How are India and Pakistan using extremist groups in Afghanistan?
By Khaledin Ziaei, Head of the Educational Discourse of the Nation Think Tank, especially for “Sangar”
The Foreign Minister of the Taliban movement, Amir Khan Mottaki, during an official five-day visit to India, visited the Darul Uloom Deoband religious school in the state of Uttar Pradesh. This school, known as the “Al-Azhar of South Asia,” holds a special place among Muslims.
The school was founded in 1866 by Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautavi, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Zulfiqar Ali Deobandi, and others — based on the ideas of Shah Waliullah Dehlawi and his sons. Soon, branches of this school spread across the Indian subcontinent, including present-day Pakistan.
Afghan Taliban consider themselves followers of the teachings of India’s Deoband schools; however, most of their leaders were educated in Pakistani Deobandi madrasas, which are, in essence, offshoots of India’s original Deoband school.
Photographs published during Amir Khan Mottaki’s visit to Darul Uloom Deoband show that the school leadership gave him a very warm reception.
This reception sparked controversy because it was the Taliban, under the cover of Deobandi teachings, who imposed the strictest laws on Afghan society. They prohibited women from education, work, and public presence — a policy known as “gender apartheid” that directly contradicts divine commands and the Sharia of the Prophet Muhammad.
INTRODUCTION
The strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan has a long history.
For both countries, Afghanistan represents strategic depth: for Pakistan, a means to strengthen security and influence over its eastern neighbors; for India, a tool to contain Pakistani influence and protect its political and economic interests. To avoid direct military confrontation and its high costs, both countries have preferred indirect methods of influence, using local armed groups as proxies.
This phenomenon in international relations is known as “support and instrumentalization of non-state armed actors.” Historical evidence shows that state support for such groups can lead to unpredictable outcomes, increased sectarianism, and long-term regional instability.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1 — Patron State and Instrumentalization:
Research shows that states sometimes use terrorist organizations as a hidden force to achieve foreign policy objectives at minimal cost. However, this “blessing” can turn into a “curse” when such groups gain autonomy or create irreversible costs for the state itself.
2 — Role of Religious Schools and Ideological Movements:
Networks of religious education (madrasas) and ideological movements, such as the Deobandi school, have played a significant role in the ideological convergence of the Taliban and certain Pakistani groups. This cultural-religious connection strengthens the influence of a shared ideology and partly explains the enduring ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
3 — Policy of Indirect Rivalry between India and Pakistan:
Research and policy reports indicate that India-Pakistan rivalry has turned Afghanistan into a theater of mutual interference and competing support. Each side claims that the other uses trusted actors (proxies) within Afghanistan for its own objectives.
CASE STUDY: PAKISTAN
– Mechanisms: Pakistan’s military and intelligence structures (especially certain army units and the ISI) have, for decades, maintained links with jihadist networks and religious schools to strengthen influence over border tribes and Afghan territory. This support included the formation and arming of groups, as well as logistical and political assistance. Human rights reports and historical studies confirm the role of Pakistan’s military and diplomatic backing in the creation and sustainment of the Taliban movement.
– Consequences: Long-term support has led to the strengthening of paramilitary networks, the weakening of the legitimacy of Afghanistan’s central governments, and mutual dependence between armed groups and their external patrons. This approach has also had blowback effects — including the growth of transnational extremism and internal instability within Pakistan itself.
CASE STUDY: INDIA
– Policy and Tools: India has also sought to establish connections and reduce Pakistan’s influence by strengthening diplomatic and development ties with Afghan governments and non-state actors. This strategy includes construction and infrastructure projects, public diplomacy, and increased political influence in Kabul. Pakistan, in turn, has accused India of using proxies in Afghanistan, which has become a key theme in regional information and propaganda battles.
– Limitations: Due to the nature of its interests, India cannot directly engage in armed proxy conflicts on the same scale as Pakistan — this would be too risky and costly. Therefore, New Delhi relies on soft power: political, economic, informational, and cultural instruments of influence.
MECHANISMS OF INTERACTION: RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS, IDEOLOGICAL NETWORKS, AND INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURES
1 — Ideological Network (Madrasas):
Schools teaching Deobandi or similar ideological currents become arenas for cultural and ideological rivalry. These institutions not only train clergy but also serve as networking channels between the Taliban and Pakistani religious circles.
2 — Intelligence and Mediation:
Military-intelligence organizations provide operational-level support, training, and coordination; however, these interactions are not always controllable and often entail strategic costs and unpredictable transregional consequences.
FUTURE ANALYSIS: SCENARIOS AND STRATEGIC-SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
Scenario 1 — “Continuation of Controlled Rivalry with Blowback Effects”:
States continue using extremist groups as cheap ground forces to achieve foreign policy objectives.
Scenario 2 — “Retaliatory Actions and Loss of Control over Groups”:
Proxy groups may escape control and turn against their patrons, conducting operations against them or expanding activities to third parties. This could lead to a regional crisis that transcends national borders.
Scenario 3 — “Creation of Regional Agreements to Limit Instrumentalization”:
If regional actors (mediated by external powers) establish trust and oversight mechanisms, the use of armed proxies could be reduced. However, implementing this scenario requires political will, moral responsibility, and international guarantees.
RISKS AND POTENTIAL CRISIS POINTS
1 - Reverse Dependence: Groups that once served as instruments may, over time, demand political concessions and influence.
2 - “Dance of Accusations and Proxy Operations”: Mutual accusations regarding proxy use can lead to retaliatory actions and escalate tensions between neighboring states.
3 - Process of Legitimacy Loss: Supporting extremist groups undermines the political and moral legitimacy of the patron states themselves, diminishes their political and economic capital, and increases international mistrust and sanctions pressure.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (PRACTICAL AND MEDIUM-TERM)
1 - Regional Transparency and Accountability: Promote regional dialogue with neutral mediators and international border monitoring to prevent the support of armed proxy groups.
2 - Separation of Security Patronage from Religious-Cultural Ties: Invest in educational and civic programs that prevent the ideological capture of religious institutions.
3 - Reducing the Benefits of Using Proxies: Implement oversight mechanisms, targeted sanctions, and political incentives to make supporting proxy groups less advantageous.
Support for Peace and Political Participation in Afghanistan: Facilitate the creation of an inclusive political process that encourages armed groups to renounce violence and join official governance structures.
CONCLUSION
Instrumental use of extremist groups for short-term objectives may appear to be an effective foreign policy tool, but historical and research evidence show that such strategies carry long-term risks: regional instability, the rise of extremism, and negative domestic and international consequences for the patron states themselves.
Afghanistan, as a theater of rivalry among neighboring and global powers, requires regional and international solutions to break the cycle of instrumentalization of terrorist groups. India’s intelligence services, by organizing the visit of Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Mottaki to Darul Uloom Deoband, aim to link Indian religious schools (especially Deobandi) with Afghan ones to weaken the influence of Pakistani religious institutions on the Taliban and assert spiritual-ideological leadership in the region. In effect, India seeks to deprive Pakistan of tools of influence in Afghanistan and to limit the religious and ideological impact of Pakistani madrasas on the Taliban leadership.
Thus, all neighboring countries — especially India and Pakistan — are actively engaged in the instrumentalization and control of extremist movements in Afghanistan to advance their own geopolitical interests.
