Foreign companies are winding down operations, with no one to take their place.

By Andrey Serenko, staff correspondent for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG)

Rising oil prices and energy shortages have become global trends in 2026. Protracted military crises surrounding Iran and Ukraine have forced countries, including energy exporters, to reassess their energy policies. The situation has hit underdeveloped countries hardest, particularly those traditionally dependent on imported petroleum products and gas. Among them is Afghanistan, which has been under Taliban rule for more than five years.

Throughout these years, Taliban representatives have tirelessly touted the “periodic table” hidden beneath Afghanistan’s soil, hoping to attract foreign investors to develop mineral resources, particularly oil and gas fields, most of which are located in northern Afghanistan. According to media reports, the Taliban signed declarations of intent and cooperation agreements with companies from China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Qatar, and several other countries, supposedly ready to undertake promising economic projects in the Taliban’s “Islamic Emirate.” Yet almost all these projects have either remained on paper or been abandoned halfway through.

The state of the oil and gas sector in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan is reflected in the assessments and findings of a confidential, 80-page field inspection report on contractors’ activities, prepared by the Taliban’s Ministry of Mines and Petroleum. NG has obtained the document.

Dated September 14, 2026, the report presents the findings of an audit of foreign companies working as contractors for the Taliban’s Ministry of Mines and Petroleum on key oil and gas projects in northern Afghanistan. These include the Tuti-Maidan gas block; two gas wells at the Yatim-Tag site; a two-dimensional seismic survey of the Bazarkami block; a proposed gas pipeline stretching nearly 100 kilometres from Sheberghan to Mazar-i-Sharif; a six-kilometre gas pipeline at the Kashkari site; the Zemurd-Say site; three agreed-upon blocks in the Afghan–Tajik oil and gas basin; and the Kashkari site and its associated facilities.

The audit found that foreign contractors had failed to fulfil their obligations, missing the deadlines for previously agreed projects. For example, under a memorandum of understanding signed on August 17, 2024, between the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and a company from Uzbekistan, the company was tasked with conducting geological studies, geophysical exploration and, where necessary, additional investigations in the Mohammad-Jan-Dagar, Ahmad-Abad and Shamar blocks, which form part of the Afghan–Tajik oil and gas basin.

“The two-dimensional seismic survey of the Mohammad-Jan-Dagar block is of considerable technical importance, as it helps identify potential oil- and gas-bearing structures, reduce exploration risk and establish a reliable basis for decisions on subsequent drilling,” the report states. As of early autumn 2026, the ministry’s auditors found that the project was far from complete, remained “at the implementation stage” and had “serious shortcomings in planning, fieldwork management, reporting and the submission of key documents to the Ministry.”

An equally troubling situation has emerged at the Tuti-Maidan site, where, following their assessment of foreign contractors’ work, the ministry’s auditors warn of “serious technical, contractual, economic and reputational risks to the project”: “It is concerning that 2025 ended without key activities being completed, that the proposed work plan for 2026 has still not been approved by the Ministry, and that the company has not begun any tangible and verifiable practical work at the site this year. As a result, the project has effectively been suspended, while contractual and operational time is being consumed without any substantial technical results.”

Regarding well drilling at the Yatim-Tag site, the auditors’ assessment identified only “preliminary preparations, limited deliveries of equipment and some fieldwork,” which “cannot be regarded as the completion of technical operations.” “Actual completion is possible only with a comprehensive plan for each well, appropriate equipment, qualified personnel, the necessary chemicals, a well-control system, a safety plan, the execution of technical operations, post-completion testing and the preparation of a final report,” the auditors’ findings state. None of this had been done.

The Ministry of Mines and Petroleum’s document notes the absence of scientifically grounded reservoir management at the Zemurd-Say, Kashkari and Amu Darya production sites: “Increasing production without precise knowledge of reservoir pressure, associated gas volumes, water quantities, allowable well flow rates, paraffin conditions, crude oil quality, separator efficiency and the capacity of surface facilities may produce an apparent increase in output in the short term. In the medium term, however, it may lead to declining reservoir pressure, an increased water cut, reduced net oil output, damage to wells and a lower ultimate recovery factor.” The auditors state that hydrocarbon production in this strategically important oil and gas region of northern Afghanistan is currently based solely “on urgent and inadequately documented decisions.”

The prospects for effectively developing northern Afghanistan’s key oil and gas fields are currently uncertain, primarily because foreign contractors have effectively refused to fulfil their commitments. The Taliban ministry’s report states that “key activities for 2025 were not completed (by foreign partners), and the (foreign) company has not carried out practical work at the site this year.” Moreover, in an official letter dated February 27, 2026, the principal foreign contractor informed the Taliban government that it was halting work on all its projects in Afghanistan, citing “insecure conditions, extraordinary circumstances (force majeure) and external factors.”

It remains unclear how the Taliban regime plans to compensate for the loss of this important foreign contractor. The emirate lacks specialists of its own capable of ensuring the professional development of northern Afghanistan’s oil and gas fields. It could try to attract foreign partners, but there is no guarantee that, after a few months, they will not flee the country just as their predecessors did.

Meanwhile, the security situation in the country’s northern and eastern regions is deteriorating for the Taliban by the day: Afghan Resistance forces are now successfully attacking Taliban units and capturing some areas, albeit small ones for now. The armed anti-Taliban opposition may become even more active in the spring of 2027, in which case any serious economic projects in northern Afghanistan will have to be shelved for a long time.


Politics

Geopolitics

Second resistance

Religion

Subscribe

Terrorism

27-Sep-2026 By admin

TTP, or a Bomb for Oneself

The Historical Roots of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Current Crisis — Who Bears Responsibility?