There is no unity within the European Union on the issue of further financing for Ukraine.
Author: Ali Askari, analyst (Germany), especially for “Sangar”
The increase in military spending in the European Union since 2022 has intensified disagreements and triggered divisions among member states over security priorities, the distribution of the financial burden, and the degree of defense integration.
A sense of conflict fatigue is growing within European society. According to YouGov opinion polls, in Germany, France, and Spain, the number of those who favor an early transition to peace negotiations has surpassed the share of those who insist on continuing military action. Growing concerns about a direct escalation with Russia and declining living standards are significantly reducing voters’ willingness to approve new funding packages. In addition, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Brussels to adopt new sanctions.
Although there was a relative consensus in Brussels during the first months of the Russia-Ukraine conflict regarding support for the Kyiv government and the strengthening of collective defense, disagreements began to intensify as overall military budgets increased. The situation surrounding Ukraine remains the main challenge for the EU, whose representatives have consistently stated in recent years that they are prepared to support Kyiv for as long as necessary.
The disagreements concern not only the scale of spending but also where the funds should be directed: joint European programs or national priorities, procurement from European or American manufacturers, as well as the balance between defense needs and social spending.
Following the change of administration in Washington, U.S. support for Ukraine has become less predictable: some programs were suspended and reviewed. The Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List mechanism was introduced, requiring European countries to purchase U.S.-made weapons and military equipment for transfer to Kyiv. As a result, European countries have had to assume a larger share of the financial, military, and industrial burden of supporting Ukraine.
Under these circumstances, the EU established the Ukraine Support Loan mechanism — a €90 billion loan for 2026–2027 intended to cover Kyiv’s budgetary and defense needs. According to the latest estimates, the amount spent on supporting Ukraine per resident of European NATO countries has increased by 50 percent since January 2025, reaching $618 per year.
There is no unity within the European Union on the issue of further financing for the Kyiv government. Among the most prominent critics are Slovakia under Robert Fico and Bulgaria. Following the formation of Rumen Radev’s new government, Sofia adopted a more restrained policy on Ukraine: the country ended state supplies of weapons and military equipment to Kyiv and withdrew from the “coalition of the willing” supporting Ukraine.
Another indication of the divisions was Hungary’s position under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who repeatedly vetoed joint financial mechanisms for supporting Ukraine and, since 2022, blocked decisions of the Foreign Affairs Council 21 times. He stressed that the EU could not afford to simultaneously increase its own military spending and finance the Ukrainian army, particularly amid economic difficulties. Meanwhile, following the April 2026 elections, Hungary’s new head of government, Péter Magyar, emphasized that Ukraine’s accession to the European Union is currently “out of the question.”
“We are talking about a country that is at war, so it is absolutely out of the question for the European Union to admit a country that is waging a war,” he said.
This confirms that the disagreements among European countries have not disappeared. Poland and the Baltic states are calling for more active collective support, while other countries regard this as an excessive burden on the common budget.
An additional source of tension is the differing perceptions of threats. Countries on NATO’s eastern flank insist on prioritizing the development of conventional forces and heavy weaponry to deter Russia, while the alliance’s western members — Italy, Spain, and France — are more concerned about challenges in the Mediterranean and hybrid threats.
