A Tajik Expert on the Taliban, the Resistance Front, and Hybrid Threats
Interview by Leyla Denis, Eurasia Today
Why is Dushanbe in no hurry to normalize relations with the Taliban, yet equally reluctant to engage in open confrontation? Do Tajik citizens fighting in northern Afghanistan support the policies of the Tajik government, and are radical groups capable of breaching the border?
RUSTAM AZIZI, a security and counter-extremism expert, breaks down the key challenges facing Tajikistan in the coming years—from online recruitment via Telegram and hybrid propaganda to the underlying causes of migrant radicalization.
— Why does Tajikistan continue to take a cautious approach toward removing the Taliban from its list of terrorist and extremist organizations? What political and ideological red lines remain decisive?
— I would no longer describe Dushanbe’s position as simply hardline or uncompromising. In recent years, open criticism of the Taliban has noticeably diminished, giving way to a kind of strategic silence. However, there are still insufficient legal and political grounds for normalizing relations.
The Taliban has failed to fulfill its key promises. It has not established an inclusive government, ensured representation of the country's ethnic and political groups, has severely restricted women's rights, and has not convincingly severed its ties with terrorist organizations.
For Tajikistan, the ideological dimension of the issue is equally important. The violent seizure of power by a religious movement should not become an attractive precedent suggesting that armed struggle ultimately leads to political power and international recognition.
— How realistic is Tajikistan’s support for the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, and is the Front capable of changing the balance of power?
— It is important to distinguish cultural and public solidarity with Afghan Tajiks from proven state-level military and political support. There is insufficient publicly available evidence to confidently claim that Dushanbe provides systematic military assistance to the Front. Symbolic and political support for the idea of an inclusive Afghanistan certainly exists. However, the Front’s own capabilities remain limited. It can maintain pockets of resistance, exert informational pressure, and prevent the issue of a political alternative to the Taliban from disappearing entirely. Yet without a broad intra-Afghan coalition, a stable social base, and substantial external support, it will be extremely difficult for the Front to alter the nationwide balance of power.
— How prepared is the Tajik-Afghan border for serious security threats, and what are the limits of the current security system?
— No responsible expert can answer such a question with complete confidence, as it depends on numerous factors and the specific circumstances of each case. Moreover, much of the relevant information is classified. It is clear that in recent years the border has been significantly reinforced: the mobility of security units has improved, surveillance systems have been expanded, and international assistance has increased. Nevertheless, the border is long, mountainous, and extremely difficult to secure. Therefore, the primary threat is not a conventional large-scale incursion but rather the infiltration of small groups, the use of smuggling routes, drones, and coordinated hybrid sabotage operations.
— How dangerous is ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), a banned terrorist organization, to Tajikistan and the countries of Central Asia today? What role do individuals from the region play within it?
— ISIS-K represents the most active transnational terrorist threat associated with Afghanistan. Its danger lies not so much in its numbers as in its ability to recruit remotely, establish autonomous cells, and organize attacks beyond Afghanistan’s borders. Individuals from Central Asia, including citizens of Tajikistan, are visible in the group's propaganda and in certain operational networks.
However, specifying their exact proportion would be speculative. There are no reliable public statistics, and estimates from different sources vary considerably. The Central Asian component is significant primarily as a linguistic, propaganda, and operational resource that enables the organization to tailor its recruitment efforts to specific target audiences.
— Which regions and social groups in Tajikistan proved to be the most vulnerable during the Syrian-Iraqi conflict? Is it accurate to associate the majority of those who left with the Fergana Valley?
— I would not accept that claim without additional statistical verification. The Fergana Valley was indeed an important area of activity for certain radical networks, particularly in the broader Central Asian context. However, it would be incorrect to attribute the majority of Tajikistani militants to that region alone. The geographical distribution of those who departed was much broader and included various parts of the country. The decisive factor was not a person's place of birth, but rather a combination of circumstances: age, labor migration, identity crisis, religious illiteracy, social isolation, and exposure to closed recruitment networks. The region itself was not the root cause, but merely one of the contexts that increased vulnerability.
— Many citizens of Tajikistan were also recruited while working abroad as labor migrants. How have the mechanisms of radicalization and recruitment of migrant workers overseas changed?
— In the past, recruitment was more commonly based on personal acquaintance, informal religious groups, hometown networks, and shared accommodation. Today, it has become hybrid. Initial contact may still take place offline, but the subsequent ideological indoctrination is shifted to Telegram, private chat groups, video platforms, and even online gaming communities. Recruiters no longer necessarily urge a person to travel immediately to a conflict zone.
The recruiter first cultivates a sense of humiliation and alienation, then offers a simplistic worldview, and only afterward gradually leads the individual toward justifying violence. Therefore, migration itself should not be regarded as the cause of radicalization. Rather, it is an environment in which legal insecurity, discrimination, and loneliness amplify existing vulnerabilities.
— How have the language and methods of extremist propaganda changed? Are government institutions keeping pace with new technologies?
— Extremist propaganda has become shorter, more emotional, and more visually appealing. Instead of lengthy ideological lectures, it now relies on short video clips, memes, personal stories, pseudo-religious answers, and content generated with the help of artificial intelligence. Radical messages are often disguised within discussions about dignity, injustice, and the defense of Muslims.
Government agencies have learned how to block online resources, but such measures are always reactive and lag behind. What is needed is not only technical control, but also high-quality alternative content, greater media literacy, sound religious scholarship, and sustained engagement with young people.
— What is the most likely security threat scenario facing Tajikistan over the next three to five years?
— Most realist experts consider a large-scale invasion from Afghanistan to be unlikely. A far more probable scenario is one of chronic instability: isolated cross-border attacks, attempts by small groups to infiltrate the country, online recruitment, the use of drones, and efforts to mobilize migrant communities.
The principal challenge lies in the convergence of external threats with internal vulnerabilities. If social discontent, youth unemployment, migrant insecurity, and declining public trust are successfully exploited by extremist propaganda, even a relatively small network could produce serious consequences. For this reason, security should be measured not only by the strength of border defenses, but also by the resilience of society itself.
