The only way is to abandon pathological nationalism and return to the ideology of Tajikism.
By Abdool Naser Noorzad, a security and geopolitical researcher, especially for “Sangar”
The issue of ethnic identity and nationalism is two two-opposing paradigms in today's discourse between nations. Ethnicity, descent, and race are always at the opposite end of nationalism, which sometimes has meaning and significance, but most of the time is presented as an abstract, dogmatic concept devoid of basic thought.
The issue of nationalism in Afghanistan is the concept of the state and sovereignty raised by the ideology of the powerful. That is, the essence of the nationalist debate is actually an attempt to maintain the dominance of lineage over power, through which it tries to guarantee its continuity in political power.
We recognize that the issue of nationalism is a kind of ingrained concept that has been raised by the ruling establishment over the years to maintain their power and prevent injustice, and has evolved into an all-encompassing ideology. Throughout their tenure in political power, the Pashtun rulers have always used vague concepts of nationalism, national unity, and false brotherhood to convince other non-Pashtun ethnic groups.
One ethnic group that has always been deceived and fallen prey to this insidious policy is the Tajiks. The Tajiks have been trapped in the illusion of this nationalism due to their high urbanization, civilized nature, attachment to urban civilization, and political flexibility that stems from the absence of ideology.
It is debatable that today's Afghanistan (occupied Khorasan), which is supposed to be the homeland of Tajiks in the future and will belong only to Tajiks, is a geography with ethnic and tribal diversity and diversity in terms of the number of ethnic groups living there. But this means that every person in the Tajik geography has the right to sovereignty or shares political power. This is the principle of struggle of Tajikism, which wants power only for itself and within a certain geography, the boundaries of which are determined by force and power.
Now, given this principle of thinking of Tajiks, other ethnic groups, especially the rulers of the Pashtun state, are left with no choice but to present a dry concept of nationalism. Because through their experience of political power, interaction with great powers, and ethnic unity, they have realized that it is impossible to fight everyone, especially the Tajiks, for the rigid concept of Pashtun rule, which seeks to dominate everyone. Therefore, in putting forward the concept of nationalism, they had two goals, which they have achieved to a certain extent:
First, the Pashtuns and other peoples perceive nationalism as a means of preserving sovereignty and maintaining political power. The grandiose shell of nationalism is essentially the principle of uniting everyone under the banner of political Pashtunism, which wants to be the helmsman of political power and make everyone obey it unconditionally. This was done to maintain Pashtun power by encouraging political power sharing, meaningless concessions, false brotherhood, and the great deception, which allowed this group to remain in the political game for political power and to subordinate others to the ideologies of Pashtunism.
Secondly, by propounding the theory of nationalism and patriotism, the Pashtuns have created disagreements, divisions and schisms among other non-Pashtun ethnic groups, especially the Tajiks. At present, we have several types of Tajiks: one is the true Tajik, who completely rejects the theory of nationalism and is just a Tajik, who considers nationalism as nothing but a process of chauvinism and domination of the Pashtun people over others. The second are those few Tajiks who, in the course of their political or administrative missions, are guided by the nationalist theories of the Shah's era, remembering that time with regret and nostalgia. They think, if Afghanistan goes back to the past and the false sense of nationalism of the Yahya family, whose aim was to create a Pashtun state, space, and country, the situation will improve. The third are the ideologically oriented Tajiks, who still live in the competitive atmosphere of the bipolar world of the Cold War, are left or right in ideological terms, and their thinking goes beyond their dogmatic ideology. They show no respect for the current situation of the Tajiks and even take it for granted to call themselves Tajiks. In this situation, this division is the result of a very clever game that the Pashtuns have imposed on the mentality and thinking of the Tajiks for the continuation of the Pashtun rule. The fourth are the Tajiks, who, by putting forward the plan of federalism, want to maintain a nationalistic atmosphere for the benefit of the Pashtuns and others, and are careful not to offend the Pashtuns in a limited geography, seemingly independent, but protected by the theory of national unity and nationalism.
Now we understand that this division among the Tajiks had only one purpose: to prevent the intellectual, functional, and political-military unity of this lineage, since if unity and consensus were achieved, the Pashtun sovereignty would be in crisis.
Now, the main question of this discussion is: what have we gained from this dry and meaningless nationalism? The answer is that amid political upheavals and throughout the political history of Afghanistan, the Tajiks have gained nothing from meaningless nationalism. The Pashtuns have tried to popularize this concept for their political purposes as much as possible. Because instilling this idea in the minds of the Tajiks has benefited the Pashtuns. The Pashtuns have actively used nationalism in their struggle for power and have chosen the Tajiks as fuel for their struggle. They have entangled the Tajiks in a crude web of nationalism and have not allowed their descendants to understand the essence of the situation, which is the question of gaining political power. Pure and meaningless nationalism has always been prevalent in political literature. What I see today is that even the best and most sincere Tajiks are unwilling to put it aside and fight for the right of the Tajik people to exercise political power and join the ranks of fighting Tajiks; this is a chronic disease - absurd and senseless nationalism. In fact, as Lenin said, this is an "infantile disease" in the ideology of Tajikism.
Given this principle, this chronic childhood disease among Tajiks has resulted in the ideology of Tajikism either not being created or falling into the pit of defiance and unwillingness. In fact, the unwillingness of Tajiks to ideologically promote Tajikism and Tajik thinking is the problem of nationalism, which can be considered the most important factor preventing its implementation. The dirty shirt of nationalism that Tajiks have worn has always been a stench and has had an undesirable effect on the formation and political cohesion of this nation. Even now, fear and cowardice of leaving the homeland is a common disease among Tajiks. Fear of being branded as separatists, dissidents, or, as the authoritarian Pashtuns see them, rebels due to their disobedience to Pashtun orders. There are several reasons for this childhood disease that have been able to weaken the bodies of sick and helpless Tajiks and establish its microbial effectiveness on them:
First, we have failed to overcome the effects of the chronic disease of the Cold War atmosphere. We are still a khalkist, a parchamist, an ikhvanist, a pure technocrat in the games of ethnic politics aimed at gaining political power, and we act in its intellectual shadow. This means that we do not experience ideological exhaustion and do not strive for it. Until we cast off this disease and make reasonable efforts to treat and cure it, and free ourselves from the shackles of Cold War thinking, there will be no possibility of finding a logical way out of the current situation.
Second, we still believe that the issue of our Tajik origin and identity has a positive meaning, and in light of this, we are not ready to fight for the liberation of the Tajik people. We rarely see a Tajik who says that he is fighting for the Tajiks and their liberation from the evil of ethnic tyranny. In political discourses, we all participate in generalized discussions and imposed political culture, which is a result of Pashtun influence, and raise issues in general and vague terms. This means that we are not ready to come out of the shell drawn by the Pashtuns, whose goal is to divide us, enslave us, and turn us into younger brothers, and engage in a Tajik-oriented struggle, appealing to our original identity.
Thirdly, there is still no coherent intellectual and political thought among Tajiks. We do not have even four words on a page to describe Tajik intellectual, political, and functional cohesion, and we have not been able to draw such a grandiose vision as the prospect of creating hope for the future of Tajiks. Tajiks, finding themselves in the grip of political power, have always acted with their hands tied, without thinking and without a guiding ideology, only tactically, on the ground and in political games. They have not even considered the future of political work and the coalition formed with non-Tajiks. This led to the fact that the non-Tajiks, taking into account this weakness, blamed the Tajiks for their failures in all deals in the field of politics, governance, and power games.
The infantile disorder of nationalism and intellectual apostasy among the Tajiks became one of the main reasons for the inability of this people to gain political power, intellectual cohesion and unity based on a single narrative, which should have ensured its continuity in the political arena, but unfortunately, it worked in the opposite direction to the interests of the Tajiks.
So, this theory that the problem of Afghanistan (occupied Khorasan) can be solved by joining the non-Tajiks to the Tajiks is fundamentally absurd and unacceptable. We must get to the heart of the matter and study the goals of the non-Tajiks of each nationality and tribe, and first of all, try to eliminate nationalism from our characteristics, thinking, and political life. We should not eat the poisonous food of nationalism to further infect the sick bodies of Tajiks with the diseases of apathy and lack of interest in political power and the struggle to gain it. If we still put nationalism at the forefront of our work and still find the arguments and conclusions presented in this article unjustified, we must accept the imposed components of history, accept Pashtunization, accept others as our elder brothers and holders of power and accept that in the political and geographical field of Afghanistan (occupied Khorasan) there is no other way of thinking than Pashtun and non-Tajik and this is the dominant and irrefutable narrative.
The core of Talibani philosophy, which is followed by today's educated and uneducated Pashtuns, followers of left and right ideologies, and those who have lived in Western culture for many years, is aimed at achieving this goal. Taliban is a guiding instrument in the service of Pashtun thought, which in the form of an ideological movement and under the guise of religion, seeks to popularize and spread the ideology of Pashtunism.
Under the guise of such thinking, which ultimately uses the dry concept of nationalism to deceive us, how can we be nationalists and not let the truth come out? We must come to our senses and no longer be deceived by empty, biased slogans filled with the stifling political propaganda of the non-tajiks. If we are still not satisfied with the argument presented in this debate, then please be kind enough to present an alternative rebuttal so that I and my other comrades who agree with the essence of these arguments can join you.
