British and Pakistani intelligence have begun a new joint game in Afghanistan.
Author: Andrey Serenko, head of the Center for the Study of Afghan Politics (Russia)
About three or four days ago, a delegation of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) representatives visited Istanbul and Ankara. According to my Afghan sources who are well acquainted with the situation, Pakistani intelligence officers held individual meetings with five well-known Afghan politicians in exile, representing almost all the main ethno-political groups of Afghanistan.
Among the interlocutors of the ISI emissaries were Atta Mohammad Noor, Salahuddin Rabbani, Mohammad Mohaqqiq, Abdul Rashid Dostum, and Aburab Rasool Sayyaf.
During warm meetings in Ankara and Istanbul, Pakistani spies and Afghan politicians discussed opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation, sources said. In particular, the Pakistanis transparently hinted to Afghan political emigrants about their readiness to assist in their negotiations with the “moderate” Taliban on the issue of forming a coalition (inclusive) government of Afghanistan.
“The Pakistanis made it clear that the new state-political system created by the Taliban as a whole should be preserved, but significant adjustments can be made to it. And the main one of these adjustments is a coalition government with the participation of these five Afghan politicians who are in exile,” the sources note.
By “moderate” Taliban, the Pakistanis meant those Taliban leaders who were ready not only to create a coalition government with the participation of some opposition representatives but also demonstrated a desire to “listen and hear Pakistan.” That is, stop supporting the Pakistani Taliban, as Islamabad is seeking from Kabul, and finally recognize the Durand Line as the official Afghan-Pakistani border.
According to rumors, Turkish meetings between Pakistani emissaries and Afghan political emigrants resulted in constructive agreements. Which, as evil tongues say, were supported by modest financial gifts from the Pakistani side.
By the way, allegedly almost immediately after the completion of meetings with Pakistani friends, Atta Mohammad Noor transferred funds totaling about 600 thousand dollars to his supporters in Iran and several other countries. It is unlikely that these were the last crumbs that the former “King of Balkh” tore from himself after pleasant conversations with the emissaries of the ISI.
However, the most interesting thing in this story is that the conversations of Pakistani spies with Afghan politicians were preceded by meetings of two British intelligence officers with the same gentlemen Noor, Rabbani, Dostum, Mohaqqiq, and Sayyaf...
As my Afghan sources note, a few days before the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence emissaries appeared in Istanbul and Ankara, two British citizens visited there. One of them is quite widely known as an expert on Afghanistan, diplomat, orientalist, expert commentator, and, of course, intelligence officer - this is Michael Semple. The second - a certain Marvin - is less widely known, but in the same capacity.
If Semple speaks brilliantly in Pashto and Farsi, then the Irishman Marvin speaks Farsi and Uzbek. Semple is considered one of the leading British specialists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Marvin in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Central Asia.
According to sources, Semple and Marvin now live almost constantly in Pakistan, from where they travel only to Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar to hold meetings with various Afghan politicians and to London to report to their superiors.
These two brilliant British intelligence officers visited Turkey a week ago, where they prepared the future meeting of Pakistani ISI emissaries with Noor, Rabbani, Dostum, Mohaqqiq, and Sayyaf.
“The British and Pakistanis worked in Ankara and Istanbul synchronously, as one team,” sources say. “First, Semple and Marvin worked on the Afghan politicians, convincing them to show prudence and constructiveness in the upcoming conversation with their comrades from Islamabad. And then the Pakistanis consolidated the preliminary negotiation success achieved by the British.”
It is curious that, according to sources, British and Pakistani emissaries, among other things, proposed to their Afghan interlocutors to open a “political office of the united opposition” in Pakistan. And it seems that Messrs. Noor, Rabbani, Dostum, Mohaqqiq, and Sayyaf responded to this proposal with pleasure.
Such a political office may appear in Pakistan after the February UN international conference on Afghanistan, which will open very soon in Doha.
So, what conclusions can be drawn from the February meetings between British and Pakistani intelligence officers and Afghan politicians in Ankara and Istanbul?
1 - The “Great Game” continues and in it, the British and Pakistani sides act together, at the same time, according to a common plan. At the current stage, this plan involves the creation of a new coalition of well-known Afghan politicians under the control of London and Islamabad with the prospect of its integration into the government of the “moderate” Taliban.
2 - The hopes of romantics in Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and the Central Asian region to create some kind of “regional consensus” on Afghanistan have failed completely and completely. Not only is Pakistan not working for the interests of this consensus, it is working against it. As you can see, it was quite successful.
3 - Turkey plays along with the British and Pakistanis in the “Great Game” and contributes to their project of a “great compromise” between the “moderate” Taliban and Turkish groups of Afghan political emigration.
4 - Behind the elegant strategy of the British and Pakistani, the shadow of Washington undoubtedly looms, which habitually acts with the hands of others, avoiding its political obligations and keeping its hands as free as possible.
5 - Russia, although it has been demonstrating some fuss in the Afghan direction in recent weeks, still cannot boast of any real successes. There is no strengthening of Moscow's position in Afghanistan; time is wasted on dull imitation stage settings. Among them are visits to Kabul by one or another Russian emissary that have no real content or consequences, stupid rituals around the long-dead Mosformat (in its current format), endless “protocols of intent” on various occasions that are signed with the Taliban, rare planes with humanitarian aid to Kabul and never-ending rendezvous with representatives of the Afghan opposition, which only emphasizes the Kremlin’s strategic emptiness.
