Reasons for Khalilzad’s frustration over a possible meeting of Taliban opponents in Pakistan
By Nurullah Walizada, analyst, especially for “Sangar”
Original article: خلیلزاد از چه «"یسوزد"؟
Since the day the media reported on a possible meeting of several civil, political, and anti-Taliban activists in Pakistan, Khalilzad has taken a sharp and alarmed stance toward this event. Initially, he called the meeting “provocative” and then claimed that it was organized by Pakistan’s intelligence agency (ISI).
Some points regarding the possible meeting of Taliban opponents and Khalilzad’s reasons for concern are worth noting:
1 - The possible meeting in Pakistan is preliminary in nature and in many ways is not as large or important as Khalilzad portrays it. There are still many rumors and questions about the composition of participants, goals, plans, outcomes, and consequences of this meeting. Among the participants are figures with little political experience, and their intentions are questionable.
Nevertheless, the very fact of holding this meeting is significant. It is the first meeting against the Taliban in a country considered one of its supporters and patrons. Therefore, many doubt that Pakistan would truly organize an anti-Taliban meeting. From the perspective of the potential start of a new phase in Pakistan’s regional policy toward the Taliban, this meeting matters.
Most likely, the Pakistanis intentionally organized the meeting with such participants so that it would not provoke excessive sensitivity but could serve as a starting point for a broader movement in the future. Pakistan considers that further actions will depend on how the Taliban react to the meeting and how seriously they take it. If the Taliban take it seriously and make the concessions expected by Pakistan, the country may not prioritize further development of the meeting. But if the Taliban ignore it, Pakistan is likely to take more decisive steps. Khalilzad probably wants to send this message to the Taliban: take the meeting seriously.
2 - Although it is difficult to believe that Pakistan would act seriously against the Taliban, this doubt diminishes when considering changing circumstances. Politics is a field of trial and error, shaped by experience. Although Pakistan created the Taliban in Afghanistan and supported them until their return to power, over the past four years it has not been fully satisfied with the outcomes of this support and has faced problems in which the Taliban are seen as a contributing factor. One consequence has been increased instability in Pakistan due to Taliban attacks and the Baloch Liberation Army.
Beyond this four-year experience, the twenty-year period of Taliban warfare and evasions also contains elements that generate distrust and suspicion in Taliban-Pakistan relations.
In 2001, under pressure from the Bush administration, the Pakistanis turned against the Taliban and even helped the US overthrow their regime. Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, mysteriously died in Pakistan. Many Taliban commanders were deliberately killed with US intelligence cooperation. Many Taliban leaders spent time in Pakistani prisons as terrorists. The distrust between the Taliban and Pakistan led to the creation of the Qatar office in 2011, involving Taliban dissatisfied with Pakistan. One of them was Mullah Baradar, who was released from a Pakistani prison under US pressure and transferred to Qatar.
The initiator of this action was Khalilzad. In fact, he wanted to widen the gap between Pakistan and the Taliban and, in his view, ensure the “independence” of the Taliban from Pakistan. The creation of the office in Qatar implied that Pakistan should doubt whether the Taliban would fully serve its goals. The Pakistanis realized that there was an attempt to distance the Taliban from Pakistan. Since then, Pakistan has tried to restore its weakened role in controlling the Taliban and has partly succeeded, but the situation has not been fully resolved.
There are still people within the Taliban who, influenced by Karzai and Khalilzad, seek to distance themselves from Pakistan and want to end this complex and tangled relationship. But because Pakistan also has its own influential agents inside the Taliban, rival forces understand this and know that intensifying competition could lead to the disintegration of Taliban unity.
3 - Considering this, Khalilzad essentially sees himself as the architect of a managed separation between the Taliban and Pakistan, positioning himself as a rival to Pakistan. He seeks to give advice and, when necessary, intervene directly, stepping beyond his authority and offering moral guidance. Khalilzad wants no one to enter the “gap” he has created between the Taliban and Pakistan without his permission, especially anti-Taliban forces from the Northern Alliance and resistance.
Essentially, he seeks a monopoly over managing Taliban-Pakistan relations. Whatever happens, good or bad, it must occur under his supervision. Therefore, when Pakistan takes actions contrary to Khalilzad’s wishes, which could allow other forces to enter the gap between the Taliban and Pakistan, Khalilzad actively intervenes, issuing orders and prohibitions.
In his concern over potential interference from Taliban opponents in the Pakistan-Taliban dynamic, Khalilzad considers ethnic interests. His strategy from the beginning has been for Pakistan to support Pashtun groups in Afghanistan to strengthen Pashtun governance, but this support should not imply that the Pashtun government in Kabul is subordinated to Pakistan. This is a difficult task. In this logic, Khalilzad views Pakistan as a tool to achieve his ethnic objectives. The Pashtuns generally hold a similar instrumental view of Pakistan.
At the same time, Pakistan similarly views Pashtun groups and governments — as instruments to achieve its regional objectives, but without allowing them to grow strong enough to become a problem for the country itself. For example, the Taliban’s Pashtun rule has become a headache for Pakistan. Pashtuns across the Durand Line aspire to create an independent state, with Afghanistan’s Taliban and India jointly supporting them. This could lead to Pakistan’s fragmentation and threaten its territorial integrity, which is considered a “red line.” Pakistan understands that there is no other way to manage Afghanistan’s Taliban and Pakistan’s Taliban in line with its objectives.
4 - For Pashtunists, managing domestic and foreign policy has always been difficult. Their plans and programs not only threaten non-Pashtun ethnic groups but also pose a risk of fragmentation for Pakistan. This reflects the inherent contradiction in the instrumental view both sides hold — Pakistan’s view of the Pashtuns and the Pashtuns’ view of Pakistan. A century of political experience in Afghanistan shows that Pashtuns have always considered eliminating non-Pashtun structures and political movements a primary mission, and all Pashtun rulers have acted in this direction.
However, they are concerned that eliminating non-Pashtuns and preventing their participation in governance without external support is impossible, and without such support, other ethnic groups may fall under foreign influence. Therefore, Pashtuns have always applied a “zigzag” strategy in their politics.
If they take steps to eliminate or suppress opposition, they simultaneously attempt to take measures to preserve what they call national unity. The same “deceptive” policy! From this perspective, Khalilzad is concerned that non-Pashtun political and governmental structures could enter stages of cooperation with Pakistan that would be irreversible and could undermine efforts to stabilize the Pashtun-Taliban administration.
5 - So far, non-Pashtun political forces have demonstrated excessive caution, lack of planning, fear, cowardice, backward-looking tendencies, and emotionalism in politics. These weaknesses among northern and resistance forces over the twenty-year republican period were extremely damaging: with each passing day, they were pushed away from the center of politics, ultimately leaving the field to the Taliban. Even today, the participation of a few non-Pashtun figures in the upcoming meeting in Pakistan is considered by many as heretical and seen as foolish. This perception is tied to the aforementioned weaknesses of the northern political wing.
If there is sufficient political courage and a clear plan for future actions, there is no need for fear or excessive caution. Naturally, Pakistan is the most skilled regional player, but today the country is in a position where it has limited room to maneuver in multi-layered games. This situation must be understood.
An organized and purposeful political movement, just as it dares to form new political coalitions, can transform overly cautious cooperation into productive cooperation to achieve concrete local objectives. This capacity must be developed within non-Pashtun political forces. If they cannot form friendship with Pakistan, they can still cooperate, which would allow them to redefine and restore their presence in the country’s power structure. This is possible. Today, relationships between countries and groups are based on mutual benefit and loss.
A figure like Khalilzad, well-versed in the psychology and political sociology of the northern wing, naturally seeks to highlight the factors preventing this wing from carrying out useful and effective anti-Taliban actions. By stating that the upcoming meeting in Pakistan is managed by Pakistan’s intelligence, he aims to instill in the public and in the collective memory of Afghanistan’s people and the northern wing the idea that their politicians are spies. This accusation is perceived very negatively in the northern wing, and some, unintentionally, strengthen Khalilzad’s narrative.
