What should think tanks in Russia, China, and Central Asia think about?
Author: Nurullah Valizada, especially for “Sangar”
ISIS* has claimed responsibility for the April 28 attacks against Shiites in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. Today (April 29) a terrorist attack in the west of Kabul claimed dozens of lives, and the exact number of victims is still unknown. Attacks in western Kabul have also been attributed to ISIS in the past.
The latest attacks follow the terrorist attacks that took place a few days ago in Kabul and Mazar. A series of these attacks could be the beginning of a new phase of security in Afghanistan. The Taliban* denies reaching this stage.
Since the perpetrators of today's attack in Kabul have not yet been identified, this article will focus on the analysis of yesterday's ISIS attack on the city of Mazar.
The ISIS attacks in Mazar-i-Sharif came after the Iranian media accused Marshal Dostum of involvement with ISIS in northern Afghanistan, claiming that Dostum received money from the British for this and that Turkey was collaborating with him. The accusation, which the party led by Marshall Dostum rejected and called a provocation.
Marshal Dostum has a long history of bloody battles with the Taliban and given his wide public and political influence among Uzbeks, it is unlikely that he would associate his name with the hated terrorist group ISIS. However, due to his presence in Turkey and his extensive relationship with it, Dostum's decisions are thought to be influenced to some extent by Turkey. Turkey has been repeatedly accused of supporting ISIS, and it is on this basis that many have concluded Marshall Dostum's relationship with ISIS.
The Taliban have a controversial position regarding the presence of ISIS in Afghanistan. In most cases, to show their control over the situation, the group downplays security incidents and denies the existence of ISIS. This Taliban approach has led many to attribute recent terrorist attacks to the Taliban. When there is no ISIS, then who arranges large-scale terrorist attacks in big cities?! The Taliban have no answer to this question.
The fact that most of the recent attacks have been directed against Shiites and Hazaras is also a matter of concern, suggesting that these attacks are aimed at creating a “new situation” for Afghanistan. A different vision of the situation emerged after the Taliban came to power, and the Taliban and their outside supporters do not want to tarnish it.
Afghan Hazaras and Shiites have good relations with Iran and one view is that ISIS, as an enemy of Iran, is attacking Iran's allies in Afghanistan. Relations between Iran and the Taliban, which were defined as friendly before the Taliban regained power (August 15, 2021), have changed sharply recently. Recently, although Iran has reportedly agreed to host Taliban diplomats, there have been reports that more Iranian troops have been sent to the Afghan border. This is some way shows that Iran does not have a clear idea of what it is going to do in Afghanistan in the long term, and therefore uses an ambivalent approach to the Taliban, which is interpreted as a policy of carrot and stick. The adoption of such a policy is tactical in nature and can be interpreted from the point of view of the "play for time" strategy.
Iran is looking for a security solution to protect its Shia and Hazara allies in Afghanistan and has offered cooperation to the Taliban, who have apparently been rejected by the Taliban. Sending loyal Fatimid forces to Iran that have successfully fought ISIS in Syria could be part of the Iranian package of offers to the Taliban that the Taliban are reluctant to accept for fear of increased Iranian influence. The Taliban fear that with the presence of the Fatimids, who are likely to move into the central and western regions, Iran's role in future events in Afghanistan will be highlighted and the Taliban will not be able to contain it. Of course, opposition to the presence of the Fatimids and emphasizing the role of Iran is something that Pashtuns strongly oppose on cultural grounds as well.
It is not clear what other options Iran has, but it is unlikely to remain silent in the face of growing threats to its allies in Afghanistan. Another option for Iran, which enjoys the approval and support of the people, is the support of the National Resistance Front led by Ahmad Massoud. Some quarters in the Iranian government support this approach and see it as helping to create better conditions in Afghanistan, and believe that this approach will guarantee Iran's strategic interests in Afghanistan.
During the first period of Taliban rule (2000-2005) in Afghanistan, Iran was a supporter of the anti-Taliban resistance front led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, but after 2001, when the Taliban declared war on the United States, Iran supported the Taliban and its connection with the Resistance Front was cut off. Now it seems that circles in Iran are seeking to revive the old relationship with the National Resistance Front. This is a case that causes the anger and discontent of the Taliban, and the tension between the Taliban and Iran depends on this cause. Of course, we should not forget that the Taliban have not forgotten about Iran's support for the anti-Taliban front in the past.
If we focus on the north, the statement about the involvement of Marshal Dostum with ISIS; the Release of Makhdum Alim, an Uzbek Taliban commander who was arrested on charges of links to ISIS; Marshal Dostum's willingness to fight the Taliban; Turkey's views on northern Afghanistan and its relationship with ISIS; Improving relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia; Turkey's concerns about reducing its influence in Afghanistan; Iranian-Turkish rivalry in Afghanistan; Good relations between Uzbek and Hazara leaders; The possibility of reviving the traditional front of the "Northern Alliance" through the political consensus of non-Pashtun ethnic leaders whose sphere of influence is the north; The formation of resistance cells in the north and northeast and the possibility of large-scale attacks against the Taliban, as well as the green light for the Taliban by Russia and China, and to some extent Iran, are among the issues surrounding the recent ISIS attacks in northern Afghanistan.
Each of these issues is a separate detailed discussion, but in the big picture, all these issues can be put together and find a logical connection between them that makes ISIS attacks in northern Afghanistan understandable in terms of its strategic framework.
The Taliban say they have the potential to destroy ISIS and are placating China, Russia, and Iran. The desire of these three countries to support the Taliban is linked to this confidence. Related to this confidence is the reluctance of the three countries to support the anti-Taliban forces. If the three countries can reach a consensus on Afghanistan, a powerful regional anti-American front will emerge. This front will consider the support of the Taliban as a factor of stability and tranquility in Afghanistan.
Given this calculation, it is likely that outside ISIS supporters are trying to refute the Taliban's claim of being able to destroy ISIS. With this assertion invalidated, the notion of stability in Afghanistan under Taliban rule is weakened, and the notion of pervasive instability is replaced by the fact that all countries must reconsider their previous calculations. Of course, as we said, this is one of several possibilities. There are other possibilities that are not considered here.
For Russia, China, and Iran, the violent and repressive nature of the Taliban is of little concern. These countries are repressive in their own right and seek greater security and police stability in the region. Russia temporarily does not want an escalation of the war in Afghanistan because of its participation in the war in Ukraine; China seeks peace and stability in Afghanistan to achieve its economic goals, while Iran fails to show serious interest in changing the balance of power in Afghanistan. As a result, these countries want peace in Afghanistan for the time being, even if the price of that peace is continued tyrannical rule by the Taliban.
So the scenario for Western countries, including the US, UK, Turkey, and other US allies, could be to prevent the same relative calm and stability that Russia, China, and Iran want in Afghanistan. This scenario could be exacerbated by an increase in ISIS attacks.
It should not be forgotten that the grounds for the expansion of ISIS activities in Afghanistan are more favorable than ever. One of the reasons is considered to be the aggressive and complex behavior of the Taliban and the policy of monopolizing power in a multinational society. Widespread poverty and unemployment have further worsened. Meanwhile, ISIS wants to recruit disgruntled Tajiks and Uzbeks and believes this is in line with the grand mission it has set for itself to infiltrate Central Asia.
On the other hand, ISIS is not the only thing that could challenge the Taliban's ability to control the situation. Various other political and military forces are emerging (including the National Resistance Front led by Ahmad Massoud), and these forces often lack strong external dependence, such as what can be said about ISIS, the strengthening or weakening of which depends on the decisions of the West or East. These forces consider themselves the main masters of Afghanistan whose national and religious duty is to overthrow the Taliban regime. These forces are expanding their activities and are seriously challenging the Taliban.
The ability of the Taliban to interact with opposition forces is also underestimated. Even the will and authority of this group to do so are in serious question. The Taliban are also considered weak in the face of multifaceted threats. Many believe that the "emptiness of space" and the "lack of a cohesive anti-Taliban force" allowed the group to take control of the country as a result of the internal and external conspiracy, rather than the superior fighting power.
Therefore, the validity of the belief of Russia, China, and Iran that the Taliban is strong and that the Taliban can bring peace and stability to Afghanistan is seriously questioned. Opposition to the Taliban has very deep historical and cultural roots, which cannot be reduced to the level of "confrontation of several armed and unarmed individuals and groups for political reasons and the desire for power." Of course, this is a mistake that think tanks in regional governments seem to have made.
If Russia, China, Iran, and the countries of Central Asia really want to protect their national security beyond spreading the influence of terrorist groups on their territory, they must rethink their understanding of Afghanistan and refrain from playing the multifaceted game with complex and dangerous events. They should adhere to a well-defined policy that is approved by the Afghan people and is in the interests of lasting peace and stability in that country. Otherwise, Afghanistan will again be involved in fierce wars that will affect all countries in the region. Blaming the US and NATO is also not the answer. Afghanistan needs to be looked at from within. Looking at Afghanistan through the mirror of competition of great powers is very harmful to the countries of the region.
*The organization is under UN sanctions for terrorist activities.
About the author:
Nurullah Valizada,
writer and
political commentator,
Afghanistan.
Lives in Tehran.
