First, one must learn the art of finding agreement and building harmony with oneself—and only then with others.
Author: Mahmoud Saiqal, diplomat, former representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations
Recently, within the camp opposing the Taliban, one often hears again that politics has no permanent friends or enemies, and that we must be pragmatic and work with reality. Many examples confirm this statement; the latest is the friendship between Donald Trump, the President of the United States, and Ahmad al-Shar’, the President of Syria and a former member of al-Qaeda.
It is also evident that the Pakistani military has entered into conflict with their own creation—the Taliban—and now ordinary civilians are being killed. Removing the Taliban from Pakistan’s orbit and turning them against Pakistan itself is a true masterpiece for India. But what are the ultimate goals of Pakistan and India in Afghanistan? Our interests?! Trump, al-Shar’, Sharif, and Modi, at the very least, rise above the internal consensus of the major political forces in their own countries and, with some degree of accountability to law and order, conduct politically pragmatic deals and negotiations.
In our country, where law, order, and political consensus have collapsed, it is crucial to ask: pragmatism—with which policy? And what is the point of having no permanent friend or enemy? If our own position is unclear and disorganized, why should we care about pragmatism or relationships of friendship or hostility with others?! Why should we even talk to the Taliban when we ourselves are in complete internal disarray? Didn’t we witness the disastrous consequences of such contacts and conversations in the final days of the Republic?!
Under current conditions, when the anti-Taliban camp still lacks the necessary cohesion, what should our priority be? Or what should it become? Should we enter into pragmatic foreign relations, or should we first consolidate our internal stance? Common sense dictates that we must first put our own internal politics in order: define a joint plan based on the major national interests to overcome the vast humanitarian, political, economic, social, and cultural crises caused by the Taliban’s tyrannical rule, and only then, relying on this foundation, move toward pragmatic foreign relations. Otherwise, the results of the fragmented external contacts of the anti-Taliban camp will remain exactly as we see them today.
There is no doubt that to keep the issue of Afghanistan—especially the suffering of our women and girls—alive in today’s busy world, it is necessary, as much as possible, to meet directly with the leaders of states and relevant international organizations. But beyond the outward optics of these meetings and complaints about the Taliban, what is our answer to the question: what unified plan do we, as the people of Afghanistan, propose for overcoming the multilayered crisis?
Moreover, are the individual or small-group negotiations of political figures with agents of regional and global intelligence services behind closed doors in hotels and restaurants part of our strategy—or merely peripheral elements of their games? With what legitimacy do these meetings take place, and what role does the will of the Afghan people play in their content? Such external interactions, lacking any mechanism of accountability to the people, may satisfy personal or group interests within the games of other powers, but they only deepen internal distrust and further fragment the opposition.
There is no doubt that the crisis in Afghanistan, alongside its internal roots, has deep external causes—but its real solution begins with addressing internal affairs, not the other way around; the history of our country also confirms this. First, one must learn the art of reaching understanding and building harmony with oneself, and only then with others. Otherwise, pragmatism, friendship, and enmity in foreign policy will lead to catastrophe.
