Pakistan Employs Offensive Strategic Engineering to Alter Afghanistan’s Configuration
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, exclusively for Sangar
After the rules of the game in Afghanistan changed, Pakistan, following transregional directives, seeks to reshape the situation—an adjustment that not only aligns with the country’s internal needs but can also play an effective and operational role in countering new threats to Pakistan’s national security.
Islamabad’s alignment with transregional powers has created economic, political, and security advantages for the country. In the current unstable environment, this coordination has become a platform for exerting pressure and strengthening influence. Pakistan’s alliance with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, the United States, and the United Kingdom has formed a new, fully calculated front regarding Afghanistan.
At the same time, India is attempting to maximize the opportunities presented by the new situation. New Delhi seeks to leverage emerging conditions and, by applying maximum pressure, restore its lost positions in Afghanistan. However, India faces two major competitors: Pakistan and China—two powers capable of seriously constraining Indian ambitions. While India’s approach is aligned with Washington’s policies, it is to some extent acceptable to Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing, as it prevents the unilateral dominance of a rival bloc in the short term and fits within the regional balance of power.
This situation activates a new puzzle of complex and dangerous proxy competitions—rivalries in which support for terrorism, management of armed groups, and the exploitation of power vacuums have become key operational tools for players. Today, the entire region and transregional powers are at one table, seeking to leverage the situation in Afghanistan for their own interests.
The United States is now set to implement the second phase of its strategy by adjusting tactics, and in this process, Pakistan’s role becomes pivotal—a state that has repeatedly demonstrated its destructive power and network capabilities and has taken a central position in the Talibanization project and in shaping the new configuration. At this stage, Pakistan is employing the full spectrum of military, intelligence, and diplomatic tools to maintain control over the situation. From bombings in Kabul and other regions of Afghanistan, to attempts to establish contact with opponents and resistance fronts against the Taliban, to a series of security and diplomatic missions to neighboring countries, including Tajikistan, as well as the Foreign Minister’s European tour and meetings with NATO officials—these all demonstrate Pakistan’s political agility and multi-layered capabilities in coordination with the ISI.
During his European visits, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister succeeded in altering European officials’ positions regarding the Taliban, convincing them that the Taliban were in the wrong in disputes with Pakistan and must yield to Islamabad’s demands. This diplomatic power and capacity for political persuasion indicate the growth of Pakistan’s negotiation skills and influence in international politics.
In the military and intelligence spheres, Pakistan continues efforts to form a front to exert strong pressure on the Taliban. Representatives of all anti-Taliban forces—from political figures in exile to active armed groups—are invited by Pakistan to rely on its support in the struggle against the Taliban. This security and intelligence dimension shows that serious backing from the United States and transregional powers underpins this high-stakes game.
Now that the Taliban have distanced themselves from Pakistan and expressed willingness for regional alignment with Russia, China, and Iran, they have lost appeal for Washington. The Taliban were important for the West when they could create organized chaos, opening space for negotiations and concessions. But now the Taliban are fragmented into multiple groups with differing views, and this division has increased opportunities for Western competitors to exert influence. Washington and Islamabad are not prepared to lose monopoly control over the project; therefore, reshuffling “problematic” figures within the Taliban has become part of the new agenda.
At both regional and international levels, Pakistan’s efforts are extensive and influential. Islamabad’s diplomacy—armed with English and backed by intelligence and military experience—has allowed Pakistan to engage in any political or security-related deals to protect its strategic interests. Furthermore, the proximity of threats from the Taliban and India, as well as the stagnation of Chinese projects in Afghanistan, has pushed Pakistan toward making another major deal with the West.
In addition, Pakistan continues to possess extensive intelligence and security capabilities in the region. From tactical coordination with Tehran during the twelve-day war to establishing communication bridges with Turkey, from contacts in Central Asia to diplomatic missions in Europe and the United States, all are noteworthy. Meanwhile, Pakistan retains hard options, including the use of reserve security forces within terrorist group structures such as ISIS, as a tool to exert pressure on the Taliban.
Now even transregional powers have agreed with Pakistan’s logic in reshaping the Afghan situation, and international media have highlighted this as well. Islamabad’s efforts to maintain the current status ensure, in the short term, that the East and India remain outside Taliban management. Reports have even emerged that Pakistan is seeking to create potential proxy groups to exert maximum pressure on the Taliban.
