Are Tehran and Baku going to war?
Author: Fararu website (Iran)
Tensions, war of words, diplomatic measures, and provocative military exercises of Azerbaijan against Iran continue with unprecedented speed and intensity. Despite the fact that several months have passed, the tension between the two countries has not only not abated, but has become more widespread in the past few weeks.
As a result of growing gaps and disagreements between the parties, the current situation can be assessed as the tensest level of relations between the two countries over the past three decades, that is, after Azerbaijan gained independence on October 18, 1991. At the same time, as the gap between the two countries widened, the focus of the media and political observers increasingly focused on this issue within Iran. Meanwhile, different approaches have been proposed to the future of tension between the two countries, which more than ever requires the adoption of reasonable decisions by the diplomatic apparatus of our country.
The story of 8 months of maximum confrontation in 8 episodes; How did the two countries achieve the tensest historical relationship?
1 - The actions of the Azerbaijani military in the summer of last year should be called the point of attraction, or, better, the hotbed of tension between Tehran and Baku, which has reached the highest possible level. In August 2022, there were relatively intense clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In a new round of conflicts, unlike the September 2020 war, the center of tension was not in Nagorno-Karabakh, but this time the focus of the Baku army was on strikes in southern Armenia and the Syunik region.
As a result of the new movements of the Baku army, all attention was focused on the goal of Ilham Aliyev to implement the Turan International Corridor project. With the support of his main allies, Turkey and Israel, Aliyev plans to implement the Zangezur-Lachin corridor, which is a communication highway connecting Asia and Europe. Syunik is surrounded by Azerbaijan to the east and Nakhichevan to the west, and borders Iran only 44 kilometers to the south.
Despite the fact that this region connects Armenia with the Nagorno-Karabakh region, it is of strategic importance for Iran. If Baku controls this province, then part of the communication route between Iran and Armenia, and therefore Eurasia and Europe, will be in the hands of Azerbaijan and its allies. Millions of dollars of Iran's foreign trade with its neighbors and even European countries pass through this route. Baku's control over the Syunik region may become the center of Israel's military presence on the northern border of Iran in the Zangezur region. Control over this region will give Ankara and Baku an advantage over Tehran in terms of energy resources and transit.
In addition to these cases, from the point of view of Iran, the capture of the Syunik region could be a prelude to the capture of all of Armenia and the disruption of the balance of power in the region. Also, the creation of the Baku corridor will mean the withdrawal of Tehran from the geopolitics of the Caucasus and the closing of the only direct corridor of Iran's territorial connection with Europe.
2 - Aware of these problems, within a few months after last August, when Baku's motivation to seize the Syunik region was revealed, Iran openly took a confrontational position. In symbolic and significant measures, on October 26, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps conducted exercises to force the Aras River in the Aras region. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdullahyan also left for Armenia on October 28 and opened the Iranian Consulate General in Kapan, Syunik region.
3 - Iran's actions provoked a response from Azerbaijan. Fifty days after the Iranian exercises, on December 17, the government of Azerbaijan, together with Turkey, held the “Fist of Brotherhood” exercises. The most significant aspect of these exercises was the passage of manpower and military equipment of the two countries across the border river Araks, which was seen by many observers as an apparent response to the recent Iranian exercises.
4 - After these exercises, the rhetoric of Ilham Aliyev and some Baku parliamentarians towards Azerbaijanis inside Iran continued, but an important incident occurred on January 27 after one person attacked the Baku embassy in Tehran. In this incident, which resulted in the death of an embassy security officer, Orkhan Askarov, the degree of tension between Iran and Azerbaijan reached the highest possible level. Baku closed its embassy in Tehran and declared the incident a terrorist one. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan issued a statement on January 31 demanding the return of its citizens from Iran.
5 - Simultaneously with all the steps mentioned, the anti-Iranian media and the propaganda attack in Azerbaijan intensified on a large scale. The most important manifestation of this was the statements of Allahshukur Pashazade, the courtier of mullah Ilham Aliyev, who made false statements "about the captivity of Azerbaijanis in the hands of the Persians." Also, on January 31, 2023, the Azerbaijani security forces announced the launch of an operation called "against the spy network of Iran." On the first day of February, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan filed a complaint against Iran at international forums.
6 - In continuation of Baku's negative approach, on February 5, a video was circulated in the media and social networks in which Aliyev sent a Koran reader to the Iranian border near the Aras River to read Surah Fath (Victory). This symbolic act was undertaken by Baku as a kind of threat of war against Iran. Aliyev's provocations did not end with sending a reader to the side of the Aras River and reading "Sura Fatah". In the heart of Europe, during the Munich Security Conference, which was held on February 17-19, he introduced the Iranian organization behind the attack on the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran and brought the stigma of state terrorism to Iran.
7 - Despite a lull in tensions between the two sides for almost a month, at the beginning of the Iranian New Year, the news was published about the gathering of forces and the readiness of the Azerbaijani army to attack the Syunik region of Armenia. News and videos from unofficial sources in Iran have also reported that Iranian forces are on standby in the northwest of the country. At the same time that the possibility of war became serious, Iranian F4 and F14 fighters flew over the skies of northwestern Iran and in areas near the borders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nakhichevan. A show that political observers interpreted as a serious warning from Tehran to Baku against any adventures.
8 - The latest and perhaps the most serious wave of tension between Iran and Azerbaijan occurred in the last few days and after the statement of 210 members of the Iranian parliament against Baku. On April 5, deputies of the Iranian parliament in their statement condemned the opening of the Azerbaijani embassy in Israel. After this statement, a wide wave of anti-Iranian actions and movements acquired an unprecedented intensity.
In the first stage, Azerbaijan identified four Iranian diplomats in Baku as "unwanted elements" and asked them to leave the country within 48 hours. At the same time, Azerbaijan began large-scale land and sea military exercises in the regions of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and near the borders of Iran. Also, the Navy of this country conducted offensive exercises with the presence of ships in the Caspian Sea. In continuation of the recent wave of hate, even the Azeri media claimed that the Iranian flag had been removed from the Iranian embassy on Bunyad Sardarov Street in Baku, which, of course, quickly turned out to be false.
In another unconstructive and tense action of Baku in relations with Tehran, the National Assembly of this country yesterday (April 8) in its statement asked Iran to refrain from "prejudiced actions" against Azerbaijan. In its statement, the Azerbaijani parliament called the statement of the Iranian parliament on the opening of the Azerbaijani embassy in occupied Palestine an "intervention in internal affairs and another politically provocative act" against Baku.
Four readings of political observers from the domino of tension between Tehran and Baku
The persistence of tensions and the culmination of disagreements between Iran and Azerbaijan have prompted four interpretations in the media and in the international security analyst community in recent months.
First: the inevitable result of Tehran's passive approach is war: most observers and analysts of international affairs and foreign policy believe that the inevitable result of the continuation of the current process of Baku's hostilities against Iran will be "war". The fact that the political authorities of Azerbaijan, headed by Ilham Aliyev, daily and in turn reveal a new level of anti-Iranian measures, is pushing Iran towards an inevitable and forced war. From their point of view, Baku's policies and actions turn the field of equations into an inevitable war.
Secondly: the reason for Baku's aggression and hostility is not external provocations, but inside Iran: some Iranian analysts also believe that Baku's continued antagonism against Tehran - despite the behind-the-scenes role of Israel, Turkey, etc. roots inside Iran. From their point of view, Tehran's excessive patience with Baku's hostile policy is the main reason for the current courage of this small country. The current situation is based on the failure of the Iranian authorities to understand the threats of Aliyev's expansionist strategy and the hopes of statesmen to change Baku's approach. This group believes that silence and shifting the blame to Iran is one of the big mistakes that have led to the fact that the level of tension in recent months has reached its current level.
Third: the need for decisive action and stopping Aliyev: Some Iranian political observers considered taking decisive action and stopping Aliyev by any means possible from the very beginning of the crisis in relations between Iran and Azerbaijan. From the perspective of this group, the threats of Aliyev and his strategists are serious threats to the national security of Iran and the region, which Iran should never accept. Even this group of analysts regards the entry into the field of tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia as a necessary measure to prevent Aliyev's insidious goals from advancing.
Fourth: Further strategic patience is a must: in contrast to political observers advocating a determined and aggressive approach, another group of political observers considers the description of tensions between Baku and Tehran to be exaggerated. From their point of view, the exaggeration of the threats to Baku's strategy towards Tehran is the result of the actions of Armenian lobbyists in Iran and has no real grounds. This group recommends maintaining strategic patience and engagement with Baku.
