One of the leaders of the Resistance operating in the country told Nezavisimaya Gazeta about what prevented the current regime in Kabul from gaining international recognition
Author: Andrey Serenko, NG's own correspondent
Internal contradictions and conflicts are intensifying within the leadership of the Afghan Taliban (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation). One of the leaders of the anti-Taliban Resistance, former head of Afghan intelligence, and chairman of the political movement “Green Trend of Afghanistan” Amrullah SALEH spoke about this in an exclusive interview with NG columnist Andrei SERENKO. According to him, the Taliban regime largely maintains dominance in Afghanistan thanks to regular financial support from the United States. “The USA is the only country that the Taliban respects,” emphasizes Amrullah Saleh. The special nature of US-Taliban relations makes the position of the countries of the region in the sphere of Afghan settlement vulnerable.
– Mr. Saleh, more and more interesting news is coming from Afghanistan. Sources report growing contradictions between the leaders of various factions within the Taliban, in particular, that the conflict between Taliban Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani and Emir Haibatullah Akhundzada is gaining momentum. How reliable is this information?
– The conflict between Haqqani and Haibatullah exists. But we must take into account that today in the system of governance in Afghanistan created by the Taliban, there is the dominant clan of Haibatullah and all other clans, which, in turn, have various factions and small groups. And all these groups strive to gain privileged access to power, material resources, and profitable positions. So far, Western financial support, and external sponsors, are helping the Taliban maintain its formal unity. But this is unlikely to last long.
The most important problem for the Taliban is the “eternal” intra-Pashtun dispute, the conflict between the Durrani (or Kandahari) clan and the Ghilzai (or Gelji) clan, which compete with each other for dominance in the country. This struggle has a long history. In the Saur (April) Revolution of 1978, for example, the Ghilzai clan carried out a coup d'état, overthrowing the king, who came from the Durrani clan. During the jihad of the 1980s, none of the Durranis were the leaders of the Mujahideen movement - only the Ghilzais.
By the way, at the same time, in the 80s, Pakistan decided not to support the Durrani clan, relying on the Ghilzais: the Pakistanis believed that the presence of Durrani representatives in power in Kabul would lead to an aggravation of the territorial dispute with Islamabad over the “Durand Line” (not border between Afghanistan and Pakistan recognized by the Afghan authorities - “NG”). That is why, with the support of Pakistan, the Ghilzais became the leaders of six large groups of Afghan Mujahideen waging anti-Soviet jihad.
This historical dispute between the Durranis and the Ghilzais and between Pakistan and the Durranis is not new. The Pakistanis thought and hoped that by handing over power to the Ghilzais in Afghanistan, they would be able to resolve the old dispute with Kabul over the border. But in the end, Islamabad was mistaken: even the Taliban’s rise to power almost three years ago did not alleviate the acuteness of the long-standing border issue.
It should be noted that after the death of the republican regime in August 2021, many experts and politicians believed that the victorious Taliban would have two centers of power and authority: the main leader Haibatullah, a native of the Durrani clan, would sit in Kandahar, and the administrative center, the official government " Taliban" will settle in Kabul. At first, this is what happened, but now we see that Mullah Haibatullah is rapidly increasing his power, and at the same time he acts not only as an absolute dictator but also behaves as a representative of the interests of the Durrani clan. And, of course, the Ghilzai Taliban and Pakistan don’t like this. Kabul, the interim Taliban government located there, does not currently have much political relevance: the Taliban interim government in Kabul is of secondary importance.
– Who is more in the Taliban government today – the Durranis or the Ghilzais?
– Today, many key positions in the Taliban are occupied by people from the Durrani clan. For example, the very influential official Taliban media spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, who is based in Kandahar, is a member of the Durrani clan. In comparison, the same Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, sitting in Kabul, does not have the authority that some people think. The first deputy prime minister of the Kabul Taliban government, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, also comes from the Durrani clan. But the head of the Taliban Ministry of Internal Affairs, Sirajuddin Haqqani, represents the interests of the Ghilzai clan. By the way, recently Mullah Haibatullah appointed his man from the Durrani clan to the post of governor of the eastern Afghan province of Khost - this is the birthplace of the Haqqanis, where Ghilzai Pashtuns live. There is no doubt that Sirajuddin Haqqani did not like this, but so far nothing has been heard of his public reaction. This personnel gesture did not add positivity to the relationship between Haibatullah and Haqqani.
KABUL IS NO LONGER A REAL CAPITAL
– Where is the real political capital of Afghanistan now?
– Today Kabul is no longer the capital of Afghanistan - the real capital is located in Kandahar. The future of Afghanistan is not being decided in Kabul right now. Mullah Haibatullah is afraid of Kabul, where the majority of the population is not Pashtun, and there are also quite prominent cosmopolitan groups there that are very critical of the Taliban regime. Haibatullah fears that if he were in Kabul, there would constantly be some kind of protest against him there. Therefore, the so-called emir of the Taliban sits 500 km from Kabul, in Kandahar, hoping, among other things, to thus avoid protests and the threat of rebellion under his windows.
– Some Afghan sources and experts report possible scenarios for modernizing the Taliban control system. Some expect the emergence of a new coalition government with the participation of moderate Taliban, some former Republican politicians, and even representatives of the Resistance movement. Others are betting on the return of the monarchy. How do you deal with such expectations? Is the system of power created by the Taliban capable of systemic changes?
– There are two different words – “Taliban” and “modernization”, but they do not coincide, moreover, they absolutely contradict each other. If suddenly the Taliban truly begins some kind of administrative and political reforms, then this will be the beginning of its end.
As for various kinds of assumptions regarding possible changes in the Taliban power system, then, in my opinion, these are not only someone’s fantasies, they are part of some kind of military-psychological operation. The current leadership of the Taliban is not preparing for any changes; almost every day they declare that they are in complete control of Afghanistan and are doing everything possible to consolidate their movement.
As for the prospects for restoring the monarchy in Afghanistan, I see no grounds for this. By the way, in our history, even such a terrible monarch as Abdur-Rahman Khan was still not a crazy person like Mullah Haibatullah. The toughest monarchy in Afghanistan will be very soft compared to the regime that the Taliban established.
When one begins to talk about some possible political changes in today's Afghanistan, one must remember that the nature of the Taliban's power is formed and determined by three factors. Firstly, the Taliban are religious fanatics. Secondly, the Taliban are ethnic, clan fanatics. Thirdly, the Taliban’s power is an absolute vertical, next to which there are no other institutions - no public associations, no political parties, no people’s self-government.
I repeat once again, the Taliban regime is an unconditional, unlimited, absolute vertical of power: from teachers in rural schools to Mullah Haibatullah - this is all the “Taliban” today. Without an armed uprising, changes in such a political system are impossible.
– Judging by some signs, today the competition for Afghanistan is intensifying between a pool of regional countries (Iran, Russia, China) and extra-regional players led by the United States. The Taliban are still trying to balance between these poles of the new “great game”, but, judging by some signs, they are still inclined towards a strategic partnership with the Americans. How do you assess the prospects of regional countries in competition with the West and the United States for Afghanistan? Who wins this Afghan game?
– It is true that competition continues between different international players on the topic of Afghanistan. But this is not an open competition; it can rather be called a secret game in the shadows. There are several aspects to this competition.
First aspect: there are some countries for which the main topic and interest today is security and economic opportunities in Afghanistan. They sell goods, resources, and things that are not of very good quality and want to eliminate threats to their security through interaction with the Taliban.
The second aspect: other countries see their relations with Afghanistan through the “window of civilization.” They believe that power in the country is in the hands of one group that does not respect Afghanistan's ethnic and religious diversity. Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras - each of these ethnic groups inhabiting Afghanistan has its own history. Tajiks are proud that they had their first state a thousand years ago, and Tajik culture dominated Afghanistan, as did the Farsi language. The Pashtuns say that they captured parts of India, and Iran and created the great history of Afghanistan. Uzbeks cherish the memory of the creation of their empire and their period of success. The Hazaras also have their own unique history. The Taliban does not respect the ethnic, religious, and historical diversity of Afghanistan, and in fact, imposes a repressive culture of canceling this diversity on our country.
But there are smart political groups in our region who understand that the culture of cancel and xenophobia that the Taliban imposes cannot bring real peace to Afghanistan or the region. They appreciate the importance of good ongoing relations between different clans and groups in Afghanistan and look at this issue very carefully.
The third aspect: is those actors, countries that look at Afghanistan through the geopolitical window. They consider the safety of their physical borders and their allies the main goal and are also worried about what is happening in the “big game”. The characteristics of Russia's current policy regarding Afghanistan are precisely this, a geopolitical point of view: Moscow, in the spirit of Soviet-era optics, still thinks that Afghanistan is not far from it.
I believe that today's Taliban threatens Russia's interests. Iran, Russia, and other countries are trying to create some kind of relations with the Taliban within a regional framework, but unsuccessfully. The Taliban only respects the agreement with the United States that it concluded in Doha in February 2020. The Doha process is a deal between the Taliban and the United States, no one else is a party to it. All countries in the region need to understand this very well.
I don’t know why the countries of the region continue to respect the agreement between the United States and the Taliban after the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan. There is nothing in it that would protect the interests of the regional community.
– Some politicians, diplomats, and experts consider it a great achievement that there are now no US and NATO troops in the region...
– Yes, US and NATO troops are not physically present in Afghanistan. But the influence of the United States in Afghanistan today remains the greatest. Every week the Americans supply from 40 to 80 million dollars to the Taliban, they bring this money from the city of Sulaymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan. Without this financial support, the Taliban regime would have collapsed long ago. If there is no geopolitical conspiracy, if the Taliban does not act as a secret proxy for extra-regional interest groups, then why does the Taliban receive so much money from the West?
During the Republic period, the US printed Afghan currency for the Afghan government in Poland. And now the Americans continue to print new Afghan currency there but for the Taliban. By the way, there, in Poland, the United States is now printing a large number of new Afghan passports for the Taliban.
During the existence of the republic in Afghanistan, there was an indispensable condition for receiving Western financial assistance - the presence of numerous Western advisers in the Ministry of Finance of Afghanistan. They wanted to see what we were doing, without their control we could not manage the money. Today there is no such condition for the Taliban: the Americans transfer up to $80 million to the Taliban every week and do not control them. Is it any wonder then that a significant portion of the funds received from America - about $2.5 billion - are used by the Taliban leaders for their military purposes, including the training of suicide bombers?
Curiously, the details of the current budget of Afghanistan are kept strictly secret by the Taliban, and the West does not require the Taliban to disclose the budget structure.
All these are manifestations of the secret love between the Taliban and the United States. In other words, the Doha agreement of February 2020 still defines the secret relationship between the US and the Taliban. The Taliban today is a participant in the US geopolitical platform in the region. The Taliban respects only one country - the United States. After August 2021, the Taliban did not say or do anything against the United States. The price of consolation is the same $80 million a week.
Who then wins the “big game” around Afghanistan? We see a not very cohesive bloc of regional states, the cautious position of Iran, not very successful actions of Russia, and a largely misguided China, which believes that the Taliban allegedly defeated the United States and needs time to turn into a civilized force... There are too many illusions regarding the Taliban in some countries in the region.
At the same time, China does not respect the social characteristics of the Afghan community. Beijing does not realize that Afghanistan is not Pashtunistan or Talibanistan and that other, different people live there, but China does not show respect for these people. Russia respects the diversity of Afghanistan, in this, its position differs from China. President Putin has publicly said that Tajiks make up 40 to 47% of Afghanistan's population but have no power there. In turn, the Taliban do not respect Shiites: they recently closed a large Shiite university and do not recognize Shiite legal proceedings. Yes, today the situation in Afghanistan is still outwardly quiet, but it does not reflect the reality that exists in this country. People, groups, and states that do not respect the character of Afghan society will inevitably lose in Afghanistan.
IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE TO JIHADISTS?
– How do you assess the prospects of the Afghan anti-Taliban Resistance? For three years now, various Resistance groups have been unable to take control of even a small territory in Afghanistan. Does this mean the Taliban are too strong? Or is the Resistance still weak? Are there any chances that the Resistance to the Taliban will become a real political force in Afghanistan?
– The current Resistance has different images, and different forms, not only armed ones. And his struggle was successful - it largely created a political impasse for the Taliban. The Taliban has not received international, regional, or domestic legitimacy. If there had been no resistance from Afghan women, journalists, and civil activists, then the Taliban could have counted on international recognition. That did not happen.
The current situation is a political dead end. Nobody recognizes the Taliban; the Taliban cannot use their flag at any conferences. This is a success for the opponents of the Taliban, who are quite successful in using various forms of Resistance.
As for armed resistance, there are many restrictions. The armed resistance is alive and continues. Kabul is no longer considered a safe city because various armed groups opposing the Taliban are now operating there. We do not kill civilians, as the Taliban did, we do not shoot at civilians, we do not kill schoolchildren and students, and we do not blow up universities. The resistance is exclusively fighting against the Taliban.
Nowadays, some groups are active both among Afghans and in the countries of the region and the West, which promote a fake position according to which there is no need to develop and support the resistance of the people of Afghanistan to the Taliban regime. They insist that we need to wait a little longer, that there is an internal conflict in the Taliban, that there are supposedly some “moderate Taliban”, and that the issue of liberating Afghanistan from the dictatorship of the terrorist group can be resolved by non-military means. I don't believe in this because it is fantasy.
We respect our citizens, all ethnic and religious communities of Afghanistan, and the humane methods of the Resistance, our civilized actions are regarded by some forces as weakness. No, this is not so - it is our soft power that will lead the Resistance to victory. After the current political stalemate in the Afghan situation, a political turnaround will inevitably come, and we are now on this path.
