Washington is again turning to an old ally to maintain influence in Central and South Asia.
By Khaledin Ziaei, Head of the Educational Discourse of the Nation Think Tank – Special for “Sangar”
Original article: آیا امریکا «دوسیه افغانستان» را به پاکستان تحویل میدهد؟
After a brief but multidimensional and complex fifth-generation war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Israeli regime, which lasted only twelve days, the United States of America, aiming to prevent the conflict’s expansion and maintain the balance of power in the region, granted Pakistan significant strategic concessions.
The primary objective of this concession policy toward Pakistan was to maintain its neutrality and prevent a potential alliance with the Iran–China–Russia bloc, as well as to curb Pakistan’s disruptive role in regional processes.
This article examines four main directions of these concessions to Pakistan:
The renewed handover of the dossier on war and peace in Afghanistan to Pakistan.
Providing Pakistan with economic incentives and military aid.
Applying pressure on India to abandon war with Pakistan and influencing the Taliban to ensure Islamabad’s security, including handing over members of the Pakistani Taliban, disarming the Baloch opposition movement, etc.
Geopolitical and strategic analysis of new balances of power and roles of regional and extra-regional powers.
After the unprecedented and unpredictable 12-day war between Iran and Israel, and amid the risk of the conflict expanding to a regional scale, the role of countries like Pakistan sharply increased in the eyes of U.S. authorities.
Pakistan is a nuclear state with a strategic geographical position between the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. It has complex security ties with Afghanistan, Iran, India, and China.
Against this background, the U.S. decided to provide Pakistan with a package of strategic, economic, and military benefits to keep it out of the war.
These concessions directly affect not only the balance of power in South Asia but also security in Afghanistan, India-Pakistan relations, and the roles of China and Russia in the region.
1 - Renewed handover of the Afghanistan war and peace dossier to Pakistan, as in the jihad era.
Historically, the U.S. recognized Pakistan’s key role in the Afghan crisis, both during the jihad against the USSR and after 2001, when it covertly supported the Taliban and Al-Qaeda after their regime fell and a republican government was established.
After the U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power, the U.S. tried to maintain influence through the Doha Agreement mechanism.
Now, the renewed handover of the dossier to Pakistan reflects Washington’s recognition of Islamabad’s strategic role in determining Afghanistan’s future political and military setup.
Analysis:
Pakistan, having traditional influence over the Haqqani network and Taliban groups loyal to it, can be viewed by Washington as a reliable partner for implementing Western strategy.
This concession is aimed at containing the influence of Iran, China, and Russia in Afghanistan.
2 - Providing economic, trade, and military preferences to Pakistan.
The U.S. offered Pakistan a package of economic and trade benefits, as well as military cooperation, to keep it out of the Iran-Israel war. This package includes:
Resumption of military aid and intelligence sharing;
Support for importing cheap energy from Central Asia and oil extraction in the Indian Ocean;
Guaranteed access to international markets and easing IMF pressure.
Analysis:
These measures can improve Pakistan’s unstable economic situation and reduce its dependence on China, Russia, and Iran.
The U.S. seeks to limit China’s and Iran’s influence in infrastructure projects such as CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) and similar initiatives in Iran and Afghanistan.
3 - Pressure on India to eliminate military threats to Pakistan.
To satisfy Pakistan, the U.S. adopted a new policy toward India, including:
Convincing New Delhi to refrain from military actions in Kashmir;
Reducing unofficial support to anti-Pakistan groups such as TTP, Baloch separatists, and other ethnic movements;
Balancing strategic partnership with India within the Indo-Pacific strategy.
Analysis:
This may increase India’s distrust of the U.S. and push it toward closer cooperation with Russia and even Iran.
At the same time, Pakistan may focus on foreign policy and a broader regional role.
4 - Pressure on the Taliban to ensure Pakistan’s security.
One of Pakistan’s key demands to the Taliban is the disarmament and expulsion of TTP militants and other political and military opponents based in Afghanistan.
The U.S. uses diplomatic and economic pressure on the Taliban to ensure Islamabad’s demands are met.
Analysis:
This may increase internal divisions within the Taliban.
The Taliban will face a dilemma: to concede to Pakistan or seek support from Iran and China, leading to a strategic deadlock.
This will weaken regional supporters of the Taliban and lay the groundwork for confrontation between the pro-Western Arab bloc (led by the U.S.) and the Eastern bloc (led by Russia and China) in Afghanistan.
5 - Balance of power and international players
Iran:
Geopolitical blockade of Iran by Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Arab countries;
Possible strengthening of military cooperation with China and Russia.
India:
Weakening of its role in QUAD due to U.S. balancing policy;
Increased destabilization of Pakistan, especially in border areas with Afghanistan, supported by India.
Russia:
Perception of threat from NATO through Pakistan, especially regarding Afghanistan and Central Asia;
Attempts to restore influence in Afghanistan using contacts with the Taliban and strengthening ties with India and Iran.
China:
Concerns about Pakistan’s rapprochement with the U.S.;
Possible reduction of influence within CPEC and overall Pakistani foreign policy.
6 - Conclusion
After the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, the U.S., by granting Pakistan strategic and geopolitical concessions, not only preserved its neutrality but also turned it into an instrument for managing regional processes.
This shift in the geopolitical balance can redefine security, economy, and diplomacy in Southwest Asia.
Although the concession policy is beneficial to Washington and Islamabad in the short term, in the long run, the risk of war between India and Pakistan with Israeli involvement and support increases.
In the long term, a resurgence of extremism in Pakistan through religious schools and parties is also predictable, as well as continued political and social instability in Afghanistan and Iran.
