How Did Iran Change the Existing Narratives?
Author: Sherali Rizoiyon, PhD in Political Science (Tajikistan)
At the height of war, assessing its course and results is a difficult task, as the parties use all available instruments to prove the correctness of their strategy, achieve major victories, and highlight the opponent’s heavy losses. The scale and intensity of the information war are no less significant than the real situation on the battlefield and likely even exceed it. Over these three days of war, numerous real and fabricated, truthful and false narratives were created—both by elites and by the media—making it extremely difficult to separate fact from fiction. Therefore, this text attempts to present several preliminary conclusions.
First, a new Iranian narrative.
Despite massive missile strikes on its territory, the death of leader Ali Khamenei, high-ranking military officials, civilians, and children, and, in general, irreparable losses, Iran emerges as the undeniable winner of the first three days of this war. Iran managed to shatter all pre-war analytical forecasts and strategic plans, seize the initiative, and steer the course of hostilities according to its own scenario. The greatest achievement and most significant consequence has been the formation of a new Iranian narrative, whose consolidation we are now witnessing.
The death of Ali Khamenei and senior military figures did not lead to structural changes within the state, and the process of resistance continued as if nothing had happened. Those who held or still hold an illusory perception of Iran, under the influence of Western-centric narratives (whose roots go back to ancient Greek historians reflecting their states’ defeats by the Achaemenids and Parthians) or those who believed the Hollywood film “300 Spartans”, are now confronted with a different reality. Through its new narrative strategy, Iran has demonstrated that it is not a tribal country, but a resilient civilization. Whoever stands at the head of the state—whether religious or secular—adheres to the traditions and foundations of Iranian statehood.
Second, the collapse of previous perceptions and analytical models.
Before the war began, it was expected that victorious airstrikes, the elimination of political and military elites, and the destruction of administrative and military infrastructure would create confusion within Iranian society and leadership, forcing them to retreat. Here, the propaganda model worked: “We invented it ourselves, we spread it ourselves, and we believed it ourselves.”
For years, planning was conducted for a potential war with Iran, discussing the strategies of major and middle powers, neighboring states, and the Iranians themselves. Analytical models depicted a scenario in which key actors and Iran would behave predictably. However, the current reality is unfolding outside the framework of those prior forecasts. Perhaps such a scenario was considered, but it was not treated seriously. As a result, we are witnessing the collapse of previous analytical assessments—both regarding global politics and the strategies of Middle Eastern countries, as well as Iran itself.
No one knows what to expect in the near future, but it is clear that a major shift is taking shape in approaches to analyzing the Middle East.
Third, the transformation of the regional security system in the Middle East.
Strikes by U.S. and Israeli forces, as well as Iran’s retaliatory attacks on American military and strategic infrastructure in Arab countries, have led to a fundamental shift in understanding the regional security system in the Middle East. On the first day of the war, the assumption emerged that American military bases and facilities were no longer a source of stability and security for host countries, but rather a source of existential threat.
The course of the first three days of war has practically confirmed this assumption. Iran declared military and strategic infrastructure in countries allied with the aggressors as legitimate targets for its missiles and carried out their destruction on a broad and unexpected scale. As a result, serious psychological and reputational damage was inflicted upon Arab states—countries that, in essence, neither deserved nor deserve such a situation.
Regardless of the outcome of the war, the regional security system in the Middle East, which had been forming over the past three decades, has become a thing of the past. Likely, Iran, Israel, the Arab states, and external powers involved in Middle Eastern processes will revise their strategies for ensuring national and regional security. Predicting what the future holds for the region and the world in this sphere is extremely difficult.
Fourth, the multiplicity of realities: from the Western image to the Iranian narrative.
Against the backdrop of air, land, and naval battles in various parts of the Middle East, different versions of reality are taking shape. A key element of this process is declaring one side the winner and the other the loser. If the war continues, it will be difficult to verify the accuracy of claims made by either side, as statements, texts, images, and video materials are all used to prove their respective positions.
In this “media war,” uncovering the genuine reality is extremely challenging, and it appears that neither side is interested in fully revealing the true state of affairs. The “war of narratives” suggests that both sides have inflicted serious damage on one another. In earlier assumptions, in the event of war, the United States and Israel would have been seen as the leading side, and Iran as the follower. However, the current images do not align with that logic: despite wartime censorship, reports are entering the media space that contradict previous assessments.
Therefore, according to the Roman wisdom that “truth lies between the two sides,” a balanced view of the situation becomes particularly important. From this perspective, in shaping the reality of the war, Iran appears as the victor, as it is taking actions that can no longer be ignored amid the widespread circulation of photos and videos in the media and on social networks.
Fifth, “psychological warfare” in the interests of the parties to the conflict.
A defining feature of all wars over the past three decades has been psychological warfare aimed at attracting supporters. Over these three days, we have witnessed changes in the positions and strategies of various states. The most serious test for Iran was precisely the first three days of the war, which it passed with dignity, marking a new chapter in history.
On the first day, many countries believed that Iran was finished and on the verge of collapse. Now, the next stage of psychological warfare concerns how the first week of hostilities unfolds. If Iran overcomes this threshold as well, various powers, having assessed the capabilities of the sides, will either rush to offer support or adopt new positions. It is difficult to predict what prospects await Iran in the near future.
Echoes in Central Asia
Tajikistan became the first Central Asian country whose president expressed condolences to the leadership and people of Iran over the death of Ali Khamenei. The country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued a statement expressing concern over the situation in the Middle East and calling on the parties to exercise restraint and resolve the issue through negotiations.
Kazakhstan initially declared solidarity with Arab countries and expressed readiness to provide any assistance. Later, at the level of the press secretary, condolences were extended to the people of Iran.
Uzbekistan at first followed the same path as Kazakhstan: its foreign minister held telephone conversations with his Arab counterparts and expressed his country’s solidarity. Subsequently, at the presidential level, Uzbekistan also expressed condolences to Iran over the death of its leader, Ali Khamenei.
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan adopted a strategic pause; however, at the level of their foreign ministries, they expressed concern about the situation in the Middle East and called on the parties to the conflict to exercise restraint and pursue a diplomatic resolution.
The shift in Kazakhstan’s position, and to some extent Uzbekistan’s, is linked to the five points mentioned above and reflects a change in the perception of the situation in the Middle East and Iran’s regional role.
Regardless of the outcome of the war, one thing is clear: for the countries of Central Asia, it will have political, security, economic, trade, transit, and transportation, as well as geopolitical consequences. It is somewhat premature to reflect in detail on these consequences, as various scenarios remain possible depending on the course of military operations and the positions taken by the parties.
And once again we say:
Long live Iran, and may the hand of the demons wither!
