In Eurasia, the creation of ethnic, racial, and religious alliances is impossible.
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, especially for Sangar
Against the backdrop of geopolitical confrontations in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, the issue of Turkey and discussions surrounding the Pan-Turkism project are becoming increasingly prominent. However, contrary to widespread assessments, the current situation represents not so much a field for implementing a regional project like Pan-Turkism as an arena of rivalry and confrontation among major world powers.
In this context, the main actors are not Turkey, but the United States, the United Kingdom, and, on the other side, the Eastern bloc led by China and Russia. Iran also occupies one of the most sensitive geopolitical positions in the world and consistently serves as a point of intersection of interests and tensions among powers. Signs of a relative decline in U.S. hegemony in the region are visible; however, this does not imply the existence of a power vacuum that a country like Turkey could easily fill.
At the macro level, current developments are largely driven by geostrategic competition—control over energy routes, confrontation between the Heartland and Rimland zones, and attempts to establish new corridors known as “crossland.” Contrary to some interpretations, this conflict cannot be reduced to a simple civilizational confrontation between Iran and the West; at a deeper level, it is a competition between Western civilization led by the United States and, in opposition, the bloc of China and the Orthodox world. In this configuration, Turkey plays more the role of a facilitator than that of an architect of the future world order.
Russia, continuing its historical trajectory of geopolitical containment, especially after the war in Ukraine, seeks to take advantage of crises as they emerge. The Iranian crisis, in turn, has contributed to increased oil revenues for Russia and strengthened its leverage over Europe. As a result, European countries have begun to seek alternative sources of energy, including China and North African countries, reflecting the growing complexity of global energy dynamics.
Under these conditions, analyzing the situation around Iran requires distancing from emotional approaches. Contrary to certain assumptions, the current situation is less the result of a civilizational conflict than of an intertwining of security, intelligence, and economic interests of major powers—primarily Russia, which benefits from the continuation of the crisis.
Turkey, for its part, faces multilayered internal and external challenges. On the one hand, economic pressure, high inflation, and social discontent limit its domestic maneuvering capacity. On the other hand, the Kurdish issue remains one of Ankara’s key security concerns.
At the regional level, the sensitivity of actors such as Israel, Arab countries, and Russia to the expansion of Turkey’s influence constitutes a serious obstacle to the realization of Pan-Turkist ambitions. At the same time, relations between Turkey and Israel are developing along a complex and potentially conflict-prone trajectory: despite periods of strategic cooperation, competition for influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Palestinian issue, energy corridors, and the pursuit of geopolitical leadership in the Islamic world intensify points of tension.
Turkey, by adopting a critical stance toward Israel’s policies and seeking to restore its position among Muslim countries, enters into a discursive and political confrontation with it. In response, Israel, deepening its ties with Arab countries and several regional partners, seeks to contain Turkey’s influence. Nevertheless, this rivalry remains within the general constraints of the international system and is unlikely to lead to a direct and large-scale conflict.
The project of Pan-Turkism, despite Turkey’s cultural and political investments in regions from Central Asia to the Caucasus, faces serious structural limitations. This idea is more of an ideological and political concept than a clear and implementable program, and it encounters numerous identity-based, linguistic, and geopolitical barriers. Turkic-speaking countries are not fully homogeneous either culturally or linguistically, and they pursue independent and sometimes contradictory foreign policies.
For example, countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan follow cautious and multi-vector approaches, Turkmenistan adheres to a policy of neutrality, and even Azerbaijan, in certain cases, acts independently of Turkey. As a result, organizations such as the Organization of Turkic States function more as platforms for limited economic and cultural cooperation rather than as cohesive geopolitical alliances.
Moreover, major powers play a decisive role in this system. Russia maintains significant influence in the security sphere in Central Asia, China expands its economic presence through the “Belt and Road” initiative, and the United States adjusts its presence depending on the situation. All of this demonstrates that the room for maneuver of Turkic countries is much more limited than is often portrayed in public narratives.
Finally, the ethnic diversity and social complexity of the region, including the presence of groups such as Kurds, Arabs, Persians, Uzbeks, and other peoples, also hinder the implementation of a unified project like Pan-Turkism. Under these conditions, this idea not only lacks the potential to become an independent center of power but may also contribute to increased tensions and even weaken Turkey’s position.
Turkey can act effectively within the existing world order only if its policies align with the interests of major powers; otherwise, it will face serious internal, regional, and international challenges.
