How are power and society transitioning from “Velayat” to “civilizational security”?
Author: Fayaz Bahraman Najimi, analyst of regional and international affairs, member of the Advisory Council of “Sangar”.
If we look at the recent developments in Iran not through the prism of news layers and numerous fragmented and contradictory reports, but more deeply, we must acknowledge that a social revolution is simultaneously taking shape in the country. This revolution reflects signs of a profound shift in the internal logic of power, one that cannot be explained solely through the classical concepts of Western political science; rather, it must be understood in connection with the historical continuity of Iranian society, which accepts change, but not at the cost of breaking with its identity and civilizational memory.
In this context, what is happening is not a simple transition from “religious rule” to “military rule,” but rather a kind of internal reconfiguration of power, in which religious, security, and historical elements are redefining their relationships with one another.
If in the initial model after 1979 the clergy served as the primary bearer of legitimacy and meaning and stood at the center of power, while military institutions were on the periphery and defined in service to it, today one can observe a shift in the center of gravity: power is moving toward layers that rely above all on the principles of survival, security, and crisis management.
This shift is not a complete rupture, but rather a continuation in a new form, whose roots can be found both in the experience of the Islamic Republic and in the long-standing tradition of Iranian governance.
In my view, this is a transformation that can be examined on three levels:
— First, THE LEVEL OF LEADERSHIP: what has occurred at the level of Iran’s leadership is not merely a transfer of power from one individual to a group, but a conscious return to the historical model of Iranian governance. The collective leadership that emerged after the sudden removal of the apex of power did not lead to a vacuum and demonstrated that Iran’s political system still possesses the capacity for self-reproduction in forms that go beyond modern models — a transformation that neither Americans nor Israelis could have anticipated!
This model can be traced in the historical tradition of Iran: in different periods, especially in the late Sasanian era, there existed a certain balance between the shah, the administrative elite, and the military forces, and decision-making was the result of interaction among these layers rather than the absolute will of a single ruler. Later, attempts were made, including by Nizam al-Mulk, to reinterpret this tradition — to separate the administrative-political sphere from religious authority and to strengthen administrative rationality, thereby reproducing the old tradition in an updated form.
In the current situation, collective leadership is not so much a “security body” as it is a sign of a shift toward the historical model of multi-layered governance, in which the leader is preserved as a symbol of unity, but decision-making is distributed across a network of influential actors. This process can be seen as the practical end of the charismatic monopoly of the clergy and the beginning of a network-based form of governance with historical Iranian roots.
Second, THE IDEOLOGICAL LEVEL: what is emerging today in Iran as “nationalism,” if misunderstood, can be interpreted as a closed and “blood-based” identity. However, in the Iranian context, it is rather a form of cultural-civilizational self-awareness rooted in the historical continuity of the Iranian world, not in racial distinction. Undoubtedly, the “Aryan ideology” of the Shah’s era still persists among some Iranians and gives rise to ethnic forms of nationalism (Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Khuzestani, Baloch), yet what is taking shape from below is, on the contrary, a return to a shared historical past.
In this sense, Iran is not an artificially constructed modern nation, but a historical unity of peoples within a shared civilizational horizon; this can be philosophically described as “unity in diversity,” where different peoples have coexisted over time within a single political-cultural whole.
In this context, the current ideological transformation should be understood not as the elimination of religion, but as a shift in the center of gravity. Religion remains present, but it is no longer the sole source of identity. Alongside it, a historical-Iranian self-awareness is becoming active, one that makes “survival,” “independence,” and “civilizational continuity” the basis of legitimacy.
As a result, religious institutions lose their monopoly position and become part of a broader system in which the state is defined as the bearer of civilizational continuity rather than the executor of a specific ideology. It is precisely at this point that ideology transforms from a purely religious form into a civilizational-political synthesis.
Third, AT THE SOCIAL LEVEL: unlike many classical models in the social sciences that directly link a crisis of political legitimacy to social collapse, the experience of Iran shows that society, despite dissatisfaction, can also perform the function of “maintaining order.” This paradox stems from a particular feature — the continuity of historical-civilizational consciousness, which places survival and identity above short-term changes.
In this context, resilience to external pressure — from war to sanctions — is not merely the result of repression or propaganda, but also part of a long historical memory of confronting external threats. It is here that interpretations close to the idea of “Iranshahr” (in the sense of the continuity of the state-civilization) gain importance: even in times of crisis, society tends to keep change internal and self-driven, resisting its external imposition.
However, there is an important nuance here that should not be overlooked: the same society that can be “resilient” in the face of external pressure does not necessarily remain “passive” in relation to its internal structure. In other words, resilience to the external can coexist with a desire for internal change — and this is precisely what creates the foundation for the formation of a “second revolution.”
Thus, if simplistically thinking analysts expected that external pressure would lead to the immediate collapse of the system, Iran’s experience has shown that such pressure can, on the contrary, lead to the reactivation of national unity. However, this unity does not mean lasting consensus; rather, it resembles a “suspension of conflict” in the face of a common threat. People give the authorities time to respond to their demands.
As a result, the main mistake of some analyses is not that they ignore the role of the people, but that they create a false dichotomy between “resistance” and “change.” In reality, in Iran, these two phenomena can coexist simultaneously:
- resistance to external domination
- and the desire to redefine the internal political order.
The “Second Revolution,” which began in the month of Dey (Jadi), is neither the product of external intervention nor the result of collapse from above, but rather the outcome of internal tension between an outdated structure and a society oriented toward the future, which seeks to carry out transformation within the framework of its historical identity, yet independently — in other words, neither the theory of “external collapse” nor the narrative of “absolute internal stability” is sufficient.
The reality of Iran lies somewhere between these two poles — in the dialectic of continuity and change.
