All projects proposed by Afghanistan's non-Tajik ethnic groups constitute a conspiracy against the Tajiks.
By Abdul Naser Noorzad Tajik, researcher in politics and geopolitics, especially for “Sangar”
Part 1:
Projects or Traps for the Tajiks
In the first part, we examined the principal objective behind promoting the concept of the Persian-speaking community, the Persian-speaking sphere, and the related theories that, in our view, run counter to the interests of the Tajiks. In this section, we will focus specifically on the fundamental challenges involved in forming an ill-conceived alliance between Tajiks and non-Tajiks based on civilizational theory, the structure of political power, geography, language, and civilizational ownership. In our opinion, any durable alliance requires a precise definition of interests as well as an honest recognition of existing contradictions. In other words, a common language alone cannot serve as a sufficient and lasting foundation for the formation of a political and social alliance.
The priorities of the Tajiks differ fundamentally from those of the non-Tajik groups. These differences stem from distinct cultural, linguistic, and even identity-related foundations. Therefore, the formation of any alliance depends not so much on linguistic commonality as on the existence of shared interests and compatible priorities. Consequently, the Persian language itself—whose historical heritage belongs to the Tajiks—cannot by itself serve as the sole foundation for political unity and cooperation with non-Tajik groups.
Supporters of such an ill-conceived alliance, who primarily emphasize historical arguments, deliberately avoid addressing the historical wounds and contradictions that exist between Tajiks and non-Tajiks. This is even though many advocate the principles of transitional justice and have turned them into political and social slogans. In practice, however, it has been the Tajiks who have become victims of double standards and discriminatory treatment. Ignoring these realities, therefore, cannot provide the basis for genuine and lasting reconciliation.
Supporters of the theory of a Persian-speaking union speak extensively about cultural solidarity. However, they consistently avoid explaining how the Tajiks' share in the country's political power, state administration, security institutions, and decision-making processes should be increased. Without a clear political program, cultural solidarity alone is incapable of safeguarding Tajik interests and cannot be regarded as a practical solution.
The concept of civilizational identity invoked by the proponents of this theory is, at best, a civilizational, cultural, and historical construct. It may occupy a special place in historical and cultural discourse; however, in the realm of practical politics and power relations, it is incapable of resolving any concrete problems by itself.
Moreover, we have serious reservations regarding the interpretation and definition of civilizational identity offered by the advocates of the Persian theory. We regard it primarily as a political instrument designed to exploit the potential of the Tajiks within the broader competition among other ethnic groups. From this perspective, the principle of the balance of power, the protection of collective interests, and careful attention to political institutions are far more important than merely emphasizing civilizational identity.
Within the theory of Persian-speaking unity, issues are deliberately presented in an overly broad and generalized manner, whereas the demands of the Tajiks are concrete, practical, and clearly defined. Matters such as the structure of political power, geography, the language question, and even civilizational ownership are, in practice, rarely—if ever—addressed clearly and seriously by the proponents of a Persian-speaking union. For this reason, such an approach generates concern and disappointment among the Tajiks. The fundamental question is what the future of such a project would look like. What will be the geopolitical position of the Tajiks? Who will possess ownership of the Persian language? And what share will the Tajiks have in the political power structure?
In this context, it is essential to distinguish between the concepts of the formation of power and the structure of power. The formation of power refers to the natural process through which the fundamental components of power emerge—a process that shapes its very essence and nature. The structure of power, by contrast, concerns the administrative organization of political authority and the distribution of functions and responsibilities within the political system. These are fundamentally different concepts and should therefore be examined separately.
When the proponents of the theory of Persian-speaking unity, guided by their own conceptual framework, disregard the specific demands of the Tajiks and attempt to define their political agenda on their behalf, their actual objective is to persuade the Tajiks to abandon such fundamental issues as the organization of political power, geography, the language question, ownership of the language, and their own historical and civilizational identity, replacing them instead with abstract and generalized themes. In practice, this approach amounts to subsuming the concrete demands of the Tajiks into large-scale, ambiguous projects that may ultimately exclude them from meaningful political and historical processes.
Within the theory of a Persian-speaking union, concepts such as "liberation" and "victory" are employed in a highly skillful, tactical, and carefully calculated manner. Since the ideas of liberation and victory appear attractive and inspiring to many Tajiks—especially under conditions in which Pashtunism has expanded its hegemony across Afghanistan's political, economic, cultural, and military spheres—such narratives easily resonate with their intended audience. In our view, however, the real issue lies beneath these slogans.
What lies behind this rhetoric also serves other objectives, one of the most significant being the marginalization of the Tajiks. This project may be presented in the form of federalism, systems of local self-government, or a joint effort by Tajiks and non-Tajiks to remove the Pashtuns from power. Nevertheless, the fundamental question concerns the post-Taliban period, with the Taliban currently serving as the representatives of Pashtun political dominance. The key issue is how the interests of the Tajiks will be safeguarded in the aftermath of such heterogeneous alliances.
Will the Tajiks continue to be regarded as an integral component of the power-sharing arrangement, or will the Persian language and Tajik identity once again be reduced to instruments for denying the historical role of this great nation? This is precisely the issue that non-Tajik groups deliberately—and misled Tajiks out of ignorance—attempt to portray as secondary. Therefore, in any political restructuring or in the formation of alliances between Tajiks and non-Tajiks, it is essential to define Tajik interests clearly and articulate the fundamental demands of the Tajik people. This constitutes an indispensable prerequisite for any meaningful political process.
From the perspective of the proponents of the idea of "Persian identity," which we regard as an incoherent combination of an unwritten, weakly founded alliance intertwined with unfavorable non-Tajik approaches toward the Tajiks, language and civilization are employed merely as instruments for creating the appearance of unity and, ultimately, for pushing the Tajiks to the margins of the political process.
Within such a framework, neither a genuine alliance between Tajiks and non-Tajiks emerges, nor is there any sincere intention to cooperate. Furthermore, the demands and interests of the Tajiks hold no meaningful place in the calculations underlying this project.
Although cultural solidarity and linguistic commonality may constitute one of the necessary prerequisites for the formation of a union among Persian-speaking peoples, they are by no means sufficient to guarantee the protection of Tajik rights and interests. Therefore, any political or social alliance must be founded upon a clear definition of the interests, rights, and political status of all participating parties.
Accordingly, until the political and economic interests, as well as the genuine political representation of the Tajiks within any heterogeneous alliance—whether in the framework of the Persian-speaking sphere, the Persian civilization, or projects based on the concept of "Cultural Iran"—are clearly and unequivocally defined, such a framework will represent not a practical program for safeguarding the interests of Afghanistan's Tajiks, but rather an identity-based theory designed to instrumentalize them while relegating their historical role to the background.
For this reason, we continue to regard this issue as one of our fundamental theses and as a concept that remains open to critical examination. Consequently, it rules out the possibility of any hasty political compromise with non-Tajik political forces.
