For many years, India has pursued a policy in Afghanistan that appears friendly on the surface but is hostile in practice.
Author: Ahmad Faisal Mirkhel
I have been studying Afghan politics for over ten years, and during this time, I have not only observed but actively participated in political struggles, writing, analyzing, and debating. Whenever the topic of our closest allies arose, I would immediately mention India.
But I was unaware then that the wheel of politics and fate recognizes no rules of nobility — it turns solely for the sake of interests. Since India began pursuing its policy in Afghanistan — back in the days when leftist parties came to power — it has always been accompanied by fluctuations and contradictions. Unfortunately, India has always had its hidden agendas.
When Dr. Najibullah, the last president of Afghanistan’s leftist government and a Soviet ally, proclaimed slogans of “Indo-Afghan friendship,” the Indians were already thinking about negotiations and establishing contacts with various mujahideen groups.
Najibullah’s famous statement, made with confidence and a loud voice, was:
"There is a powerful India over there, and a powerful Afghanistan here; Pakistan between them is nothing more than a grain of wheat between two millstones."
However, the policy that Afghanistan followed at that time, and even later until the end of Ashraf Ghani’s rule, turned out to be empty words — nothing more than slogans. Although Afghanistan’s leftist governments had a significant advantage in intelligence and information, it can now be said with complete certainty that their devotion and self-sacrifice toward India was a grave mistake, for which thousands of young Afghans paid with their lives.
Najibullah Ahmadzai, the last president of Afghanistan’s leftist government, remained unconditionally loyal to the Indian camp until the final days of his rule. He even believed that if Kabul were ever besieged, the first to come to his aid would be the Indians. However, when he attempted in the last days of his rule to seek refuge in India and lead a government in exile from there, India unexpectedly refused. To Najibullah’s representative, the Indians said:
"The era of Dr. Najib’s rule and popularity in Afghanistan has ended. We do not wish to jeopardize our relations with other forces, especially the mujahideen and groups hostile to Dr. Najib."
Even when ambassadors from various countries visited Dr. Najibullah at the UN office in Kabul, Pakistan — contrary to expectations — showed him far more respect than India, even though Najibullah had long been its enemy. The Pakistani ambassador persistently invited Najibullah to come to Pakistan, promising to provide a safe diplomatic corridor. But blinded by his one-sided devotion to India, Najib refused. In the end, he died remaining loyal to India, which, even after his assassination by the Taliban, did not issue a single official condolence.
Thus, during the period of the Islamic government, India initially appeared as a close ally and later, during the First Resistance, as a consistent patron of the United Front (Northern Alliance). Although formally India supported the United Front alongside Russia, events show that from mid-1997 until late 2000, India simultaneously tried to establish contacts with the Taliban and achieve intelligence influence in tribal areas, especially among those advocating the creation of a “Pashtunistan.” However, the extensive influence of Pakistani intelligence proved a serious obstacle, and India failed to significantly strengthen its position.
With the beginning of the “democratic era” in Afghanistan, when the country, under unconditional Western support, entered a new phase and impoverished Afghanistan acquired wealthy allies, India once again appeared, at first glance, as Kabul’s closest partner. It actively participated in the country’s reconstruction, invested in infrastructure, and stood alongside wealthy Western nations.
Unlike previous leftist governments, India now had a special trump card — President Hamid Karzai, a man educated in India who later pursued doctoral studies at one of Bombay’s universities. This gave India a significant advantage and a powerful instrument of influence, providing it with a winning card in the political confrontation with Pakistan.
Although initially India acted as a close and sincere ally of the leaders of the “United National Front,” praising the heroism of this political wing and pursuing a policy of influence, with the rise of Pashtun technocrats, Delhi adopted a new strategy. This time, India made enormous efforts to rekindle in the hearts of these young politicians the idea of Pashtunistan — the revival of the old slogan of uniting Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line.
A large portion of these newly empowered politicians, of Pashtun origin and occupying various high-ranking positions — from senior military officers to deputy ministers and advisors to President Karzai and the early Ghani administration — enjoyed India’s support. Many of them traveled to India multiple times with their families.
I personally knew one of those whom India considered a “favorite” at the time. On one occasion, in a private conversation, he told me that he had traveled to India several times with his wife and children. Yet the most curious aspect was that there were no photos or official records of these trips, and even his three grown sons, with whom I have known since youth, never mentioned any experiences or memories of India.
The obvious question arises: why did officials of the former Afghan government travel to India secretly and confidentially, and why were most of them proponents of the idea of Pashtunistan?
Many years ago, I read in one Pakistani newspaper the words of an official: “India is the main source of terrorism in the region.” At the time, I chuckled and thought what a ridiculous statement from a country already harboring dozens of terrorist groups! But today I clearly understand that the Pakistani politician was not far from the truth.
India not only maintained its influence within the Afghan governmental system but also kept close ties with factions across the Durand Line — especially with the Taliban and forces opposing the Pakistani state.
General Abdul Raziq Achakzai, who had significant influence in Kandahar and southern Afghanistan, openly enjoyed India’s support. So much so that Sheida Muhammad Abdali, then Afghanistan’s ambassador to India, officially coordinated these relations, providing financial aid and military resources. Although for the Kandahar authorities, these relations seemed advantageous and reliable, for India, they were merely a means to achieve specific objectives on Pakistani soil.
Repeated information provided by Pakistan indicated that General Achakzai carried out special operations in Pakistan on India’s orders, though no international sources ever confirmed these reports. Ultimately, General Abdul Razik Achakzai died defending his beliefs and values. Yet the very Indian government, which treated politics as a form of business, had, three years before the death of this respected commander, established close contacts with his future killers.
Today, reliable sources state that since 2006, India has maintained ties with terrorist factions operating in Pakistan — especially those involved in the conflict over the Durand Line. India provides financial and military support to movements advocating for Pashtunistan and Balochistan, as well as to armed groups that make these ideas central to their struggle. In some cases, key commanders of these movements traveled to India for medical treatment and living arrangements.
A former acting chargé d’affaires of the Afghan embassy in Delhi candidly revealed that in 2017–2018, one of the commanders of the Haqqani Network, wounded in the Afghan battlefield, was treated in one of India’s major hospitals. He also added that the son of Mullah Salam Zaif, a senior Taliban figure and former ally of Pakistani intelligence, studied at one of India’s medical universities, and that the family of this Taliban official occasionally traveled to India.
A year after Afghanistan fell under the control of the Taliban, an image appeared in an Indian media outlet showing Tadin Khan Achakzai alongside Mullah Mohtasim Agajani — one of the figures formally dissatisfied with the Taliban movement. According to reports, they were there at the invitation of Mullah Salam Zaif.
Understanding the full context of these events — of which I have only touched on a few — it can be stated with confidence that India continues to pursue a policy of hostility and self-interest toward Afghanistan, even though Afghanistan has remained loyal to its friendship and commitments to India, often at the cost of its own sacrifices. Therefore, it can be said that the so-called “romantic rapprochement” between the Taliban and India is unlikely to last long.
Although India, much like its famous film industry, has this time created a vivid scenario regarding its relations with the Taliban, attempting to portray the tainted terrorists in the eyes of the Indian public as heroes — sometimes of Cuban origin, sometimes of Pathan descent, fighting against the “Mughals” — in reality, this narrative is hardly achievable and practically impossible.
