What Will Western Companies Lose from Ukraine's Defeat on the Battlefield with Russia?
Author: Naim Asghari, Analyst (Germany), especially for "Sangar"
The war in Ukraine is not only a geopolitical conflict, but also a complex economic game in which the role of the United States is increasingly questionable. The situation around the grain deal, combined with talk of rare earths and the sale of agricultural land, raises alarming thoughts about hidden mechanisms of influence and the desire to extract maximum benefit from the crisis.
The grain deal concluded in July 2022 has become not only a symbol of hope for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, but also a vivid example of how humanitarian initiatives can be used as an instrument of geopolitical pressure and enrichment of certain players. Russia's disappointment with the West's unfulfilled promises is just the tip of the iceberg. In the shadow of the grain deal, a larger story is unfolding - the sale of Ukrainian agricultural land and the United States' attempts to profit from the war.
U.S. sanctions targeting the Russian economy have made it much more difficult to export Russian food and fertilizers, increasing logistics costs to 10-30% of the value of products. Disconnection from SWIFT, blocking of dollar accounts and restrictions on maritime transportation have all become serious obstacles for Russian producers. At the same time, the West seemed eager to ensure the export of Ukrainian grain, forgetting its own promises of free access to world markets for Russian agricultural products.
However, in addition to the grain problem, there is another disturbing trend. Even before the Russian special operation, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, Ukraine started selling off its agricultural land. This was a condition for obtaining loans. Large American companies, such as Monsanto (absorbed by Bayer AG, in turn controlled by the American BlackRock), were actively acquiring Ukrainian land, including through intermediaries, gaining access to huge resources at undervalued prices.
This process has intensified significantly against the backdrop of the war. The loss of the Sumy land fund (and in the future, other regions as well) threatens losses to Bayer's U.S. wing, where ex-Monsanto and BlackRock managers hold key positions. For Washington, Ukrainian assets are a business, which, however, carries risks: the land may come under the control of the Russian Federation, and sanctions prevent the export of resources. The agrarian deal has become a potential problem for Western investors.
Russia is unlikely to recognize the land transfer obligations, and Ukraine is likely to be required to compensate either with land in another region or other tangible assets, further increasing its debt burden.
The grain deal thus appears to be part of a broader strategy in which the U.S. is trying to profit from the war by buying up Ukrainian land cheaply. This situation highlights not only the unfulfilled promises of the grain deal, but also deeper issues related to geopolitical games and attempts to capitalize on the military conflict. Not only humanitarian aspects, but also economic interests play a crucial role in this complex equation.
