Amir Sahib, I gave them the coordinates that I signed, but your planes attacked Marshal Dostum's column of troops instead of aiming at the enemy.
Author: Hanif Rezai, former Spokesman for Shaheen Corps 209, Afghan Ministry of Defense
Last year, exactly one month or 20 days before this date (August 12), the Taliban attacks on the centers of the northern provinces and cities intensified in an unprecedented way, and the Taliban advance began with all perseverance. Of course, these successes were not due to the power of the Taliban, but to the inefficiency in the ranks of the leadership of the war and the incompetent people who were appointed by Ghani and Mohib time after time. This was the reason for this rapid retreat of the armed forces.
As the Taliban's offensive against the provinces of Saripul, Juzjan, and areas of Balkh province intensified, the fronts of defense and security forces were strengthened with the support of popular uprisings. The anti-Taliban front was created with the voluntary participation of the people. The battle lines were fortified, and the enemy was forced to retreat in some areas. In order to organize the war and reduce the pressure, military officials from the army and Ali Sarwar Hazara were sent to the two provinces and districts where the Taliban's pressure was concentrated the most.
General Yasin “Sadad”, the chief of staff of the corps 209 “Shahin”, was sent to the province of Saripul, and Lieutenant Colonel Zakir Hussein Mazlumyar went to the Chaharkent region to help Salima Mazari and the forces stationed there. General Munib Amiri, commander of the 3rd brigade of the National Army, was sent to the Chimtal, Kishindeh, and Dehdadi districts of Balkh province, along with several commanders of his brigade and the commanders of the Shahin corps. And Ali Sarwar Hazara, with a number of people under his command, went to the province of Juzjan to help the people's militias associated with Marshal Dostum and the 2nd brigade of the corps 209 "Shahin".
Very destructive wars went on in the provinces of Saripul and Juzjan and in the regions of Chaharkent, Chaharbulak, and Chimtal (Balkh province). A group of Taliban, mobilized by Pashtun extremists from the south, Uzbek Taliban from the north, and with the assistance of foreign terrorists, mainly Pakistani and Uzbek, made every effort to conquer one of these provinces and areas adjacent to the city of Mazari Sharif.
According to the information that I personally received from the front line, the Taliban group organized their attacks day and night at half-hour intervals and was defeated by the resistance of the National Army and the people's militias. For twenty days or a month, every time the Taliban attacked the positions of the defense forces and the people's militias, they were defeated.
You may wonder why all this power suddenly collapsed from everywhere and the motivation to resist the Taliban subsided, which ultimately led to the fall of the Juzjan and Saripul provinces.
Yes, exactly a few days before the fall of these provinces, President Ghani came to the north and met with prominent figures. In these meetings, the leaders of the North had the only demand from Ghani, and that was to equip their forces to protect the centers of the provinces and metropolitan areas of the north, but Ghani, without thinking about the role of popular uprisings in protecting the city centers, rejected their demand. He clearly stated that I do not support any other organization than the defense and security forces, and I am against informal popular armed fronts and militias. Even if all the northern provinces fall, I will not arm them. Our defense and security forces are capable of defending cities.
The fall of the northern provinces began after the arrival of Ghani in Balkh. The people's militias in Saripul province retreated, and the National Army, police, and security forces were disbanded overnight.
Of course, in this collapse, the role of the media was very visible and undeniable. The propaganda in the media was so extensive that I personally, as the press secretary of the army corps 209 “Shaheen”, was convinced that the atmosphere in the media could no longer be controlled.
In a word, Saripul fell. The main part of the forces stationed in Saripul surrendered to the Taliban with all means, and the other part was transferred to Juzjan by helicopters of the 777th Air Force Brigade at night. There is no spirit left in the security and defense forces for defense and resistance. Only the popular uprisings under Yarmuhammad Dostum in Juzjan were stubbornly defended, and Ali Sarwar Hazara was one of the commanders of the Dostum-affiliated popular front against the Taliban in Juzjan.
The troops stationed at Juzjan were also under severe siege. They had only a few limited places, which were always in danger of falling after the fall of the province of Saripul. The intensity of the war in Juzjan increased with every minute. However, there was no support from the “Shahin” corps. There was no air support, no ground support, and no logistics. The reason was clear. The central government decided that after the fall of the centers of the provinces of Faryab and Juzjan, the evacuation and defense lines would be transferred to the outskirts of the city of Balkh. On this basis, Juzjan was not given any help.
The forces that remained in Juzjan, including Yarmukhammad Dostum, were evacuated by the air force, but Ali Sarwar Hazara, Ghulam Abbas "Qote'", the commander of the first battalion of the National Army, and several other army commanders and people's militias with a thousand fighters moved from Juzjan to Balkh. Although they knew that all roads leading to Balkh were in the hands of the enemy, the probability of being trapped and having casualties were very high, but they did not allow their weapons and vehicles to fall into the hands of the Taliban.
When these forces moved out of Juzjan, I had direct contact with some of the commanders of the National Army and Ali Sarwar Hazara himself. They fought from Juzjan to the Bargakh area of the Chimtal district, repulsed the enemy, and came forward.
Every time I called Ali Sarwar Hazara, the sounds of gunshots were constantly heard, and Ali Sarwar led his forces with composure and high spirits. That day, these forces broke into 19 enemy ambushes without serious casualties, and between 1330 and 1400 hours they and the equipment at their disposal moved to the Chimtal area, which was several kilometers from the army corps.
They defeated the last enemy ambush in the Bargah area of the Chimtal district and crossed to the Imam Bakri Bridge locality, the defense line of the city of Mazari Sharif.
Around 2:00 pm I called some of my friends and they were all glad that they had destroyed the enemy ambushes and crossed the danger safely. I wanted to call Commander Ali Sarwar Hazara and ask about his situation, but no matter how many times I called, his phone did not answer. I called his assistant, but his phone was off too. I told myself that maybe their phones were out of charge.
I received information from headquarters. I was told that the convoy passed, two Super Tokano planes were sent to the area to support the convoy and attacked one target, which also had casualties. We are collecting data on the victims and will inform you.
I've calmed down. I was sure that the column passed through this area. Since I was the press secretary of the army corps, I had to answer questions from the media every minute. I tried to contact all authorities, to get information so that my information was up to date. I called the command headquarters several times, but no one gave me accurate information. Inevitably, I called the head of the national security department in Balkh and asked for details of the air attack in Chimtal. The head of national security told me the bad news and it was the assassination of Ali Sarwar Hazara and his associates.
I told him, Mr. Chief, didn't you give the coordinates? How is it possible that a friendly column was attacked instead of an enemy column? The chief said briefly and clearly: you should ask this question to your commander of the army corps. Amir Sahib, I gave them the coordinates that I signed, but your planes attacked Marshal Dostum's column of troops instead of aiming at the enemy.
The commander of the army corps 209 "Shaheen" at that time was Khanulla Shuja (in the photo).
I consider one point worth mentioning: as the press secretary of the 209th Shaheen Army Corps, I did not give interviews to any media about the assassination of Ali Sarwar Hazara, but a few moments after his death, I saw that the media wrote from army corps officials that Ali Sarwar Hazara, one of the Junbisi Milli commanders, was killed by the Taliban in an ambush. Now God knows who this official was. The Taliban could not kill Ali Sarwar Hazara, but he was vilely killed on the orders of Khanullah Shuja, the commander of Shahin's 209th Army Corps.
This was the story of the murder of Ali Sarwar Hazara!
