensive evaluation. Such developments cannot be interpreted solely through the prism of emotions, sentiment, or anti-Taliban attitudes.
On today's battlefield, every military action is defined by strategic objectives, operational planning, geostrategic considerations, emerging technologies, and the requirements of modern warfare. Consequently, the successful execution of a guerrilla operation alone neither guarantees victory nor demonstrates the achievement of strategic objectives.
Badakhshan, particularly the Hindu Kush mountain range, is one of the few regions of Afghanistan whose geographical characteristics allow military operations to continue throughout all four seasons. Few other provinces possess such an advantage. Any force that thoroughly understands this terrain and is adequately trained for combat under such conditions can maintain continuous operational planning and sustained mobility without becoming entirely dependent on seasonal changes.
From a strategic perspective, however, Yaftal—or any other district, regardless of its geographical value—cannot by itself create the conditions necessary for delivering a decisive blow to the Taliban. Relying on a single geographical area or one operational axis cannot serve as a sustainable strategy in a prolonged war of attrition. No matter how impressive localized successes may be, they cannot alter the existing balance of power without unity of action among the various resistance movements.
Today, the most urgent priority is the establishment of genuine coordination among the different fronts of the resistance. Such coordination must begin with intelligence sharing and operational cooperation before evolving into mutual trust, the division of geographical responsibilities, and the planning of complementary military operations. Fragmented and uncoordinated actions, even when they produce short-term gains, inevitably lead to higher costs, greater casualties, and an increased risk of failure over the long term. The struggle for Afghanistan's liberation requires, above all, unity in vision, strategy, and action.
The absence of such cohesion also creates fertile ground for political exploitation. Various actors—both allies and adversaries—will seek to capitalize on battlefield successes in pursuit of their own political agendas. As a result, the very essence of the struggle risks being overshadowed by the dynamics of global geopolitical competition.
One of the most important lessons of the Yaftal operation is the need for the resistance to fundamentally reconsider the strategic role of geography. Geography, in and of itself, is not a strategic advantage unless it is effectively integrated into a coherent military strategy. The mere presence in mountainous terrain should not be mistaken for a guarantee of victory. The true value of geography emerges only when it is employed as a strategic asset, enabling sustained guerrilla warfare and long-term attritional operations adapted to the changing conditions of every season.
In this context, concentrating the struggle along a single axis cannot impose decisive pressure on the Taliban. The movement will experience genuine strategic attrition only when it is forced to confront simultaneous pressure across multiple fronts and from different directions. Expanding the battlefield will deprive the Taliban of its ability to concentrate forces, rapidly redeploy units, and manage crises effectively, compelling it instead to disperse its military and security resources.
At the same time, guerrilla operations should not be viewed as an end in themselves or as an independent strategy. Rather, they must form an integral component of a comprehensive military campaign. Their true strategic value lies in their continuity, coordination, and their ability to sustain relentless pressure on the enemy, compelling the Taliban to experience not only physical attrition on the battlefield but also growing psychological insecurity.
In this regard, expanding the operational reach of such attacks is of particular importance. Operations that remain confined to mountainous or remote areas without affecting security conditions in urban centers possess only limited strategic value. For example, an operation conducted in northern or northeastern Afghanistan should be planned in such a way that its security repercussions are felt in key population centers such as Charikar. Once fear and insecurity spread into urban areas and undermine the enemy's psychological confidence, a guerrilla operation ceases to be merely a tactical action and becomes an instrument of strategic influence.
For this reason, the events in Yaftal should be examined within the broader historical context of guerrilla warfare and national liberation movements. The success of such operations depends not merely on the execution of an attack, but on an entire set of interrelated factors: the existence of a secure strategic rear base, well-developed logistical networks, effective intelligence dominance over the operational environment, the ability to sustain operational continuity, and the preservation of tactical surprise across multiple sectors of the battlefield.
At the same time, the consequences of "hit-and-run" operations must be carefully considered. Although such attacks may generate considerable public attention and deliver significant propaganda gains, they also provide the Taliban with an opportunity to tighten security measures, intensify pressure on local communities, and make the planning and execution of subsequent operations substantially more difficult. For that reason, every tactical action must be designed within the framework of a carefully calculated strategy that fully accounts for its post-operational consequences.
Alongside popular support, geography remains one of the resistance's most valuable strategic assets. Public support, however, should not be regarded merely as an emotional resource. It must be managed wisely and directed toward the achievement of long-term strategic objectives. Operations of this kind can revive public confidence and shatter the perception of the Taliban's invincibility, yet they are not, by themselves, capable of fundamentally altering the balance of power.
Ultimately, the anti-Taliban resistance is constrained less by a shortage of weapons than by a lack of strategic resources. Sustainable financing, access to valuable natural resources, temporary control over mineral deposits, key economic infrastructure, and revenue-generating transportation corridors are all decisive factors in sustaining a prolonged war of attrition. Without a solid economic foundation, even the most successful military operations cannot be maintained over time.
The Hindu Kush and the mountainous terrain it dominates continue to provide resistance with vast, yet still largely untapped, opportunities for waging a sustained campaign of attrition against the Taliban. Intelligent, deliberate, and timely exploitation of these geographical advantages could gradually erode the Taliban's operational capabilities throughout the region. Much of Afghanistan's strategic geography remains underutilized. If these advantages are incorporated into a unified, coherent, and well-coordinated strategy, they have the potential to shift the balance of this conflict in favor of the resistance.
