When will the Kazakh Taliban make itself known?
Author: Andrey Serenko, head of the Center for the Study of Afghan Politics (Russia).
The decision by the Kazakh authorities to exclude the Afghan Taliban from the national register of terrorist organizations has not only a purely Afghan, but also an intra-Kazakh dimension.
First of all, this move is a de facto political rehabilitation of the Taliban brand. Now, in the eyes of Kazakh public opinion (especially its religious part), it is a legal, legitimate organization. And, accordingly, the methods of her political activity are also legitimate and acceptable.
Let us remember that the main method of the Taliban is jihad. Armed struggle on the path of Allah for the sake of creating an Islamic state in which Muslims could live in full accordance with Sharia.
In this, the Taliban is practically no different from other jihadist projects. Contrary to the assurances of pro-Taliban sympathizers from Central Asian countries, the Taliban is by no means a purely Afghan project. Even the Taliban themselves don’t think so. In their perception, the Taliban is an exemplary model of victorious jihad. Exemplary for everyone - Afghans, Palestinians, Pakistanis, Kazakhs, Russian Muslims, etc. The Taliban does not offer exceptions.
Another thing is that Taliban propagandists do not always list - for clarification - specific peoples, tribes, and countries where the Taliban model can be applied. But sometimes they still do this - for example, about the Palestinians, when they comment on today's battles between Arabs and Israelis in Gaza.
Perhaps the day will come when some Kazakhstanis will comment.
Against the backdrop of the already rapid Islamization of Kazakh youth, among whom, for example, the Salafi “madhab” is becoming increasingly popular (note the quotation marks in this word), legalizing the jihadist project and the Taliban brand is, without quotation marks, a real act of political courage. Somewhat bordering on political recklessness. And we sing a song to the madness of the brave...
Now let's bring these positions together.
So, today, an increasingly massive social corporation of young Kazakh Islamists is throwing up the Taliban brand, based on the mythology, aesthetics, and youth subculture of jihad, as a legitimate one.kaz Which, in turn, is very popular among Islamized youth - and not only because of Sharia dreams but also because of the specifically transmitted doctrine of jihadist social justice.
And now there is a demand for social justice not only in Afghanistan but also in public opinion in the same Central Asian republics, including Kazakhstan.
The legalization of the Taliban brand in Kazakhstan creates excellent conditions for the meeting of two political “solitudes” - a broad demand for justice and a successful model for achieving it through victorious jihad.
In this case, the emergence of a political organization under the code name “Tehrik-e-Taliban Kazakhstan” (TTK) seems not only possible but also almost inevitable. As they say, it's a matter of time.
And how then will the Kazakh government react to the emergence of the Kazakh Taliban project? What prohibitions should you appeal to?
Today's episode with Astana's de facto semi-recognition of the Afghan Taliban is unlikely to add political happiness to the “furious mullahs” in Kabul.
But for Kazakhstan itself, perhaps this episode will be analogous to the release of a very controversial and dangerous genie from the bottle.
Who knows if it will be possible to push it back?
