Control over time, crisis management, and dominance over energy flows have replaced the traditional concept of victory on the battlefield.
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, especially for Sangar
The issue of war in the Middle East, confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and efforts to reduce or manage tensions have been analyzed in various contexts; however, the outcome of these analyses points to a common conclusion: the United States, contrary to superficial perceptions, did not enter this arena without prior calculations and planning.
Nevertheless, a common mistake in many analyses is that they still attempt to answer the question: “Who won and who lost?” Whereas at this level of conflict, such a dichotomy is essentially irrelevant. What matters is precise timing, the use of multi-layered tools, and the implementation of scenarios that gain meaning within the strategic calculations of major powers, primarily the United States and China.
In this context, Donald Trump’s approach relied more on “time” than on victory or defeat in the classical sense. He placed his bet on managing time, the intensity and scope of the crisis, rather than on direct military outcomes or even the costs of war. Therefore, six weeks of hostilities, the extensive use of various types of weapons, and the creation of a tense environment were aimed not at destroying the opponent, but at adjusting the balance in global equations.
Within this framework, Iran effectively became an actor facilitating the implementation of this scenario — one that played a significant role in generating tension and bringing it to an end. For this reason, the end of the war was also predetermined in the calculations, and prolonging it did not align with the logic of this design.
At the center of this configuration was the Strait of Hormuz — a passage that formally accounts for about 10% of global oil supplies, but in practice has become a geopolitical instrument with far greater significance than its actual weight. The emphasis on the role of this strait was deliberate, aimed at drawing all key global players into the unfolding situation.
Pressure on Iran to provoke a response, particularly the possibility of closing the Strait of Hormuz, was not a random consequence but part of a broader design. Such a scenario directly affected the interests of Europe, China, and even Russia, forcing them to choose between energy security and political independence.
In this context, Europe found itself in a kind of “security trap” — a trap formed under conditions of “managed tension” and aimed at the energy economy. At the same time, topics such as Greenland, which had previously been at the center of the U.S. political and media discourse, were temporarily removed from the agenda. This apparent retreat was not a sign of neglect, but rather part of a temporal prioritization.
In reality, the issue of Greenland was merely postponed so that, after managing the crisis in the Middle East, it could once again be used as a lever of pressure against Europe. At that point, the United States, citing Europe’s insufficient support in previous crises, would be able to gain greater legitimacy for exerting pressure and redefining relations within NATO. The result would be a Europe compelled toward flexibility, concessions, and the acceptance of a subordinate role in relation to U.S. demands.
On the other hand, the war in Ukraine and Russia’s interests are also inseparably linked to this configuration. Signs of a tacit convergence between the United States and Russia in containing the long-term threat posed by China can be observed. In this logic, a weak, dependent Europe, caught between the United States and Russia, would benefit both powers. Such a Europe would not only lose its ability for independent competition, but would also become a secondary actor in the international system. This, combined with China facing energy challenges and economic pressure, creates a more favorable balance for Moscow and Washington.
In the domestic dimension of the United States, midterm elections and a volatile political environment also play an important role in this framework. Under conditions of growing public dissatisfaction with foreign interventions and militaristic policies, the creation of a global economic shock followed by its management through a ceasefire may help reduce this discontent. A sharp rise in oil prices — exceeding $150 per barrel — followed by their containment is an example of such “crisis engineering.”
At the same time, China temporarily overcame the crisis by relying on its own reserves, Russia benefited from rising prices, and the United States, by managing the market and releasing reserves, influenced prices and generated significant revenues. This cycle demonstrates how a crisis can be transformed into a tool for redistributing wealth and power at the global level.
In the domestic dimension of the United States, midterm elections and a volatile political environment also play an important role in this strategy. Amid growing public dissatisfaction with foreign interventions and militaristic policies, the creation of a global economic shock followed by its management through a ceasefire can help reduce this discontent. A sharp increase in oil prices — exceeding $150 per barrel — followed by their control serves as an example of such “crisis engineering.”
At the same time, China temporarily overcame the crisis by relying on its own reserves, Russia benefited from rising prices, and the United States, by managing the market and releasing reserves, simultaneously influenced prices and generated significant revenues. This cycle illustrates how a crisis can become an instrument for redistributing wealth and power on a global scale.
Meanwhile, the consequences of this process for China are significant. An economy dependent on cheap energy, in the event of disruptions in supply chains, will face rising production costs and a slowdown in growth. From this emerges the concept of “choking economic bottlenecks” — a strategy aimed at containing China’s growth without direct military confrontation.
Within this logic, countries that supply China with cheap energy resources gradually become exposed to instability, pressure, or even regime change. Examples such as Venezuela and Iran fit well within this model. The disruption or limitation of oil flows from these countries directly affects China’s economic capacity and increases the gap between it and the United States.
Based on this, Trump and his team, taking into account the relative lag of the United States in several economic indicators—especially against the backdrop of China’s rapid growth—shifted toward the use of indirect tools such as controlled instability, limited wars, and pressure on supply chains. This approach not only reduces the costs of direct military conflict but also makes it possible to manage multiple variables simultaneously.
Ultimately, what is being observed in these processes is a conscious and deliberate entry of the United States into a multi-layered game—a game in which military technologies, informational capabilities, the global economy, and public perception are simultaneously tested and utilized as instruments.
Economic shocks, regional tensions, and carefully calculated ceasefires are all elements of a larger architecture: the engineering of the future world order. An order in which control over time, crisis management, and dominance over energy flows have replaced the traditional understanding of victory on the battlefield.
