Beijing, through the meeting in Urumqi (talks between the Taliban and Pakistan), is pursuing a policy of “engineering instability.”
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, especially for Sangar
Against the backdrop of complex and multilayered developments in the Middle East, China has deliberately launched new activity in the Afghan direction—activity that reflects not so much a genuine will to resolve the crisis as a calculated entry by Beijing into a phase of “crisis management.”
At the same time, tensions between the Taliban and Pakistan are no longer confined to political disagreements but have clearly taken on an intelligence and security dimension. Both sides, relying on defined objectives, specific missions, and external resources, continue this exhausting process, while China, with a deep understanding of the situation, positions itself in this complex game based on its strategic interests.
The key question at this stage is not the nature of the Taliban–Pakistan conflict, but China’s real objectives in this foggy arena. Evidence suggests that China is not primarily seeking a fundamental resolution of the Afghan crisis, but rather aims to keep it at a controllable level. This approach allows Beijing both to contain the growth of security threats near its borders and to use instability as a tool for expanding its geopolitical influence.
Under these conditions, Pakistan seeks to achieve its security goals, particularly the containment of cross-border threats, while the Taliban—under pressure from a crisis of legitimacy and fear of sudden collapse—are compelled to participate in this game. In such a configuration, the lack of trust between the parties is not accidental but an inherent part of their interaction.
Pakistan’s recent steps, including inviting Taliban opponents to Islamabad, issuing repeated diplomatic warnings about the need to establish a “legitimate regime” in Afghanistan, and activating international diplomacy, indicate a shift in tactics. These actions have effectively placed the Taliban in a defensive position and forced them to turn to China to ease the pressure.
On the other hand, China, dissatisfied with the Taliban’s ambiguous and hesitant behavior in addressing security threats—especially those affecting its interests—views the situation as an opportunity to seize the initiative. Although there was little optimism about the outcome of the talks from the outset, this process has created new opportunities for all parties.
For China, such meetings provide a platform to deepen its influence and exert indirect control over Afghanistan’s security dynamics. For Pakistan, they serve as a tool to increase pressure, test Taliban behavior, and limit the influence of other actors. The Taliban offers a chance to gain legitimacy, reduce isolation, and buy time. Therefore, these meetings are more experimental and tactical than decisive in nature.
Against this backdrop, the Taliban’s vulnerable position is being exploited by both China and Pakistan. The Taliban, on the brink of crisis due to a lack of domestic and international legitimacy, are in urgent need of external engagement. However, this dependence places them in a weak position and creates opportunities for increased pressure from regional actors. Contrary to initial claims, the Taliban have still not been able to integrate into regional frameworks or become a reliable partner in regional cooperation.
Moreover, the rhetoric used by the Taliban at these meetings itself reflects hidden realities. The frequent use of terms such as “mutual respect,” “non-interference,” and “constructive engagement” indicates an attempt to conceal deep divisions and merely manage contradictions on a superficial level. This discourse is not a sign of progress, but rather evidence of forced flexibility and even a form of retreat under regional pressure. The Taliban are trying to present themselves as a responsible and negotiable actor, while in practice, they face serious constraints.
At a broader level, the relative convergence between China and Pakistan on the issue of “de-Indianization” of the structure of engagement with the Taliban is one of the important but less visible goals of this process. These two countries closely monitor any signs of rapprochement between the Taliban and other actors, especially India. At the same time, India itself appears to be acting with a degree of caution and hesitation in engaging with the Taliban, possibly influenced by broader regional developments, including crises in the Middle East. Nevertheless, China and Pakistan maintain their focus on Afghanistan and closely track any changes in Taliban behavior.
It is also important that China, in this configuration, does not act as a neutral and benevolent mediator. Beijing clearly understands that the Afghan crisis, alongside the threats it generates, also creates opportunities for expanding influence. From this perspective, China seeks to manage the crisis in such a way that others bear the costs while it reaps the benefits. This approach is logical for China, and Pakistan is well aware of it and aligns with it within the framework of its own interests.
From the shared perspective of China and Pakistan, these negotiations serve as a tool for buying time, increasing room for maneuver, and managing threats. In turn, the Taliban view this process as an opportunity to gain legitimacy and reduce regional tensions. However, the core problem is that none of the parties is ready to offer real concessions to achieve a sustainable agreement. This is what keeps the deadlock in place, leaving no clear path out of the crisis.
China aims to build a multi-layered influence: keeping the Taliban within controllable limits, managing regional security dynamics, and securing its vital interests. At the same time, it seeks to limit the role of other actors, especially India. Pakistan, for its part, uses this situation to maintain constant pressure on the Taliban to prevent them from moving beyond its sphere of influence. At the same time, Islamabad understands that the complete removal of the Taliban from power is neither possible nor desirable; therefore, its strategy is based on control, not elimination.
Ultimately, the Taliban, caught in a multi-sided pressure environment, are trying to use every possible opportunity to legitimize themselves. Participation in such meetings serves as a tool to distance themselves from the image of an isolated regime and to establish themselves as a political actor. However, without real changes in policy and behavior, these efforts alone cannot ensure sustainable legitimacy.
This process reflects hidden and managed competition among regional players more than it signals real progress toward resolving the crisis. China seeks influence and control, Pakistan seeks containment and pressure, and the Taliban seek survival and legitimacy. The lack of trust and the absence of will for real compromise reduce these negotiations to a tactical level. Ultimately, a “managed crisis” continues to prevail over a “real solution.”
