What are the goals, tactical methods, and general strategy of the organizers of the Moscow consultative format?
Author: Ghaus Janbaz, political scientist and former diplomat of Afghanistan
(I wrote this article a year ago on the eve of the Moscow Consultative Format meeting on Afghanistan. Representatives of the Taliban group did not participate in that meeting... Almost a year has passed now. On September 29 of this year (2023), a meeting of the Moscow format will be held in the Russian city of Kazan. The Taliban have said they will take part in the meeting and their delegation arrived in Moscow today (September 26). This article attempts to analyze the goals, tactical methods, and general strategy of the Format organizers. I advise my friends to read it. Thank you!)
Russian Special Representative for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov said that a meeting of the “Moscow Consultative Format on Afghanistan” is planned to be held in Moscow in mid-November of this year (2022).
In fact, the above statement came at a time when Moscow was expected to take a new step in ensuring stability in Afghanistan. The organization of the upcoming Moscow Format meeting could have unexpected consequences both for Afghans and for participants in the Great Game in the region and beyond. For example, some signs show that preparations for a second US-Taliban deal have reached the final stage, and this is extremely worrying for Moscow.
But the main question is what exactly can Russia put in the political arena as an obstacle (or opposition) to US actions and the conclusion of a possible Doha-2 agreement? Of course, when Russia really wants to prevent Doha-2, its words are not an allegory and political rhetoric. Some observers, especially within the Russian Federation, believe that Kabulov's statements this time have practical support and that he will take the initiative.
Therefore, it is very important to know on what agenda Kabulov and his team will hold a “Moscow format” meeting in the near future and to achieve what goals.
Informed sources mention two versions regarding the upcoming meeting:
According to the first version, this meeting is more of a bureaucratic and protocol meeting and is held for the purpose of reporting on the “work done” to higher authorities in Russia itself, which usually happens at the end of each year;
The last meeting of the “Moscow format” was held in Moscow on these same days last year (2021). Last year's summit did not bring any benefit to Afghanistan and Russia and had no impact on the situation in Afghanistan. The meeting was largely based on general diplomatic rhetoric such as: “The participants are determined...”, “The accepted principles must be respected...” and other issues that are actually more controversial and limited in Russia's strategy towards Afghanistan.
It is not far off that the upcoming meeting of the “Moscow format” will be a repetition, without a new initiative, devoid of political courage and foresight. In this case, the summit will be considered a political failure for Moscow and will have negative consequences for it and Russia’s policy in general towards Afghanistan. On the other hand, Russia's failure will lead to further consolidation of US positions, including the conclusion of a new deal between the US and the Taliban.
The second version is that the upcoming summit in the Moscow format will bring positive results for Russia and significant progress in the Afghan direction. Moscow will try to construct a meaningful agenda for the summit and not lose the initiative.
The main thing is that the meeting will show whether the Russian Foreign Ministry team is capable of “seizing” the initiative from the Americans and preventing the new deal that Washington has started with the Taliban?!
Looking at the stupidity of Zamir Kabulov’s diplomacy, it is difficult to believe in its effectiveness, but one cannot help but notice the presence of a certain “miraculous” factor.
During the “first deal” between the US and the Taliban in Doha in February 2020, Zamir Kabulov and his team worked hard to ensure the success of the process, helping Khalilzad, the US State Department's special representative for Afghanistan, to keep the "fierce mullahs" happy.
It will soon become clear what tools and means Kabulov and his team will use to not only disrupt the new deal between Washington and the Taliban but also to put Moscow in a more advantageous position.
Meanwhile, some signs show that Moscow's consultative format is changing from a vehicle for Russia's Afghanistan policy to a source for formulating and determining the country's policy in Central Asia.
In Mr. Kabulov’s article, published on November 3, 2022, in one of the central Russian newspapers, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, he actually presents aspects of the formation of a “new consultative and coordinating council.”
The new council will bring together special representatives from several countries and, apparently, there will be an exchange of views on issues affecting not only Afghanistan but the entire region.
As the Ukrainian crisis develops, Russia is paying more and more attention to the Central Asian region. Just a few days ago (in 2022), Russia convened a large summit called “Russia and the Central Asian Republics” and it once again emphasized that this area is an area of its vital and strategic interests.
Observers still doubt whether the council will present constructive and meaningful proposals and initiatives on Afghanistan?! But, as mentioned above, the current format can play the role of connecting as many Central Asian countries as possible with Russia through the issue of Afghanistan; In other words, Russia is trying to include Moscow’s consultative format in the “Russian Strategy in Central Asia” as soon as possible.
On the other hand, the lack of unity of opinion about the Taliban group among the Russian elite is not a new phenomenon, and I have repeatedly mentioned this in my articles.
In this context, in the highest echelons of the Russian government, one can observe two opinions (fundamental differences) regarding the Taliban group:
- Firstly, the position of Nikolai Patrushev (military sector as a whole), Secretary of the Russian Security Council (an influential person in matters of Russian security and intelligence, a close ally of President Putin);
- Secondly, the position and method adopted by the Russian special representative for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov, and the team of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of this country in relation to the Taliban.
Nikolai Patrushev once again expressed his tough position against the Taliban on November 3 of this year (2022) at the annual meeting of the Chairmen of the Security Councils of the Commonwealth of Independent States as follows:
“The Taliban, like al-Qaeda and ISIS, was created by the United States, and these groups are still used to advance the interests and geopolitical goals of the United States.”
Contrary to Mr. Patrushev, Zamir Kabulov in his latest statement (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 2, 2022) separates the Taliban from ISIS. Kabulov mentioned American pressure on the Taliban and accused Washington of blackmailing and imposing economic and political sanctions, as well as threatening to attack the Taliban with drones. Kabulov also accused Washington of supporting ISIS and obstructing the “anti-terrorist capabilities” of the Taliban regime.
Thus, it is clearly visible that Patrushev and Kabulov have a clear contradiction with each other regarding the perception of the political position of the Taliban and the system that they created in Kabul.
It will be very interesting to see what the efforts of the “Moscow format” will lead to in formulating a unified position of the countries of the region in relation to the Taliban and their regime, while there is no consensus on this matter in the highest echelons of the Russian government and other countries in the region.
