What role do we play in this geopolitical chess game: an active player or a silent observer?
Author: Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, exclusively for Sangar.
August 15, 2021, the day of the fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, was not merely an internal political event. This day marked a turning point in geopolitical equations, a moment when Afghanistan transformed from an occupied country into an arena of direct confrontation between the world’s major powers. In this process, the Taliban acted as an alternative force to advance this occupation, serving as a regional lever and local instrument.
In this analytical context, contrary to common understanding and widespread perception, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan was not merely a result of failure but part of a carefully calculated dual strategy of Washington: rebalancing and destabilization. These two strategies are products of 21st-century geopolitical competition between the “Axis of the East” (including China, Russia, and Iran) and the United States.
In recent decades, the U.S. concluded that the costs of a direct military presence in crisis regions, particularly the Middle East and Afghanistan, outweigh the benefits. The rebalancing strategy was based on reducing costly direct presence, transferring security responsibilities to regional partners and local forces, and redirecting freed resources to other key fronts, primarily to limit China’s influence in East Asia.
Afghanistan became a strategic laboratory within this framework. Washington realized that even without thousands of troops on Afghan soil, it could influence the country through intelligence, drones, and networks of influence. Therefore, the U.S. military withdrawal appeared as a retreat, but in reality, it was a deliberate maneuver to redirect resources to regions such as the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
The second U.S. strategy—destabilization—was based on turning Afghanistan, after the American departure, into a managed crisis. The goal was not to leave the country to itself but to make it a stage that would drain competitors’ resources. Considering Afghanistan’s geopolitical position and fragile political structure, Washington created conditions for the country to be drawn into internal and regional conflicts, engaging powers like Iran, Russia, and China, while the Taliban continued to act as a destructive player. This situation could pressure the Taliban, create shared threats for neighbors, and provide the U.S. a pretext for limited interventions.
The consequences of the U.S. withdrawal quickly became apparent in the regional balance of power. Pakistan, which played a key role in the Taliban’s victory, expanded its influence in Kabul. China gained the opportunity to strengthen its Belt and Road routes through Afghanistan, and Russia reinforced its security presence in Central Asia. Nevertheless, these developments did not signify a complete U.S. defeat, as Washington calculated that the more the Eastern powers invest in Afghanistan, the more deeply they would be drawn into its complex and chronic problems.
Today, Afghanistan has become a geopolitical minefield. The “Axis of the East” seeks to distance itself from U.S. hegemony through multilateral systems, while Washington uses the Afghan crisis as a tool to contain this axis. Yet the costs of this dangerous game are borne by the Afghan people: ordinary citizens, women and girls deprived of education, youth and talent forced into exile, and years spent in stagnation and fear.
The Taliban resort to systematic repression, taking full advantage of the moment and targeting all layers of society. Over the past four years, this regime has achieved nothing that brings happiness to the people. Its only pride is in “providing security,” but as the proverb says: “When a thief becomes the master of the house, there is nothing left to steal.”
Today, the disruptors of security have become a force that believes it has established order. Within this system are murderers, robbers, and self-proclaimed lawmakers taking bribes. Intelligence agencies, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and all Taliban militias engage in systemic corruption under the pretext of their own laws.
In such conditions, no force besides the Taliban can disrupt security. Under the guise of “universal security,” the regime of repression continues, and only the Taliban is capable of violence, theft, and destabilization.
It seems that behind this instability and systematic repression stand the major powers, negotiating their interests in Afghanistan. Therefore, August 15, 2021, is not just a date in the political calendar but a symbol showing that a change in government does not necessarily mean a change in the rules of the game. The game is planned by those who know the rules and possess the tools.
The U.S., with its two strategies—rebalancing and destabilization—did not leave Afghanistan to lose it but to turn it into a stage to exhaust its competitors. For the Afghan people, this is a serious warning: without an independent national strategy, any political changes in Kabul will only be a rearrangement of pieces on a board laid out by others.
Today, the central question is: what role do we play in this geopolitical chess game—an active player or a silent observer? The future of Afghanistan is not determined by behind-closed-doors agreements, foreign military bases, or the promises of Eastern and Western powers; it depends on our ability to design the game based on national interests.
Unfortunately, the divisive policies of Karzai, Ghani, and the Taliban have created deep ethnic splits, destroying all opportunities for national integration. Therefore, national unity seems impossible unless the people respond in a coordinated and organized manner to the current situation.
We must understand that August 15, though the day of the republic’s fall, could mark the beginning of national and geopolitical awakening—a necessary awakening for the survival and dignity of this land in the 21st century. Perhaps this awakening is belated, and perhaps it was part of the plan of the great powers to implement a “divide and rule” policy through Karzai, Ghani, and the Taliban, turning the people into passive observers. Such a process facilitates the implementation of colonial plans and allows them to proceed unimpeded.
