Compared with Iran and the Resistance Front, it was the Taliban who benefited most from the existing balance
By Nurullah Walizade, analyst (Afghanistan), especially for Sangar
The presence of Ahmad Massoud, leader of the National Resistance Front, at the funeral ceremony for the late leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran attracted considerable attention in both Iranian and Afghan media.
Although the Islamic Republic of Iran has provided limited support to the National Resistance Front, such support has consistently been accompanied by efforts to keep both the relationship and the assistance out of the public eye. The official reception accorded to the leader of the Resistance Front during the funeral ceremony may therefore signal a more visible shift in Iran's policy toward Afghanistan and the Taliban. It appears that, in the post-confrontation period with the United States, Tehran has begun reassessing certain aspects of its Afghan policy.
At the same time, the presence of Mohammad Mohaqiq alongside Ahmad Massoud at the ceremony may carry a separate political message of its own.
In recent weeks, Mohaqiq has adopted a more conciliatory tone toward the Taliban. Over the past several years, he has supported Ahmad Massoud more consistently than most other former leaders of the Northern Alliance. However, his recent moderation toward the Taliban has fueled speculation that Iran is seeking to facilitate closer ties between Mohaqiq and the Taliban.
These assumptions have made the joint appearance of Ahmad Massoud and Mohammad Mohaqiq in Tehran the subject of numerous interpretations. To date, Ahmad Massoud has shown no indication of softening his position toward the Taliban. Nevertheless, an important question arises: Is Massoud attempting to bring his political positions closer to those of Mohaqiq, or is Mohaqiq moving toward Massoud's stance? Or was their simultaneous appearance merely related to the funeral ceremony and should not be interpreted as evidence of a broader political realignment?
Be that as it may, although Iran began pursuing a policy of fostering engagement between the Taliban and their opponents approximately five years ago, the absence of a genuine balance of power rendered this strategy largely ineffective from the perspective of the anti-Taliban opposition. Ultimately, among the three principal actors involved, it was the Taliban that derived the greatest benefit, while the Resistance Front found itself in the weakest position, and Iran likewise failed to secure any substantial political gains.
The lack of balance manifested itself in two respects. First, no genuine balance of power existed between the Taliban and their opponents. Second, Iran itself did not adopt a genuinely balanced approach toward both sides. Moreover, Tehran made no serious or sustained effort to establish such a balance between the competing forces.
At the same time, compared with the Taliban, the Resistance Front has demonstrated far greater consistency in preserving its relationship with Iran. The leadership of the Resistance Front has repeatedly declined invitations from the United States to visit Washington to avoid causing friction with Tehran. By contrast, the Taliban have held numerous rounds of talks with American officials and have openly expressed their desire to establish friendly relations with the United States.
At the same time, the Taliban have developed close and extensive relations with Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and India—countries that Iran regards, to varying degrees, as strategic competitors or even adversaries.
In other words, the Taliban have never been willing to do what Iran, Russia, and China expected of them: namely, to limit their extra-regional ties and provide credible assurances that they had distanced themselves from Western intelligence influence and networks.
It is precisely this lack of confidence that has prompted regional powers, including Iran, to reinforce their dual-track strategy toward Afghanistan. Under the current circumstances, strengthening such a policy appears to be the most rational course of action available to the countries of the region.
Afghanistan can achieve lasting peace and political equilibrium only through the establishment of genuine equilibrium—rather than imposed, one-sided engagement—and a sustainable balance of power among the country's principal ethnic and political centers of authority. This objective carries paramount strategic importance, above all for the states of the region.
A mono-ethnic and monopolized political system cannot bring durable peace or stability to Afghanistan. The country requires an inclusive democratic system of governance, and this is not merely the demand of the Taliban's opponents; it is an objective national necessity for Afghanistan as a whole. The more clearly regional states recognize this reality and the more actively they contribute to achieving it, the more their own long-term strategic interests will ultimately be served.
