Why does the region periodically demand the formation of an inclusive government in Afghanistan?
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, exclusively for Sangar.
Since the return of the Taliban to power, almost all surrounding powers from Iran and Pakistan to Russia, China, India, and the Central Asian states have repeatedly called for the establishment of an “inclusive government” in Kabul. At first glance, this may appear to be a diplomatic recommendation or a moral slogan, but in reality it has deep security and geopolitical roots. Unlike many political movements in Afghanistan, the Taliban is not built on a national program but on a narrow ideological interpretation, which makes the group prone to becoming an uncontrollable tool in regional equations and susceptible to transnational networks, extremist groups or unidentified financiers. From the neighbors’ perspective, the continuation of this ideological nature not only keeps Afghanistan unstable but also creates a corridor for insecurity, radicalization, and migration to spill over into their own borders.
The past two decades have also shown that pro-Western currents in Afghanistan have failed to build a sustainable relationship of trust with the neighboring states. The Western-style state-building project effectively turned Afghanistan into a platform for extra-regional military and intelligence penetration. From this perspective, although a single-group Taliban government is costly, its sudden replacement by a pro-Western force could reproduce the same threats in a different form. This is why the region is seeking a third model neither pure “Talibanism” nor unrestrained “Westernism” but a balanced combination of Afghanistan’s various indigenous forces.
Today’s Taliban, unlike the 1990s, has a more unified structure. This unity is an advantage for the group itself but, for its neighbors, it means the emergence of an actor that is not easily bargained with or co-opted. Under such circumstances, any security or economic agreement can quickly be undermined by the decisions of a closed power center and jeopardize regional interests.
This is the fear that drives countries to demand an “inclusive government,” creating internal balance and maintaining access to multiple channels of negotiation. From the surrounding powers’ point of view, a mono-voice Taliban Afghanistan is an opportunity for extra-regional actors: a state with only one decision-making center can easily become a tool of distant powers. The more diverse the power structure in Kabul, the harder it is for outsiders to exert exclusive influence and the costlier it becomes to destabilize.
The region knows well that, although complex and time-consuming, a participatory government in Afghanistan can strengthen internal balance and make extra-regional penetration more difficult. Such a structure gives neighboring states the possibility of dealing not with a single closed and unpredictable actor but with a set of diverse and negotiable forces.
Decades of experience show that whenever Afghanistan has become the monopoly of a single group or a narrow coalition, instability and proxy rivalries have increased; whereas whenever the power structure in Kabul has been more pluralistic, regional cooperation has been easier. “Diversity of power holders” is therefore not a slogan but a security necessity for Afghanistan’s neighbors, giving them reassurance that Kabul will not become a geopolitical threat to their interests.
The region’s call for an inclusive government is not driven by compassion for the Afghan people but by its own national security and geopolitical interests. They know that a unified Taliban is an uncontrollable tool prone to extra-regional manipulation and that pro-Western currents have been equally threatening in the past. The only middle way is to create a multi-layered, participatory power structure in which internal balance works in favor of regional stability.
Yet achieving this model is not easy. The Taliban still regards its exclusive legitimacy as its main source of power and is unwilling to genuinely share authority. Meanwhile, the forces opposing the Taliban are fragmented and unorganized. Without coordinated regional pressure and the design of a joint roadmap, the slogan of an “inclusive government” will remain a mere diplomatic recommendation.
Afghanistan’s future depends on neighbors moving beyond spectatorship and using a mix of pressure, incentives and initiative to steer the power structure toward genuine participation; otherwise, the “geopolitical wasteland” now emerging will soon engulf not only Afghanistan but the entire region.
