How can historical facts be denied through fabricated statistics and historical ignorance be perpetuated?

By Abbas Farasoo (Afghanistan)

I have read an article by Noor Ahmad Khalidi titled “When Statistics Disprove Claims.” The reality is that his publication has neither scientific merit nor anything new to contribute to our understanding of Afghanistan’s history. Therefore, it might not even deserve a response. However, because the author reproduces an entire set of racial stereotypes, outdated historical interpretations, and justifications for state violence, using them to question the historical suffering of the Hazaras and their present-day demands, I felt it necessary to address several points to clarify these issues.

First, Khalidi bases his argument on a racial stereotype. He claims that the Hazaras are descendants of a thousand children who survived the Mongol invasion of Bamiyan in 1220. These children were supposedly born from relationships between Mongols and local women. This is the same simplistic, racially prejudiced narrative about the Hazaras that reduces their origins, history, and identity to the descendants of Mongol conquerors. Yet such a view cannot withstand scientific or anthropological scrutiny. Human communities neither emerge in this manner nor can they be meaningfully analyzed in such terms. I should emphasize that there is nothing inherently objectionable about the Hazaras having historical connections to the Mongols. However, the issue is far more complex than this narrative suggests.

Ethnic identities are complex historical and social phenomena, not simple, immutable, or predetermined biological characteristics. They emerge through intricate historical processes, evolve, and change over time rather than being confined exclusively to the descendants of a particular group or individual, as ethnic and tribal myths often suggest. Like other human communities, Hazara society has taken shape through centuries of demographic, cultural, and political transformations. The problem, however, is that the work of people like Khalidi has nothing to do with either historiography or demographic science. It merely reproduces an extremely simplistic ethnic stereotype, thereby perpetuating and spreading historical ignorance.

Second, Khalidi presents himself as an expert in statistics and numerical data, yet he demonstrates neither an analytical approach to examining such data nor a sound analytical model. To estimate the Hazara population in the past, he relies on figures Mountstuart Elphinstone provided in the early nineteenth century. However, Elphinstone was a representative of the British East India Company who visited Peshawar in 1809. He never traveled to Hazarajat, and his information about those regions came primarily from other people. Such estimates cannot be regarded as a reliable population census. Even today, Afghanistan lacks a comprehensive population census, and political and ethnic considerations have also shaped this absence. How, then, can indirect information gathered by a colonial official more than two centuries ago be treated as a definitive measure of the Hazara population and subsequently used to construct a flawed analytical model?

Khalidi then resorts to a ridiculous calculation. He assumes an initial population of one thousand people—once again relying on the same racially prejudiced stereotype—postulates a constant population growth rate over nearly eight centuries, and concludes that a 60 percent decline in the Hazara population during Abdur Rahman Khan’s reign would have been impossible.

My purpose is not to defend the figure of “60 percent,” but rather to demonstrate the fundamental flaws in Khalidi’s mathematical model. The problem is that he calculates the population growth rate using a hypothetical population at the beginning of the period and an estimated population in the present day (the end of the period), and then uses that calculated rate as a benchmark for assessing historical events.

Let us assume for a moment that the population estimates at the beginning and end of the period under consideration are accurate! Even then, the assumption of a constant population growth rate over eight centuries is methodologically indefensible. More importantly, an average population growth rate calculated over eight hundred years tells us nothing about the demographic changes that occurred during individual historical periods.

The population of a particular community may have grown rapidly during one period, declined dramatically during another, and then increased again. Therefore, it is impossible to draw meaningful conclusions about the population of a particular human group over eight centuries based on a single average growth rate. Such an approach rests on imaginary assumptions.

Furthermore, one cannot assume an average population growth rate over eight centuries and conclude that no catastrophe occurred during that time. At best, one could say that instead of examining the demographic history of the Hazaras, Khalidi has simply substituted the assumptions of his own model for actual history.

Another flaw in Khalidi’s calculations is that he misrepresents the very claim he seeks to challenge. The widely cited estimate of “60 percent” in academic literature refers to the total number of Hazaras who were killed, enslaved, or displaced from their lands, rather than solely to those who were killed. For example, the fourth volume of Siraj al-Tawarikh describes the destruction and displacement of approximately 400,000 Hazara families during that period (assuming an average of four members per family, this would amount to more than 1.5 million people). However, Afghanistan is a country where reliable statistical data are lacking, and the figure of 60 percent is itself an estimate made subsequently on the basis of historical accounts. Its accuracy can therefore legitimately be debated. Yet even if the 60 percent estimate is inaccurate, this does not change the historical reality of mass killings, enslavement, forced displacement, and the confiscation of land belonging to approximately 400,000 Hazara families. This is part of Afghanistan’s historical reality.

However, Khalidi’s underlying motives for constructing his imaginary mathematical model become clearer in the subsequent sections of his article. He goes on to justify the nature of the violence perpetrated by Abdur Rahman Khan against the Hazaras. He compares the war against the Hazaras with the suppression of the Shinwari, Ghilzai, and other groups, treating all of these campaigns as part of the normal process of “state-building.” This is a familiar interpretation in which state violence is normalized under the pretext of centralizing power. But the issue is not that Abdur Rahman also fought against other groups. The real question is how his government waged war against the Hazaras and what objectives it pursued.

Abdur Rahman Khan accompanied his campaign against the Hazaras with religious declarations of unbelief—takfir—and the proclamation of jihad. His wars against the Shinwari and other groups did not have the same character. The government issued religious decrees and proclamations calling on people from across the country to participate in the war, encouraging them with promises of land, war booty, and captives. Hazara women and children were enslaved, their lands were confiscated, and a substantial portion of the population was forcibly driven from their homes. In his fatwa against the Hazaras, Abdur Rahman declared: “The killing of people, the dispersal of the [Hazara] population, and the destruction of their settlements constitute true jihad and strengthen the religion of the Lord of all servants.” Moreover, according to this fatwa, even their repentance was not to be accepted.

These are not new allegations, nor are they fabrications invented by Hazara activists living outside Afghanistan. These policies are documented in Siraj al-Tawarikh by Fayz Mohammad Katib, the official court chronicle of Afghanistan. One government proclamation speaks of uprooting (“eradicating”) the Hazaras in certain regions, taking children captive, and distributing their lands among the Ghilzai and Durrani tribes. This is precisely what subsequently happened. Katib also documented a decree ordering the distribution of captives and war booty between the state and the forces participating in the campaign, as well as the collection of taxes on the buying and selling of Hazara slaves. Moreover, these events are recorded not only in official Afghan government documents but also repeatedly in intelligence reports produced by the colonial authorities of that period.

What do these actions have to do with ordinary state-building? Why should a government, in pursuit of consolidating its authority, declare an entire population to be unbelievers, enslave its women and children, and transfer its lands to other groups belonging to its own ethnicity? State-building may explain the historical circumstances in which violence occurred, but it cannot justify that violence. Khalidi and others like him ignore this fundamental distinction because, morally, they are unwilling to acknowledge the historical suffering of some of their fellow countrymen; intellectually, they are unwilling to examine history critically; and in terms of education and knowledge, they lack the capacity to understand human communities and their own country's history beyond simplistic stereotypes and racial prejudices.

We know that genocide is not defined by any single population figure. The central issue is the commission of specific acts with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular ethnic, national, racial, or religious group. To examine the nature of the violence carried out by Abdur Rahman Khan, it is necessary to investigate government decrees, the methods used in the military campaign, and the fate of the civilian population. Various scholars who have studied the genocide of the Hazaras have approached the subject precisely from this perspective. Khalidi, however, without familiarizing himself with the relevant academic literature and research, has produced a ridiculous calculation whose conclusion was already predetermined in his own mind.

Third, the most important aspect of Khalidi's article lies in its political implications. Having questioned the historical violence against the Hazaras, he proceeds to cast doubt on their contemporary persecution and discrimination, before turning to Australia's immigration policy. He portrays the activities of Hazara rights advocates as “lobbying” and claims that exaggerated historical narratives have resulted in disproportionate support for the Hazaras. In this way, the historical suffering of the Hazaras is reduced to a false narrative, demands for justice are portrayed as ethnic self-interest, and humanitarian assistance is presented as the result of political pressure. This approach is well known in Australia and is nothing new to either Hazaras or members of other ethnic communities living there. The current social divisions are also partly rooted in such activities.

However, this approach becomes even more striking when viewed in the context of the situation in Afghanistan. It is widely known that the Hazaras face political, religious, and economic discrimination under Taliban rule. They have been excluded from many government positions, the Ja'fari school of Islamic jurisprudence has been removed from the judicial system, and Shia religious education and ceremonies are subject to severe restrictions. At the same time, disputes over land and pastures, the forced eviction of families, and Taliban policies concerning land ownership and residential settlements threaten the security and livelihoods of the Hazaras. The Taliban have imposed complex legal, economic, and political obstacles on Hazara communities in urban areas, seeking to force them to abandon their homes, leave the cities, or flee the country altogether. Yet Khalidi chooses to remain silent about all of this. His silence may be interpreted as an indication of his approval of the Taliban's discriminatory policies. It is conceivable that tomorrow he may justify further atrocities under the pretext of “state-building.”

Moreover, in other sections of his article, he even attempts to justify bloody terrorist attacks against Hazara women and children. We all remember the targeted attacks carried out by ISIS-Khorasan against educational institutions, mosques, and Hazara-populated neighborhoods. This threat remains serious to this day. Such atrocities have been documented in reports by the United Nations and international organizations. Yet Khalidi attempts to link some of the contemporary violence against the Hazaras to the participation of certain Hazara migrants in the war in Syria. However, the massacres in Mazar-i-Sharif and Yakawlang occurred many years before the Syrian war began. More importantly, the actions of a particular military organization cannot be attributed to an entire ethnic community. That would be equivalent to holding all Pashtuns responsible for the actions of the Taliban. Such reasoning is based on the principle of collective responsibility and, instead of holding the actual perpetrators of violence accountable, portrays the victims as responsible for the actions of others. This logic is morally unacceptable and analytically unsound.

I have addressed these issues because, under the present circumstances, denying the historical suffering of the Hazaras, as well as that of Afghan women, is not merely a disagreement over interpretations of the past. In academic literature on genocide and ethnic, racial, and gender discrimination, denial of the very nature of such discrimination and violence against victimized groups is recognized as one of the major factors contributing to their persistence. In my view, this is precisely what Khalidi is doing. Denying violence and discrimination effectively amounts to endorsing and encouraging violence and discrimination against a particular ethnic group.

Common sense suggests that someone like Khalidi, who has spent many years living in a developed country such as Australia and has grown old enough for his hair to turn gray, should stand alongside his Hazara compatriots rather than deny their pain and suffering. He should criticize the discriminatory policies that have victimized both the Hazaras and Afghanistan as a whole. Unfortunately, however, Khalidi demonstrates a lack of such intellectual capacity and moral courage.


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