In 2025, 9,000 radical Islamists moved from Syria to Afghanistan in search of new sponsors and missions
Author: Andrei Serenko, special correspondent for “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”
Afghanistan has been flooded by autonomous small groups of adherents of armed jihad who are actively seeking sponsors to organize terrorist attacks in regional countries—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Iran, as well as Russia and China. Supporters of the so-called “wandering jihad,” many of whom moved to Afghanistan from Syria, are trying not so much to seize the initiative from the “systemic mujahideen” of traditional jihadist brands as simply to survive in an unfavorable socio-economic environment.
Afghan sources familiar with the issue report an upsurge, beginning in early autumn 2025, of activity by some former field commanders and operatives from terrorist organizations banned in Russia*, including Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State (IS), Jamaat al-Ahrar, and others. Some time ago, for various reasons, they failed to reach an understanding with the “systemic jihadists” of these structures, were expelled from their ranks, cut off from funding, and left without a role in the Taliban emirate. However, this autumn, dozens of such “forced retirees from jihad” (often once quite influential) began showing increased interest in finding partners to organize autonomous terrorist operations outside Afghanistan.
For example, sources in Afghanistan have recorded significant activity by one former Al-Qaeda* operative, Abu Bakr Badakhshani, reportedly a native of Afghan Badakhshan who fought in Syria against the Bashar al-Assad regime and later moved to Afghanistan. For unknown reasons, Abu Bakr ceased to be an official member of Al-Qaeda*, but he maintained an extensive informal network among its influential field commanders, intelligence officers, recruiters, and political operatives. It is known that he not only controls a group of militants in northern Afghanistan but also maintains close ties with “sleeper” jihadist cells in Russia’s North Caucasus region. Recently, sources say, Badakhshani began actively searching for sponsors for his group. This suggests that he is planning—or may already be preparing—to carry out a terrorist attack (possibly a series of attacks) in the countries where he has supporters. It is unlikely that this will take place in Syria.
It is reliably known that, among others, Abu Bakr Badakhshani reached out for support to the current Taliban governor of the northern Afghan province of Panjshir, Maulavi Abdul Hakim (also known as Hakim Agha). An ethnic Arab, Hakim Agha was known in the early 2000s as Aga Jan and was a close associate of Osama bin Laden. Maulavi Abdul Hakim still maintains strong ties with Al-Qaeda*. “In private, without cameras, the current Taliban governor of Panjshir proudly recalls his past in Al-Qaeda* and has not forgotten his old friends,” sources familiar with the situation note. It is therefore no surprise that Abu Bakr Badakhshani approached him for support: in Al-Qaeda*, there are no ex-members.
Notably, other “autonomous” or “wandering jihadists” have recently sought assistance and advice in Panjshir as well. These include Commander Sabir—one of the leaders of Jamaat al-Ahrar, a terrorist organization banned in Russia that splintered from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan—as well as Maulavi Farooq and his son, both former active members of Al-Qaeda*, who fell out with its current leader, Hamza bin Laden, and are now located in the eastern Afghan province of Kunar.
There are additional examples of increased activity by former highly motivated members of Al-Qaeda* and other jihadist brands who, for various reasons, were pushed out of their core terrorist structures, shifted to a “wandering jihad” model, and are seeking sponsors for their survival. Such “Bremen Town Musicians of jihad” may pose a serious threat to the countries of the region. Unlike the Afghan Taliban, IS*, or Al-Qaeda*, they lack stable budgets and political backing. And to obtain them, they must convincingly demonstrate their capabilities—namely, by carrying out a series of high-profile terrorist attacks outside Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Obviously, these “wandering jihadists” will attempt to do so where they have personal networks and potential helpers—in the Central Asian republics, Russia, and possibly some European countries.
Syrian connections of former or “sleeper” members of Al-Qaeda* and other terrorist structures may play an important role in the development of the “wandering jihad” phenomenon. After the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime, many foreign “mujahideen” began—some voluntarily, others under pressure—to leave Syria for various reasons. They are increasingly choosing Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as their new place of residence. According to sources, in 2025, up to 8.5–9 thousand Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, Uyghur, Caucasian, and other jihadists moved from Syria to Afghanistan. Not all of them managed to settle successfully on this new “land of Sharia,” obtain reliable sources of income, or secure personal prospects within the structures of “systemic jihad” in Afghanistan. A large portion of these “Syrian” militant migrants are doomed either to poverty and stagnation or to a “wandering jihad” beyond the borders of the Taliban emirate.
Available information indicates that individual (“wandering”) Al-Qaeda* cells and several other jihadist groups that found themselves on Afghan territory are trying to regroup while simultaneously searching for resources for survival and effective management for future development. The “wandering jihadists” are poor, not controlled by the Taliban or other “systemic” terrorist organizations, and unpredictable in their actions. They will easily follow those who can offer them survival resources and who can act as relatively effective manipulators in dealing with them. There is little doubt that sooner or later such partners and sponsors will emerge for the “wandering jihad.”
