If morality is removed from politics, banditry is better than political maneuvering.
Author: Hafiz Mansur, writer and politician, especially for Sangar.
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During the years of jihad, Mr. Muhammad Hasan Wolusmal published a weekly newspaper in Peshawar titled Mujahid-e Wolus. In addition to curses and attacks against the Soviet Union and its agents, the publication also criticized the jihadist organizations that had their headquarters in that city; not a single issue appeared without such material.
In those years, Mr. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar portrayed himself as more serious and active compared to other jihad leaders. He appealed to the Pakistani police to arrest Wolusmal — and this was done: Wolusmal was taken to a police station. Perhaps some leaders of the jihadist parties were pleased with this development, as a fearless and sharp critic had been detained and was expected to be punished. However, Professor Rabbani, leader of Jamiat-e Islami, considered the incident unacceptable and took steps to secure Wolusmal’s release. He was eventually freed, and Rabbani even arranged measures to ensure his personal safety.
Rabbani argued that if such actions by the Pakistani police were not stopped, in the future they would, with even greater audacity, arrest any jihad commanders and leaders at their own discretion.
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During the same period, Sarwar Nuristani, a well-known Marxist officer in Nuristan, built a network around himself and provided certain individuals in that province with financial and military support. Due to the strategic importance of Nuristan province, these individuals sometimes interfered with the supply caravans of the mujahideen.
The Pakistani government decided to eliminate this obstructing force and developed a commando operation plan. All the leaders of the jihadist parties agreed to carry it out; however, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani once again expressed his opposition and prevented the attack.
Rabbani stated that Pakistanis should not be allowed to intervene in the territory of Afghanistan/Khorasan, as such interference would expand over time and harm the future of our country.
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A month after the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the Battle of Jalalabad began. As part of this campaign, it was planned that Ahmad Shah Massoud would block the Salang Highway to cut off the main supply artery of the Kabul regime. For this purpose, he was even sent two hundred thousand US dollars (details are described in Steve Coll’s book Ghost Wars). However, Ahmad Shah Massoud did not participate in the operation and took no action to block the Salang road.
In an interview with a Western journalist, Massoud stated that the Kabul regime would still be able to secure supplies through other routes, but closing the Salang Highway would harm thousands of impoverished residents of Kabul who were already struggling to survive.
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In 1368 (1989–1990), after consultations with the leaders of jihadist organizations, the Pakistani government developed a plan for a multi-front offensive against Kabul. This plan was adopted after the defeat in the Battle of Jalalabad and the failure of Shah Nawaz Tanai’s coup attempt. Ahmad Shah Massoud was also invited to Pakistan for discussions — this was his only trip to Pakistan during the years of jihad.
In a meeting with Mirza Aslam Beg, Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army, Massoud described the plan as flawed both militarily and from a humanitarian perspective and refused to participate in the operation. As a result, the large-scale offensive against Kabul, for which preparations were already underway, was canceled.
Massoud said: This war would lead to the deaths of thousands of innocent people, and we cannot take part in it.
***
One day, Muhammad Sadiq Rahi, the brother of Dr. Najibullah, head of the Kabul regime, traveled to Pakistan. According to him, a pamphlet titled “Know Najib” was published in two languages — Persian and Pashto — with a print run of thousands of copies. Rather than offering a critical analysis of Najibullah’s political activities, the pamphlet mainly presented information about his personal and family life.
The government of Pakistan distributed this pamphlet among refugees and also sent part of the print run into Afghanistan/Khorasan.
Kaka Jan-Muhammadkhan, who at that time was responsible for the logistics of the Shura-i Nazzar (Observatory Council) in Pakistan, recalls:
"We were also given 50 boxes of these books to send inside the country. Out of these, I sent 4 boxes, because at that time the priority was sending weapons and ammunition, not books.
When the books arrived at the front, Ahmad Shah Massoud, at the first opportunity, read one of the pamphlets, then came on the radio and asked:
— Who gave you these books?
— The government of Pakistan.
— How many are there?
— Fifty boxes.
— Four boxes are already here, and the rest are with you?
— Yes, another 46 boxes are ready and held with us.
— Brother! As soon as you finish on the radio, take some jerrycans of fuel, pour them on them, and burn them. Make sure everything burns completely. Understood? Do not be careless!
Kaka Jan-Muhammadkhan says that, following the orders of Amir Sahib (Ahmad Shah Massoud), he burned the books.
A few months later, when I arrived at the front again, I asked Massoud why he did not allow the books to be delivered.
Massoud replied:
— Yes, we are currently in conflict with Najib, but this is our internal dispute. What right does Pakistan have to speak so viciously and ruthlessly about one of Afghanistan’s major figures? If they are not stopped, tomorrow they will write and publish books about others as well.
Years passed. Dr. Najibullah’s regime fell, and I became a guest of Najib at the United Nations guesthouse. We occasionally spoke. One day, I told him the story of the books and Massoud’s order to burn them. Dr. Najibullah wept and said:
"We thought of him one way, but he thought differently."
***
In the early years of the resistance, the late Dr. Abdullah Laghmani was one of those who traveled between the front and Pakistan. On two occasions, I saw that, along with letters and messages sent to certain individuals, Ahmad Shah Massoud transferred cash through him to General Shah Nawaz Tanai.
As the poet said:
"From a pot of the cooked, no sound arises;
Shouting comes from the raw."
In my immaturity, I objected: Why send money to a fleeing coup organizer?
Massoud replied:
— Brother! He was once the Minister of Defense of Afghanistan/Khorasan — his hand should not be extended to the Pakistanis!
I have recorded these events without commentary or interpretation, and you, dear readers, can consider them in the context of Pakistan’s airstrikes on our country.
If morality is removed from politics, banditry is better than political maneuvering.
