The view of a significant part of the Russian military on the Tajiks of Afghanistan is very pragmatic and is not the product of the work of Afghan Tajiks, but of the personality of Emomali Rahmon. The change in Putin's understandings that Tajiks are in the majority must also be the result of Emomali Rahmon's influence on him.
Author: Fayaz Bahraman Najimi, International Affairs Analyst, Member of the Sangar Advisory Board
The Great Game is entering a new phase.
Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in Dushanbe on the evening of June 28. All roads from St. Ayni to Rudaki were blocked. News agencies reported on a closed meeting between Putin and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon.
Press Secretary of the President of Tajikistan Abdulfattah Sharifzoda said that no documents would be signed during Putin's visit.
The meetings were held only in the 1+1 format.
Although the officials of both countries stated that the purpose of this trip was to expand cooperation between Russia and Tajikistan, the meeting of the presidents of the two countries took place in a special format.
Some experts believe that this meeting discussed some important and "sensitive" issues between the two countries, as well as global issues.
In addition to the issues of expanding bilateral cooperation in the field of security, modernizing the armed forces of Tajikistan, and strengthening and protecting its borders with Afghanistan, as well as cultural ties, Afghan issues were also discussed. There have already been reports that Putin will meet with Ahmad Massoud during his trip. It seems that such a meeting took place in the presence of Emomali Rahmon.
Before that, in a public section, Putin told the media: “You know that we are doing everything to normalize the situation in this country (Afghanistan). We are trying to establish relations with the political forces that control the situation.”
He added: "Our view is that all ethnic groups living in Afghanistan should participate fully in the governance of this country."
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In the past, I have repeatedly reminded both in writing and orally that in Russia there are two opinions on the Afghan issue: one refers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the other to Russian intelligence and the military.
If the Russian Foreign Ministry was completely devoted to working with the Taliban, then the military and intelligence agencies relied on the option of hard power.
On the eve of Putin's visit to Dushanbe, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that international terrorist groups intend to use Afghanistan as a base to infiltrate neighboring countries and create a network of underground jihadists.
On the contrary, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Zamir Kabulov allowed the Taliban to send a representative to the Moscow embassy and even participate in the St. Petersburg economic forum.
For some time now, Russia has begun to work multifaceted in its foreign policy. What was common during the Soviet era. For example, close relations with communist and workers' parties, on the one hand, and official relations with governments, on the other. They replaced one with the other as needed.
In the past three decades, the United States of America and the West have set their country policies in the same way, with governments on one level and political parties and civil society on another.
Based on this, Moscow is changing its diplomatic priorities, like the United States, and instead of a large presence in Western countries, it is moving towards expanding its diplomatic network with countries whose importance is more important than large countries.
However, the Russian Foreign Ministry is very interested in recognizing the Taliban, but the military is against it. The Russian Foreign Ministry has afghanists whose knowledge is based on the books of the former Soviet Union.
For example, in the largest Russian academic center that has survived from Soviet times, the Moscow University of International Relations, which belongs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where I studied too, there is a department of Afghan studies from the past, which trains specialists with a Pashtun bias. The scope of Afghan studies means Pashtun studies with Pashtun language and history. And Persian refers only to Iranian studies.
Most afghanists who speak Pashtun have been and remain Pashtun lobbyists in Russia's foreign policy towards Afghanistan. Most of these experts are, at best and at worst, one with the Pashtuns. I remember that Professor Konstantin Arkadyevich Lebedev, the author of a Russian-Pashto dictionary, never spoke to native Persian speakers. And his students were more and more fanatical than any Pashtun.
Most of these people still exist in the field of Afghan studies in Russia. Some journalists are also interested not only in the Pashtuns but also in their current representative, the Taliban, influenced by many books by experts on the past Soviet Union. Those who got acquainted with Afghanistan during the rule of the People's Democratic Party, like Semyon Bagdasarov, who is the purest Khalqi and Talib, play a very negative role in shaping the notions in Russia against the Iranian speakers in Afghanistan.
The view of a significant part of the Russian military on the Tajiks of Afghanistan is very pragmatic and is not the product of the work of Afghan Tajiks, but of the personality of Emomali Rahmon. The change in Putin's understandings that Tajiks are in the majority must also be the result of Emomali Rahmon's influence on him.
Therefore, it is no coincidence that at the height of the war, Putin made a two-day trip to Dushanbe in a very informal setting and from the very beginning had a special conversation with Emomali Rahmon, who was even fixed on cameras.
Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, one of the toughest figures in the Russian leadership, the day after Putin's visit, contrary to the position of his country's Foreign Ministry, called Afghanistan a threat to the security of Central Asia.
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It is very important that Putin during his visit to Dushanbe did not mention the Taliban, but only the ruling political forces in Kabul.
Contrary to all expectations, Putin's message was the same - to prevent the opening of a new front from Afghanistan, which the US, with the help of Britain and Turkey, desperately wants to deploy in Central Asia.
The West accepted Putin's message, and it is no coincidence that the European Parliament condemned the Tajik authorities for "repressions" against the residents of Gorno-Badakhshan.
Thus, it is argued that traces of recent events in Karakalpakstan of Uzbekistan reach Turkey and Great Britain. There are many gaps in the region, through one of which the West is trying to enter Russia's backyard.
To summarize the discussion, it should be said that: Putin and Emomali Rahmon made an important strategic deal on the issue of Afghanistan, namely that Dushanbe should become a bridge for urgent negotiations between the National Resistance Front and the Taliban in order to create an inclusive government.
The purpose of this step is that the plan of the American trilateral meeting of the Taliban, the National Resistance Front led by Ahmad Massoud, and the National Resistance Council led by Sayyaf in Washington failed and that Biden could not use this conference as a winning ticket in the US midterm elections.
Internal disagreements between the Taliban, the preparation of the Resistance Front for direct negotiations in Dushanbe, and the withdrawal of troops from Andarab can be considered as some signs in this direction.
