An exclusive interview by Sayhun Kuhsor, correspondent of “Khorasan Times,” with Dr. Sahebnazar Muradi, historian and writer (Afghanistan)
Source: “Khorasan Times”
In the modern history of Khorasan-Afghanistan, the crisis of identity and the legitimacy of the political system have become the foundation for the emergence of several alternative ideas aimed at redefining this land.
Among them, four major theories stand out: Pashtunistanism, which once sought to unite the Pashtun peoples on both sides of the Durand Line; Hazaristanism, which emphasizes the rights and autonomy of the Hazaras in the central regions; Turkestanism, which has recently become increasingly prominent in the north of the country and focuses on the identity of the Turkic peoples of the region; and finally, Khorasanism, which rejects ethnic labels and seeks a solution in returning to a historical and non-ethnic identity.
This raises a fundamental question: Is the solution to the political and ethnic problems of Khorasan-Afghanistan the division of the country into small autonomous territories based on these theories?
To answer this question, “Khorasan Times” conducted a detailed conversation with Dr. Sahebnazar Muradi, historian and writer.
KHORASAN TIMES: Is the solution to the ethnic and political problems of Khorasan-Afghanistan the disintegration and division of the country into small autonomous territories?
MURADI: No, absolutely not! Solving the political and ethnic problems in Khorasan-Afghanistan requires a series of humanitarian and social reforms. We can rely on political and social mechanisms that would not lead to the breakup of the country, but instead create mutual understanding, solidarity, and cooperation among peoples; such solutions do exist. However, the main problem is political stubbornness and intransigence on the part of ethnocentric groups and ethnic governments in Khorasan-Afghanistan, which fail to show flexibility toward the country’s changing realities.
KHORASAN TIMES: In the past, the ideas of Pashtunistanism, Khorasanism, and Hazaristanism already existed. Recently, a fourth theory called “South Turkestan” has emerged in the north and northeast of Khorasan-Afghanistan. Where does this idea derive its political origins from, and how feasible is it from the perspective of social structure?
MURADI: Regarding Pashtunistanism, it should be noted that Daoud Khan, even during his time as prime minister, focused on the idea of Pashtunistanism by creating various political institutions and attempted, under the slogan “Lar and Bar,” to turn both sides of the Durand Line into a single territory for the Pashtuns. However, since international political agreements recognized the Pashtuns as citizens of two separate states, Daoud Khan was unable to find a mechanism to resolve this issue.
Thus, the Durand Line agreement, signed during the reign of Abdur Rahman, was later reaffirmed and signed by five more rulers of Khorasan-Afghanistan. All of this led Pashtunistanism to become a source of tension in relations between Khorasan-Afghanistan and Pakistan without producing any other meaningful result.
Even today, Pashtunistanism, which is once again being discussed, resembles a dried tree: no matter how much it is watered or fertilized with chemicals, it will never become green again. Therefore, this slogan has demonstrated its ineffectiveness in practice and is in no way adaptable to the realities of Khorasan-Afghanistan.
As for Khorasanism, it should be said that this alternative is essentially a replacement for the very name “Khorasan-Afghanistan.” “Afghanistan” is an ethno-geographical name, whereas “Khorasan” is not an ethnic name and is not tied to any particular people. All citizens are Khorasanis, and Khorasanism grants neither superiority nor inferiority to anyone in comparison with others.
Based on this, Khorasanism is not merely a slogan of Tajiks. It is an issue that concerns all the people of the country. It serves both as a solution to the country’s problems and as an alternative for all those who do not accept “Afghanistan” as an imposed identity.
Khorasan is both our 1,500-year-old historical identity and, at the same time, a non-ethnic name. Every person living on this land has, to some extent, lived in Khorasan and is connected to the achievements of the Khorasanis.
However, the ideas of Hazaristan and Turkestan are also ethnic names. Those who today promote the slogan of “South Turkestan” rely on a region inhabited by many different peoples. What does this mean? If “Afghanistan” is considered an ethnic name, then “Hazaristan” and “Turkestan” are likewise two other ethnic names. It is impossible to solve the country’s problems by removing one ethnic name and replacing it with another ethnic name.
Therefore, it is better to choose a name that does not belong to any particular person. An ethnic name will neither solve the problems of Khorasan-Afghanistan nor have practical applicability.
KHORASAN TIMES: In your opinion, how does Khorasanism differ from the three other viewpoints — Pashtunistanism, Hazaristanism, and Turkestanism?
MURADI: Khorasanism differs fundamentally from ethnic slogans and ethnic names associated with the geography of Khorasan-Afghanistan. I repeat once again: Khorasan is not an ethnic name, but rather a shared heritage and a common point of unity for all the brotherly peoples of Khorasan-Afghanistan.
Every Uzbek, every Pashtun, every Hazara, and every Tajik can proudly say: “I am a Khorasani.” It should be understood that the same problems and conflicts that exist within the country today will also exist within “Hazaristan” and “Turkestan.”
KHORASAN TIMES: Does Khorasanism mean the disintegration of Afghanistan?
MURADI: No, absolutely not. As we have already said, if we want to move beyond the problem of the disintegration of Khorasan-Afghanistan, we must reject ethnic names and choose an alternative that has no ethnic foundation. Under no circumstances would this lead to the breakup of our country.
For example, “Afghanistan” is not a reliable name for the unity of the country’s peoples. For this reason, the names “Turkestan” and “Hazaristan” are also ethnic names that create even more contradictions. If we want to prevent disintegration, we must either choose the name Khorasan or any other name that does not have an ethnic origin.
However, since the name Khorasan has a historical legacy and appears in historical sources, travel accounts, and written texts, returning to Khorasan would in fact mean preserving that historical heritage.
Thus, we are in no way interested in the breakup of the country. But if such stubbornness and refusal to recognize the country’s real characteristics continue, I believe that this country will no longer be able to achieve lasting stability.
KHORASAN TIMES: Is the creation and spread of the idea of Pan-Turkism in Khorasan-Afghanistan beneficial to the national interests and stability of the country?
MURADI: No, that is not the case either. We know that Pan-Turkism is an ethnic and tribal ideology, just like Pashtunism. In countries where different people live together, the disease of ethnic nationalism should not spread to the point where it absorbs the interests and values of other people and ultimately creates widespread dissatisfaction and ideological conflicts.
Pan-Turkism is an ethnic ideology that, for at least the past century, has displaced the history, culture, language, and even the religion and traditions of the peoples living in Central Asia.
Based on this, this way of thinking still has external roots today. Those who advocate Turkestanism should understand that if the goal of Turkestanism is the realization of the rights of peoples, then they have the right, based on international principles of the right of nations to self-determination, to demand equality of rights up to autonomy and even separation. However, Pan-Turkism and the slogan of “South Turkestan” differ from such an approach.
First, the north of Khorasan-Afghanistan has never been Turkestan. Second, in the north of Khorasan-Afghanistan, besides Turkic peoples, Tajiks, Hazaras, Pashtuns, Qizilbash, and other peoples also live there, and in terms of population, the Turkic groups are in the minority.
If they are in the minority, then how do they dare impose the ethnic name of a minority upon the majority population of northern Khorasan-Afghanistan? This means “pouring water onto a colorful palette” and contributes neither to stability, nor identity, nor to the national interests of the Uzbeks.
At present, the Uzbeks are facing extremely difficult and dangerous conditions. If these gentlemen possess honor and courage, they should fight against the dark domination and fundamentalism of the Taliban group, which has turned religion into a tool of intimidation, and defend the people of the north and the Uzbeks. Even a stone makes a sound, but not these gentlemen! Yet when it comes to Turkestanism, they are very active and bold.
The meaning of such behavior is that these slogans originate from other centers, and their promoters undoubtedly receive compensation for them.
KHORASAN TIMES: Do the countries of the region support the disintegration of Khorasan-Afghanistan, or at least sympathize with such an idea?
MURADI: In my opinion, Iran, Pakistan, and the countries of Central Asia themselves largely face problems similar to those of Khorasan-Afghanistan — namely, ethnic diversity and the coexistence of multiple peoples.
If they support the disintegration of Khorasan-Afghanistan, they themselves will face even greater problems. For example, the creation of an independent Balochistan in Pakistan is impossible without the disintegration of Khorasan-Afghanistan and Iran.
KHORASAN TIMES: From a historical perspective, which peoples were more indigenous to northern Afghanistan, and what has been the historical background of the cities in this region?
MURADI: From the perspective of political ethics, it is impossible to declare who came earlier and who came later. We believe that anyone whose umbilical blood was spilled on the land of Khorasan-Afghanistan is a citizen of our country and possesses equal rights alongside all other peoples.
However, since you raised this question, I would point out from the perspective of historical heritage that ancient history, the medieval era, and the modern period show that Tajiks are among the oldest peoples living in Khorasan-Afghanistan, especially in the north of Khorasan-Afghanistan.
Those who promote the slogans of Pan-Turkism do not respect the country’s history, even from the standpoint of historical realities; they resort to appropriating ethnic identities and make baseless claims without any roots or sources.
Modern history relies not on oral statements but on documents and sources. First and foremost, supporters of Turkestanism should find justification for their ideas in historical sources rather than waving empty slogans.
KHORASAN TIMES: Are there alternative ways of resolving the ethnic problems of Khorasan-Afghanistan without territorial division, for example through decentralization or systems of shared governance?
MURADI: Yes, as I already mentioned in the first question, disintegration is not the only solution. First of all, the disintegration of Khorasan-Afghanistan itself is associated with very complex problems, and in general, we see no reason for such a breakup.
If the radical ethnic slogans and the ideas of Pashtunistanism promoted by our Pashtun brothers were to change, part of the country’s problems would be resolved. After that, we could implement political participation based on legal principles and a humanitarian approach.
Today, Khorasan-Afghanistan is a country of the twenty-first century that has gone through numerous events and crises over the past half-century. A parliamentary system could also become a solution to the country’s problems — a system in which the central issue is not the question of majority and minority, but rather citizenship and civic society.
In a political system founded on civil rights and citizenship, an unreasonable majority would not be able to deprive a reasonable minority of its rights. Around the world, the national question already has fair examples of resolution, and multinational states have tested such models in practice. We too can make use of this experience. The ethnic problem of Khorasan-Afghanistan will not be solved through “Facebook games” — it requires a national dialogue.
Wise and respected figures must come together and discuss these issues through reasoned arguments at a scientific conference or symposium in order to convince one another and find a way out of the crisis.
Brothers who advocate for Turkestan or Hazaristan should not be deprived of their rights. However, such theories and demands can only be realized within their own absolute territories, not on the lands of other peoples. For example, when the issue of “South Turkestan” is raised, where are the other peoples living there supposed to go? If other ethnic groups fall under the dominance of this Pan-Turkism, it will once again become oppression and a repetition of the mistakes of the past.
