How is Tajikistan becoming an effective player in the Afghan arena?
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, exclusively for Sangar
Following recent frictions with Pakistan, the Taliban are seeking alternative political, economic, and security pathways that would allow them to maintain their grip on power. The group’s growing interest in the Eastern bloc and its increasing closeness with Russia, China, and Iran indicate that Islamabad is no longer the only attractive center for the Taliban.
However, this shift in posture does not imply full internal consensus; there is still a circle of leaders and commanders who view relations with Pakistan as a strategic asset. This dependence is rooted in the Taliban’s history of residing in Pakistan, the influence of radical religious schools that shaped and motivated the movement, family and tribal connections, the concentration of Taliban leaders’ financial resources on Pakistani soil, and the movement’s deep linkage with that country’s intelligence and military structures.
Nevertheless, under current conditions, the Taliban are trying to step out of Islamabad’s shadow and present themselves as an independent actor capable of negotiating directly with the West and with countries of the Eastern bloc. Based on this approach, expanding diplomatic contacts, security cooperation, and trade ties with states that can serve as alternatives to Pakistan has become part of the movement’s multi-vector strategy.
Although these efforts have not yet resulted in official international recognition of the Taliban, within the logic of intelligence and security, they have transformed the group from a purely military formation into a partner that is “usable” — one that regional and global powers can both control and employ.
Central Asia, particularly the countries bordering Afghanistan, has assumed a special place in this new Taliban strategy. This interest involves several layers of security and geopolitics.
First, the energy, water, electricity, and transit routes that these countries provide to South Asia through Afghan territory are vital for the consumption-oriented Taliban regime. In the Taliban’s view, control over these arteries can serve both as a source of revenue and as a tool of political and coercive pressure.
Second, the alignment of these states with the Eastern bloc makes the prospect of reaching Moscow and Beijing via the northern route more realistic for the Taliban. They calculate that the positive attitude of Central Asian states toward them may help ease some of Russia’s and China’s doubts, turning the northern region into a convenient platform for lobbying their interests with the Eastern bloc.
At a deeper security level, the Taliban are seriously worried about the gradual strengthening of their opponents — especially resistance groups — and their emergence as active players in the calculations of regional powers and intelligence agencies. The Taliban’s own experience, having returned to power thanks to cooperation with Pakistan and the existence of safe havens on its territory, now functions in their strategic mindset as a reversed nightmare. They understand all too well that the same model that once brought down the Republic could be used against them, should the resistance acquire a strategic rear base.
For this reason, the Taliban are seeking closer relations with Central Asian states and are gradually trying to replace Pakistan’s role in certain political and economic areas, turning these countries from a “playground for the opposition” into a “space for containing and controlling the opposition,” and using them as security guarantors for the continuation of their rule.
The Taliban’s dramatic pivot toward Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan reveals the depth of their concern about potential multilayered isolation from neighboring states. For the Taliban, the northern countries represent both a potential route for economic exchange should relations with Pakistan collapse entirely, and an important lever of influence over China and Russia — a means capable of altering or softening their attitudes toward the Taliban regime.
Tajikistan occupies a special place in this context; it is a country that has so far firmly opposed the Taliban regime and, relying on cultural and civilizational diplomacy within the framework of the Persian language, has maintained a critical distance from Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. However, now, in parallel with the emergence of certain security and economic channels, Tajikistan’s position in the Taliban’s strategic calculations has noticeably strengthened.
The Taliban have specific security demands toward Tajikistan; at the center of these demands is the elimination of any possibility of organizing armed resistance against the Taliban on Afghan territory with Dushanbe’s support. This demand reflects the Taliban’s deep fear that Tajikistan could transform into a strategic rear base for the resistance. In turn, the government of Tajikistan, despite existing contacts, does not fully trust the Taliban and considers the presence of terrorist groups inside Afghanistan both an immediate and future threat.
For this reason, Dushanbe is attempting to strike a fragile balance between security precautions and the avoidance of open hostility toward the Taliban. At present, the country maintains channels of engagement with the Taliban at multiple levels — intelligence, security, trade, and diplomacy: from intelligence-sharing to facilitating certain economic and commercial processes, from establishing security contact channels to laying the groundwork for confidential talks between the Taliban and the Russians. All of this is part of Tajikistan’s multilayered strategy aimed at managing threats while avoiding the loss of leverage in the broader regional landscape.
A distinctive feature of the Taliban’s current situation is that, due to instability in the regional order and fears of a return to uncontrollable wars, virtually no country is willing to isolate them completely. This shared anxiety over the potential collapse of order in Afghanistan and its cross-border consequences has resulted in the Taliban’s relations with neighbors, regional states, and external powers being preserved through a network of security and intelligence channels.
However, these relations are primarily shaped by a narrow logic of security and threat management, rather than by any long-term strategic or geopolitical vision. Within this network, the Taliban are viewed more as a “manageable source of threat” than as a long-term strategic partner.
In this situation, Tajikistan is of particular importance to the Taliban. On the one hand, the country has the potential to mobilize and organize anti-Taliban groups — especially Tajik forces — in the event of open confrontation, and can serve as a strategic rear base for the resistance. On the other hand, its shared border with Afghanistan and its ability to provide various forms of weaponry and logistics to create security challenges for the Taliban regime constitute a strong card in Dushanbe’s hands — one that the Taliban regard as among their most sensitive vulnerabilities. The Taliban clearly understand that if Tajikistan moves beyond relative neutrality and becomes an explicit supporter of the resistance, their security architecture in the north will quickly become fragile.
Beyond this, Tajikistan’s role in how major Eastern and Western powers perceive the region, and its place in the future security and geopolitical configuration of the Heartland and Rimland zones and along transcontinental corridors, makes it one of the key players in Afghanistan’s future and in defining the ultimate fate of the Taliban regime.
In fact, the more intense the confrontation or competition among great powers in this region becomes, the greater Tajikistan’s weight will be — as a transit hub, a shield, and at times a lever of pressure — in Afghanistan’s strategic equations. The Taliban are acutely aware of this reality and are attempting, through calculated rapprochement with Dushanbe and northern neighbors, on the one hand, to create a form of “reverse strategic depth” against their opponents, and on the other hand, to elevate themselves in the broader regional security and intelligence game from expendable pawns to deliberate and capable players — though the gap between aspiration and reality remains significant.
