Are the interests of the Afghan "Turk peoples" really important to Turkey?
Author: Nurullah Valizada, writer and political analyst, especially for Sangar
We ended the previous article on Turkish interference in Afghanistan with the above question.
Now we will answer this question. Turkey considers itself the protector of the interests of the Afghan Turks. In this article, we will examine the correctness of this statement. It is also possible that Turkey's definition of the interests of Afghan Uzbeks may differ from the fact that Afghan Uzbeks define them for themselves.
Turkey looks at the Uzbeks of Afghanistan in the global and regional big picture and naturally defines their interests based on that big picture. But the realities of Afghanistan and its socio-cultural context make it difficult to determine the interests of an ethnic group from the outside. In other words, Turkey cannot accurately determine the interests of the Afghan Turks. Of course, the discussion of the question of what exactly are the interests of the Turkic peoples of Afghanistan requires a separate approach. This article will focus on whether their interests are important to Turkey.
On the other hand, however, the last question may not be accurate in the eyes of many and maybe fundamentally wrong, arguing that the interests of the Uzbeks and the interests of Turkey coincide. But it must be said that this is not so. Despite the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic commonality, Turkey as a new nation-state has its own interests that are different from those of the Uzbeks of Afghanistan.
Most governments in our region are in a similar situation. On the one hand, they are bound and obliged to ensure their own "national interests", which consist in ensuring the safe and prosperous life of citizens living in their geographical territory, regardless of their ethnic and tribal affiliation, and on the other hand, there are related ethnic and racial groups for abroad, the support and protection of which is also part of the responsibility of governments. Of course, by and large, the support of kindred ethnic groups outside national borders opens the way to the establishment and development of trade, and economic and cultural ties between countries, but on the other hand, it can be determined for many countries from the point of view of national interests and even as it is now national security. However, “instrumental opinion of kindred peoples outside the national territory of the country in pursuit of national interests” is one thing, and “value-based support for them beyond national borders” is another thing that should be noted.
In fact, there is a thematic and conceptual overlap between domestic and foreign policy, which sometimes leads to conflicts and puts governments in serious trouble. This is especially difficult for governments such as Turkey, Iran, and India, which claim to be the cultural and civilizational central position in our region.
This difficulty is such that, in many cases, it puts the governments of the region at a crossroads in order to prioritize the interests of kindred peoples abroad and those of domestic citizens. Especially when these interests conflict and "central" governments are forced to choose between two options.
Turkey is in a difficult geographical position. It is subject to three major conflicts - East and West, Arabs and non-Arabs, Islamism, and secularism. Turkey also competes with European states in terms of overall welfare in terms of the level of social security of its citizens. Such countries are forced to pay more attention to the well-being and comfort of citizens living on their territory than, for example, pretend to be a "hero-savior" of foreign peoples! Although Turkey has so far managed to somehow reconcile and move forward between all these conflicts, they have always endangered the Turkish government. When Turkey intervenes in these disputes, it can be difficult in many cases to give priority to the interests of the Turkic ethnic groups outside of it.
If we turn to the experience of recent decades in Afghanistan, where Turkey tried to play the role of a patron and protector of the interests of the Uzbeks and Turkmens, or the same Turkic peoples, we can say that this country, faced with the choice of national interests and the interests of the Turkic peoples, gave preference to its own interests. This policy of Turkey towards the Turkic peoples of Afghanistan is an example of a folk saying: "Water up to the throat, a child under the foot!" (verbatim)
The Junbishi Milli (National Movement) Party of Afghanistan, led by Marshal Dostum, which is, after all, considered an Uzbek political organization and considers itself the protector of the interests of the Uzbeks, in many critical cases took a position based on Turkish interests, and to the detriment of the Uzbeks of Afghanistan. This clearly indicates that Turkey is forcing the Afghan Turks to take positions that are dangerous for their national interests. Of course, as we have already said, determining the interests of the Uzbeks is a separate issue, which will be considered later. But one thing is certain, the Junbish party and Marshal Dostum have lost some of their political and military prestige over the past twenty years, acting on the advice of Turkey, and in the long run, this is not in the interests of the Uzbeks.
In fact, over time, Junbish and Marshal Dostum came under Turkish influence, and now the party's relationship with Turkey is more a reflection of the relationship of the hostage-taker and the hostage than a reflection of the strategic relationship of the party with the government that supports it! In other words, by increasing its influence within the party, Turkey has turned Junbish into a tool to advance its complex games in Afghanistan.
Over the past twenty years, Marshal Dostum has formed political alliances and made decisions that were against the will and worthy conduct of the policy of the powerful Junbishi Milli party. The Junbishi Milli party came up with the idea of fighting for justice and with this idea won its place in Afghan politics. Junbishi milli can have a place and prestige in Afghanistan only by maintaining the identity of striving for justice, resisting tyranny, and fighting the Taliban and Pashtunism. If it loses its identity, this party will not be able to maintain its influence.
The preservation of the justice-seeking identity of Junbishi Milli means that the party must stand side by side with the powerful parties of the North and, in alliance with them, defend its position against the aggression and domination of the southern forces organized against all ethnic groups and parties of the North. But, as already noted, over the past twenty years, the Junbish party has done just the opposite. The party sometimes sided with Karzai and sometimes with Ghani against northern forces. Junbish Milli's alliances with the Jamiat and Vahdat parties were also short-lived, and this instability, if partly due to the two parties, was partly due to the advices Turkey gave to Junbish. In fact, Turkey has always wanted to use the alliance of parties and military-political figures of the North as a tool for its own purposes.
In other words, the Turkish consultations have turned the Junbish Party and Marshal Dostum into a political toy in the political equation that has lost its stability and grandeur. This will greatly weaken the credibility of the Junbishi Milli on the part of the northern parties and ethnic groups, which in the long run will cause irreparable damage to the Junbishi Milli party and the Uzbeks. In fact, during the last twenty years, Turkey has always advised the Junbish Party to pursue a policy of "realism". A policy that captures and exploits the Pashtun-Uzbek alliance for short-term gain as an opportunity. This is politics, where you play between two football teams in favor of the winning team! We are a supporter of the team that wins! This policy will benefit you in the short term but will reduce your credibility with strategic allies and friends in the long term. The misuse of this opportunistic political method is strongly condemned in Afghan society.
Of course, this is a moment that can be analyzed and evaluated in the context of "preferring Turkey's national interests over the interests of its kindred peoples." Turkey, based on its own national interests, prefers the Uzbeks to interact with the Pashtuns as an ethnic group in power. However, this interaction is contrary to the policy and strategy of the Uzbeks in Afghanistan! This method is actually a method of competition between political parties in democratic systems, but in the primitive and traditional society of Afghanistan, using such a method, which is based on the idea that "there are no permanent friends and enemies in politics", does not work and leads to the suspicion that to compensate for ethnic parties is not a simple matter.
In the most recent case, Turkey hosted Marshal Dostum and another group of northern politicians after the fall of Ghani's government and prevented them from starting a war with the Taliban. With the hope that Turkey will achieve its goals through negotiations with the Taliban. As it turned out, this policy failed, and now the damage falls more on the Junbish Party and the Uzbeks. For Junbish, the best option is to fight the Taliban and join the anti-Taliban forces in the north. The marshal must not remain on the sidelines of the battlefield, choosing what many consider self-imposed exile. In other words, the active presence of Junbish and Marshal Dostum on the battlefield against the Taliban is what the interests of Junbish and the Uzbeks demand, but Turkish interests have other special requirements that keep Marshal Dostum out of the fight indefinitely!
It does not seem that Turkey does not know this. Turkey is well aware that the presence of Marshal Dostum on the battlefield is crucial for his future authority and military-political position, but nevertheless, when it blocks the return of Marshal Dostum to the battlefield, this means that it is pursuing its current national interests which seem more achievable in cooperation with the West, Pakistan and the Taliban while ignoring the interests of the Afghan Uzbeks, Marshal Dostum personally and the Junbishi Milli Party.
