What is the message of the recent events in Kabul?
By Abdool Naser Noorzad, Security and Geopolitical Researcher, especially for Sangar
Why are scenarios of discord among the Taliban being deliberately promoted? Undoubtedly, behind the scenes, events are taking place that will create the basis for qualitative and quantitative changes in the Taliban Emirate. The public's mental preparation for a deviation from the main path of analysis of political events and developments in Afghanistan takes on a different tone.
ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan) is wisely monitoring all the forces involved in the game of chaos in Afghanistan to determine the future of the country using a proactive approach. The intelligence organization is actively interacting with countries involved in the Afghan problem, both in the region and beyond. It offers and earns points. Meetings with Taliban opponents in Turkish palaces considered politically futile attempts to create coup scenarios in Kabul, and organized movements of Taliban fugitives abroad to create a critical platform - all this can be analyzed in one direction.
The escape of Stanikzai, the political deputy foreign minister of the Taliban, criticism of the reaction of the Kabul mullahs to the resignation of Haibatullah from Kandahar, the tears of Abdulmannan Omari over the deplorable and unpleasant state of female education in Afghanistan, reports of clashes between different branches of the Taliban, all are based on the trans-regional reaction to the situation in the region.
This is where the ISI tries to act in the opposite direction to the Taliban to change Washington's approach. Of course, such a change of direction and position on the part of Pakistan is not surprising. The ISI is a skillful actor, capable of adapting to any new situation to achieve its vital interests. Of course, in the past, with the reluctance of the Mujahideen groups after the fall of Dr. Najibullah's government, Hekmatyar and then the Taliban came to power as an alternative and became the main pawns in this bloody game in Afghanistan in the role of protecting Pakistan's interests in collusion with the West.
At the same time, contradictory news was published about the clash in the presidential palace between Mullah Hassan and Mullah Baradar. News was also spread about the disarmament of the Haqqani Network forces by the Kandahar group. Now, if we start with Pakistan and look at its goals and objectives in the new transformation of the rules of the game after the Trump administration came to power in the United States, it is necessary to understand why Pakistan, by changing the nature of the game, can play the opposite role to achieve its goals? In this regard, several questions should be considered that show why Pakistan joined the fugitive remnants of the Republic. First, we need to assess three issues regarding the ISI’s new maneuver:
First, Pakistan may stop being the sole patron of the Taliban and expand its ties with opposition groups. In this regard, the fundamental problems in realizing Pakistan’s strategic depth after the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, the changing nature of the game in Afghanistan and the recourse to the second and third options, and excessive pressure from the security establishment in the country have led to the adoption of such an approach by Pakistan;
Second, these ISI actions may embolden the Taliban’s opponents and pave the way for their further activities. Thus, Pakistan will have more opportunities to play its role in future developments in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Engaging the Taliban’s opponents gives the ISI several options to put pressure on the Taliban if the group does not comply with Islamabad’s demands. On the other hand, it should establish itself as a new partner in the US-led regional game, especially in Afghanistan;
Third, Pakistan’s actions will increase international pressure on the Taliban, as other countries may perceive these developments as a sign of the fragility of their rule. Therefore, the Taliban will again have no choice but to return to Islamabad’s embrace and submit to its security concerns.
Fourth, Pakistan has always sought to have a favorable governance structure in Afghanistan. Although it has supported the Taliban in the past, it may now have concluded that diversifying its relations with other Afghan political movements is necessary and can help Islamabad gain greater political influence in Afghanistan and benefit from it. Meanwhile, the meeting of ISI officials with opponents of the Taliban indicates Pakistan’s increasing efforts to strengthen relations with Afghan political leaders and find common solutions to regional challenges. Solutions that Pakistan’s interests are linked to.
At the same time, new developments are taking place in Kabul. The tensions between the Haqqani network, the Qatari group and the Kandahari group have created many doubts about the military strength of the Taliban. In the latter case, it was reported that Mullah Baradar was injured in a clash between Mullah Baradar and Mullah Hassan. If this is true, then why should two extremely passive elements in the Taliban group fight each other? While the main system and conflict between the Taliban, two heavily armed groups of Kandahari led by the invisible Haibatullah and the Haqqani group, is the suicide machine of this group, one side must step aside and give way to the other. This event will occur when the balance of power among the Taliban is disrupted and shifts in favor of one of the groups.
But Mullah Baradar, this brutally tortured ISI prisoner in need of mercy, who cannot even speak, and Mullah Hassan, who is trying to use the excuse of illness to stay out of the internal Taliban squabbles and not become the target of the wrath of the Kandahar Circle or the Haqqani Network, why should both fight each other? It is a false flag when such news is spread deliberately and with the aim of misleading public opinion by the intelligence agencies involved in the deal and an attempt is made to hide the existing and undeniable facts of this game.
In this Game of Thrones, the Kandahar group, the Haqqani network, and its affiliates were supposed to clash with each other, which is what happened. The banning and removal of Taliban officials who are mainly supported by the Haqqani network, the disarmament of units belonging to the network in various security zones in Kabul and on the highways leading to the capital, the deployment of fresh forces belonging to the Haqqani network in Kabul and the movement of the group’s heavy weapons to the provinces, the escape of police chiefs from Khost and Paktia who were representatives of the Haqqani network, and the tightening of security in Kabul are not ordinary incidents.
All these incidents are happening in a chain of events under the control of the ISI and at the wider regional and sub-regional level. The facts on the ground indicate that important developments are about to take place in Afghanistan under Taliban rule shortly. The changing nature of the Taliban regime, the creation of a platform for greater Western surveillance in the country, the intensification of divisions and rivalries between regionally and trans-regionally supported groups, and the involvement of politically sterile groups outside Afghanistan that are supposed to be part of a new power deal in the country, will put all sorts of scenarios on the table for analysis. It remains to be seen which direction events will take and where the fate of the Haqqani Emirate and Haibatullah will lead.
