Pakistan and the Taliban have fallen into the trap of regional intelligence.
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, especially for Sangar
In the current complex and multilayered crisis in South Asia, the Taliban and Pakistan are engaged in an intelligence game that erases the line between hostility and alliance. Recent remarks by Zabihullah Mujahid regarding Pakistan’s attempts to return the U.S. to Bagram Air Base may appear as a political warning at first glance. Still, in reality, they are part of a larger, pre-planned scenario. In this game, from Kabul to Islamabad and from Bagram to Washington, intelligence networks, economic interests, and geopolitical objectives are intertwined. The killing of Qari Amjad and the exposure of intelligence cooperation between the Taliban and Pakistan signal the unfolding of Afghanistan’s security scene, whose ultimate goal is the restoration of a new order centered around the major powers.
The question is: how is this new order taking shape? The answer is hidden in the concealed layers of these developments. The Taliban are now talking about what their critics warned years ago: a new game has begun, whose central focus is the interests of the great powers, not Afghanistan’s security. Mujahid asserts that Pakistan, by creating a crisis, is preparing the ground for the U.S. to return to Bagram; if this is true, then the Taliban are playing the same role they did in 2001 — the innocent victim of a carefully planned assault.
However, this time the difference is that the Taliban are no longer in the position of the “unaware victim,” but are active participants in the game. Taliban accusations against Pakistan may appear to signal distrust, but in reality, they reveal the contradiction between words and actions. This group claims independence in the media, but in practice remains dependent on Islamabad for logistics and intelligence. As repeatedly noted, the distinction between the “civilian government” and the “Pakistani military” is only superficial; in fact, both are subordinate to a unified security doctrine designed by the ISI, and the Taliban are a direct product of this doctrine.
In this context, Bagram is not just a military base; it is a symbol of Washington’s soft return to the heart of the region. Both Pakistan and the Taliban use this card as a tool in the game. Border bombings, airstrikes, and fruitless negotiations are part of the same crisis engineering, designed to open space for new interventions. This is an old but effective method: create instability, then return as a mediator and partner for peace.
In this situation, the killing of Qari Amjad (Mufti Muzohim), deputy leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), was not accidental. Security sources claim that the Taliban handed over his position to Pakistani intelligence to gain leverage in the Istanbul negotiations. In reality, however, this was a targeted elimination — part of an intelligence “purge” scenario. Qari Amjad, once a key TTP figure, had already exhausted his usefulness. In this game, when a piece is deemed redundant or uncontrollable, its removal serves to restore trust among the remaining players. By sacrificing such individuals, the Taliban attempt to present themselves as a reliable regional partner.
Outwardly, the Taliban claim to cooperate with neighboring countries in combating terrorism, but in reality, this is part of a hidden intelligence deal between the Taliban, Pakistan, Turkey, and Qatar. These countries requested that the Taliban, in exchange for political and economic incentives, share information on TTP leaders. The Taliban agreed, but not voluntarily — rather under coercion. They know that if the TTP gains power, their positions in Kabul will be shaken, and Pakistan will again seek a replacement.
This covert cooperation is in fact part of the phased restoration of the Taliban in future regional projects; the project aims to create a rift between the Taliban and other Islamist groups, thereby weakening the internal structure of the group. The Taliban carry out these instructions not out of counsel, but to implement the plan, which has been systematically followed since the Doha Agreement. This game has a pre-designed path: the Taliban must remain, but weak and dependent.
This covert cooperation is, in fact, part of the phased restoration of the Taliban in future regional projects; the project aims to create a rift between the Taliban and other Islamist groups, thereby weakening the internal structure of the group. The Taliban carry out these directives not out of counsel, but to implement the plan, which has been systematically executed since the Doha Agreement. This game follows a pre-designed path: the Taliban must remain, but weak and dependent.
In this context, the Istanbul negotiations were both a stage of open diplomacy and a venue for behind-the-scenes deals. Outwardly, the discussions focused on border control and preventing attacks, but in reality, it was a field for testing the Taliban’s loyalty to the Turkey–Qatar–Pakistan axis. The Taliban know that maintaining power without the consent of this axis is impossible, so they enter intelligence interactions with an appearance of calm, both to reduce pressure from Pakistan and to secure the trust of Turkey and Qatar.
Pakistan also continues its dual game: on one hand, it labels the TTP as an enemy, while on the other, it uses it as a tool of pressure on the Taliban. These two opposing yet coordinated roles are part of the old doctrine of “managed instability” that Islamabad has been implementing in Afghanistan for years. The ultimate goal is to control the Taliban through threats and crisis management; if the Taliban become too independent, it would become a nightmare for Pakistan.
From the perspective of Pakistani military officials, the greatest danger is a shift in the Taliban’s ideological orientation. If, in the future, the center of the Taliban’s ideological leadership moves from the Akora Khattak and Haqqania seminaries toward Deoband or even Indian influence, Islamabad will lose its strategic position. For this reason, the Pakistani army continues behind the scenes to remove defiant TTP figures and maintain direct influence over the Taliban’s leadership structure, ensuring control over the process.
Meanwhile, the United States observes calmly and carefully. Washington understands that by exploiting internal divisions among the Taliban, the TTP, and Pakistan, it can pave the way for its return—not with soldiers, but through intelligence, agreements, and security cooperation. In this framework, the Bagram project is being revived: a soft return of the U.S. through artificially engineered crises.
Today, Afghanistan is a field of competition across three layers of intelligence:
The first layer: the Taliban, a tool in Pakistan’s hands;
The second layer: Pakistan, a mediator serving Washington;
The third layer: the U.S., which, through engineered instability, regains control over the region.
Meanwhile, other players such as Turkey, Qatar, Iran, Russia, China, and the Arab states also seek to benefit themselves. But the only party that gains nothing is the Afghan people—a population once again victimized by games in which Islam and jihad serve only as a mask for politics and the interests of the great powers.
Ultimately, we face a scene in which everyone lies, and each lie conceals another truth. Outwardly, the Taliban speak against Pakistan, but in reality, they are the same military actors who enable the Bagram project and the regional game. Pakistan complains about the Taliban, yet keeps them as a tool. And the U.S., observing from above all these contradictions, watches calmly and precisely, ready to intervene again at the right moment. Afghanistan remains a stage for great games, where every piece can be sacrificed and serves the interests of the great powers.
