All projects advanced by Afghanistan's non-Tajik ethnic groups constitute conspiracies against the Tajiks.
By Abdul Naser Noorzad Tajik, researcher in politics and geopolitics, especially for “Sangar”
Concepts such as the "Persian-speaking (Tajik-Hazara) space," the "common Persian identity," the "Democratic Republic of Hazaristan," and "South Turkestan" have nothing to do with us, the Tajiks. Nor can they represent the legitimate demands, just interests, or historical aspirations of the great Tajik nation.
Rather than serving the interests of the Tajiks, these concepts instead turn us into fuel for a struggle over power against the Pashtuns.
Undoubtedly, preserving Tajik political power, dignity, and the independent political agency of the great Tajik nation in the face of black Pashtun, "yellow" Hazara, and multicolored Pan-Turkist projects—most of which are built upon anti-Tajik sentiment—remains our principal objective.
This is a historical mission and the responsibility of every committed, patriotic, and steadfast Tajik in confronting all forms of anti-Tajik actions.
For this reason, I have repeatedly warned about the hidden intentions of certain individuals, political movements, and closed circles that seek to sow division and fragment the great Tajik nation under such slogans as the "Persian-speaking space," "federalism," and other similar concepts.
This position is not merely a personal opinion or the product of subjective emotions. Rather, it is grounded in direct personal experience and first-hand familiarity with the activities of these circles.
I have personally observed their activities, objectives, and methods of operation, which led me to conclude that there exists a dangerous agenda aimed at eroding and gradually transforming Tajik identity.
From small groups operating under the banner of "movements," to covert and biased initiatives that primarily serve the interests of non-Tajik forces, as well as statements made by certain self-proclaimed Tajiks who have lost their sense of national identity while exploiting existing sentiments within Tajik society—all of these phenomena can be understood within the framework of a single coherent concept.
According to this analysis, the Tajiks constitute a genuine, historically established, and distinct identity that cannot be reconciled with artificially constructed, ideologically driven, and conspiratorial concepts such as the "Persian-speaking space," self-proclaimed and artificial "republics," or geopolitical projects like "South Turkestan" and the "Democratic Republic of Hazaristan."
At the same time, we firmly believe in the necessity of a practical, consistent, and uncompromising struggle against Pashtun ethnic nationalism, regardless of whether it manifests itself in the form of a monarchy, a republic, an emirate, or any other political model that, in the author's view, operates against Tajik interests.
From this perspective, a practical, strategic, and rational struggle against all anti-Tajik movements and against all adversaries of the Tajik people is regarded as an urgent and unavoidable necessity.
Viewed in this context, neither the ideology nor the publicly expressed positions of these small movements and their imagined, ideologically motivated "republics" reveal anything beyond a latent hostility toward the Tajiks.
Even in the official and unofficial statements of representatives of these circles, one can rarely find any meaningful commitment to defending Tajik identity, strengthening the political standing of the Tajiks, or expressing solidarity with the great Tajik nation.
This naturally raises the question: how can one place trust in hollow, tendentious, and conspiratorial concepts advanced under such notions as the "unity of the Persians," the "Persian-speaking space," "federalism," and other similar concepts?
As is evident from the positions espoused by these movements, a broad, deliberate, and carefully orchestrated effort is underway to portray the Persian language as the principal foundation of political identity and the primary link connecting the Tajiks with non-Tajik communities.
The reality, however, is that a substantial part of the Tajiks' political interests cannot be reduced to language alone. As both a political and an ethnic community, the Tajiks possess their own distinct and concrete demands regarding the distribution of power, political participation, representation, and an equitable share in the structures of governance. It is precisely these demands that, in the author's view, these movements consistently avoid addressing and remain unwilling to support openly.
For this reason, no policy document, political platform, or conceptual framework produced by these anti-Tajik movements contains a clear commitment to defending the political rights or national identity of the Tajiks.
Instead, one can observe coordinated efforts suggesting that an excessive emphasis on such notions as "Persian-speaking peoples," the "Persian-speaking space," "federalism," together with unconditional support for projects such as the "Democratic Republic of Hazaristan," may in practice contribute to the gradual erosion of the Tajiks' political identity.
Fortunately, such projects have, to a considerable extent, failed to achieve their objectives thus far. Nevertheless, a small number of individuals who identify themselves as Tajiks continue to fall under the influence of these ideas and lend them their support.
The author has personally witnessed that, during formal discussions within these circles, not only is the distinct nature of Tajik identity and its historical continuity denied, but it is also asserted that the very concept of the "Tajik" emerged only within the past century and that its formation is inseparably linked to the work of Sadriddin Ayni.
At the same time, sophisticated and carefully coordinated efforts are being made to portray the Persian language as the sole unifying element, even though, from both a historical and civilizational perspective, the Tajiks have been its principal custodians and bearers.
Meanwhile, in practical activities and discussions concerning identity, particular attention is devoted to non-Tajik identities—especially Hazara and Turkic identities. Dedicated representatives are assigned to promote these constituencies, and systematic efforts are undertaken to advance their visibility and political profile.
Against this backdrop, an obvious question arises: what genuine common ground can the Tajiks share with movements that adhere to such views and approaches?
At the same time, one fortunate development for Tajik society has been that the true nature of these closed circles—regarded by the author as acting against the interests of the Tajik people—has gradually become apparent through their own public statements. Those statements have increasingly revealed a pattern of bias, prejudice, and, at times, overt hostility on the part of certain representatives of non-Tajik communities.
This has enabled the great Tajik nation—with its considerable capacity for statecraft and political leadership—to gain a clearer understanding of the underlying objectives of such projects and to develop an appropriate response, one that is increasingly evident today among those committed to safeguarding Tajik identity.
Nevertheless, these sophisticated and carefully disguised initiatives continue to evolve in different forms and employ a variety of methods, while some Tajiks who have come under their influence remain their principal victims.
The author expresses the hope that these individuals will soon reconnect with their national identity and come to recognize the realities that, in the author's assessment, are unfolding to the detriment of the Tajik people.
